

WORKSHOP 4 Enhancing Capacity Building for the Implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy—Focusing Mainly on the Experiences in Southeast Asia

17–18 June 2008 | Tokyo, Japan

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

These questions have been prepared by the organizers to help focus the workshop discussions. To this end, the moderator and panelists for each session are strongly encouraged to focus their remarks on addressing the relevant questions below, with a view to identifying concrete and practical steps that can be taken at the global, regional, and national levels to enhance the facilitation, delivery, and coordination of capacity-building activities related to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

I. Assessment of Strategy-Related Vulnerabilities and Capacity-Building Needs and the Role of the United Nations: Successes and Areas for Improvement

- What difficulties do the countries in Southeast Asia face in trying to assess their own vulnerabilities and needs?
- Are there effective mechanisms at the UN, regional, or national level for assessing these vulnerabilities and needs? Do they cover all pillars of the Strategy? Is there effective coordination and information sharing among these mechanisms to minimize overlap and maximize use of limited resources and expertise?
- What steps should be taken at the global, regional, and national levels to enhance assessment capabilities and mechanisms of matching needs and available assistance?
- What entity is best placed to assume a leading role in this area: the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED), or a regional body or mechanism? What should be the role of the Task Force in this area? Where does the comparative advantage of the United Nations lie in this area? Is there a division



of labor among the aforementioned actors to ensure that capacity-building needs are identified and prioritized across all pillars of the Strategy and that the needs are matched with appropriate assistance?

II. The Facilitation and Delivery of Capacity-Building Assistance on Strategy-Related Issues and the Role of the United Nations: Successes and Areas for Improvement

- What are some of the successes and areas for improvement in multilateral and bilateral efforts to facilitate and deliver Strategy-related capacity-building assistance?
- Are the capacity-building needs well matched with assistance from outside the region? What are some successful examples in this area and some reasons for success? What are some difficulties or problems in finding the appropriate assistance to meet the identified needs?
- Is this assistance being facilitated and delivered across all pillars of the Strategy? If not, which entities, either at the global, regional, or national level, could assume a leading role in filling this lacuna?
- For partner countries, what are the difficulties faced in the facilitation and delivery of capacity-building assistance? Is there any room for improvement in this area?
- For the United Nations and its relevant bodies, what are the difficulties faced in the facilitation and delivery of capacity-building assistance? Is there any room for improvement in this area?
- What steps should be taken at the global, regional, and national levels to enhance facilitation and delivery efforts?
- How can information concerning bilateral and regional efforts be better shared and coordinated with the United Nations to reduce duplication and increase efficiency among relevant stakeholders at all levels?
 - What is the appropriate role for the Task Force and its constituent entities?
 - What role could the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) play in helping to coordinate Strategy-related capacity-building efforts? Would enlarging the CTAG to include a broader range of bilateral and multilateral donors make it more effective?
- What steps could be taken to enhance the ability of the CTC/CTED to carry out its assistance facilitation role?
- Can the CTED play a more important role in supporting Strategy implementation efforts? For example, should the CTED be given the mandate for facilitating and coordinating the delivery of Strategy-related capacity-building activities?
- How can the United Nations improve on its efforts to reinforce ongoing bilateral and regional capacity-building efforts? What additional value does or can the United Nations bring to enhance such efforts?
- What should be the role of the Task Force in this area?
- Where does the comparative advantage of the CTC/CTED lie in a region where there is so much regional and bilateral capacity-building activity?



- Would UN effectiveness in this area be enhanced if it had a field presence to help coordinate the Strategy-related efforts in those regions or states requesting attention or if a forum existed at the regional level where the United Nations could meet with the relevant regional stakeholders and member states to develop a Strategy implementation plan and have annual follow-up meetings on what has been done and what more is needed?

III. The Role of Regional Bodies and Mechanisms in Providing and Facilitating the Delivery of Capacity-Building Assistance on Strategy-Related Issues: Successes and Areas for Improvement

- How can regional bodies and mechanisms contribute to providing and facilitating the delivery of capacity-building assistance on Strategy-related issues?
- What role have regional bodies and mechanisms played in this area so far? What are some of the successes and areas for improvement?
- What role could they play in providing and facilitating the delivery of assistance in areas related to Pillar I and/or Pillar IV of the Strategy?
- From the viewpoint of regional bodies and mechanisms, what are the difficulties faced in the facilitation and delivery of capacity-building assistance (e.g., the difficulties with regard to the relationship with donor and recipient countries and the relevant UN bodies)?
- What steps should be taken at the global, regional, and national level to enhance the capacity of regional bodies and mechanisms to contribute to Strategy-related capacity-building efforts?
- How can coordination and information sharing among these bodies and mechanisms be improved to minimize duplication of effort?
- Which regional mechanism(s) should assume a leading role in Southeast Asia?
- What good practices can be shared from other regions?

IV. The Provision and Coordination of Capacity-Building Assistance in the Key Areas of the Strategy and the Role of the United Nations: Successes and Areas for Improvement

- What efforts have been made at the global, regional, and national levels to coordinate capacity-building activities in each of the key areas of the Strategy (e.g., the ratification and implementation of the relevant UN conventions, judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, counterterrorist financing, deradicalization, the protection of human rights, and assistance related to promoting good governance and strengthening the rule of law)?
- What have been the successes and what opportunities exist for improvement in each of these areas? What steps should be taken at the global, regional, and national levels to enhance coordination in these areas? What is the appropriate role for the Task Force and its constituent entities?



- What efforts have been made at the global, regional, and national levels to ensure effective coordination of capacity-building activities across the different key areas of the Strategy? What have been the successes and what are the areas for improvement in this area?
- What steps should be taken at the global, regional, and national levels to enhance capacity-building coordination across the different pillars of the Strategy?
- How can coordination and cooperation between development and traditional counterterrorism capacity-building efforts be improved without compromising or politicizing development work and without diluting counterterrorism efforts?



WORKSHOP 4 Enhancing Capacity Building for the Implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy—Focusing Mainly on the Experiences in Southeast Asia

17–18 June 2008 | Tokyo, Japan

WORKSHOP SUMMARY

1. On 17 and 18 June 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Japan Institute of International Affairs hosted the fourth workshop in the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, which is being cosponsored by Turkey, Costa Rica, Japan, Slovakia, and Switzerland and supported by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. The workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, i.e., all discussion was off the record and not for attribution. The following summary reflects some of the highlights, themes, challenges, and recommendations identified during the meeting but is not an official or complete record of the proceedings and does not necessarily reflect the views of all the participants.

2. The aim of the fourth workshop was to allow for reflections on the earlier workshops and an opportunity to focus sustained attention on capacity building, which the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy recognizes as a “core element of the global counter-terrorism effort.” Although not intended to reach any definitive conclusions, the two-day event allowed some 40 experts representing states, multilateral bodies, and civil society to engage in a frank discussion of the role of states, regional bodies and mechanisms, and the United Nations in enhancing Strategy-related capacity building, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia. The workshop provided an excellent opportunity not only to reflect on the performance of these actors in assessing vulnerabilities and delivering and facilitating Strategy-related capacity-building assistance in the traditional and nontraditional counterterrorism areas, but to consider ways in which the overall effort could be strengthened.

3. Although the workshop focused on Southeast Asia, many of the issues raised were relevant to wider Strategy-related capacity-building efforts. Among the key themes highlighted were (1) the need to enhance horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation and identify a clear division of labor among the wide range of multilateral



and bilateral donors engaged in capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere both in the traditional (e.g., law enforcement and other security-related issues) and nontraditional (e.g., education, good governance, and development) counterterrorism fields, in particular the role of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), which is trying to strengthen its role in assessment of assistance needs and facilitation of assistance, and the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which is aiming to enhance coordination among all the related bodies, including non-traditional actors, in counterterrorism assistance; (2) the need to ensure that the Task Force is provided with the resources and mandate necessary for playing the role it can usefully play, adding value to the works of other related bodies; (3) the importance of deepening engagement between the United Nations and local and regional actors on Strategy-related capacity-building issues; (4) the need for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an organization to be given the mandate and resources to allow it to play a leading role in promoting Strategy implementation in the region and in facilitating engagement between the United Nations and countries in the region; (5) the importance of having the United Nations reinforce but not duplicate regional and bilateral capacity-building activities; and (6) the need to ensure that local and regional perspectives are adequately reflected in the work of UN entities engaged in Strategy-related activities.

Introduction: Summary and Reflections of Zurich, Bratislava, and Antalya Workshops

4. A number of ideas originally put forward at the three prior workshops in the International Process were enumerated as among those that would be considered at the final workshop in New York on 10–11 July. These ideas focused on (1) improving the coordination within the United Nations on a range of thematic areas addressed in the Strategy among entities involved in capacity building; (2) providing the Task Force with the necessary mandate and resources to ensure it has the capacity to carry out its coordination and information-sharing role more effectively; (3) finding ways to deepen the engagement between the Task Force and regional, subregional, and functional bodies and civil society, including by finding a forum at the regional level where the United Nations could meet with relevant regional stakeholders to develop a Strategy implementation plan; (4) finding more ways for states to engage with the Task Force; (5) connecting UN counterterrorism activities more directly to national counterterrorism coordinators and focal points; and (6) using the Strategy to further national efforts to develop holistic national counterterrorism strategies and deepen interagency cooperation.

5. Participants reiterated the importance of finding ways to get those UN actors that are involved in Pillar I issues more engaged in the work of the Task Force while remaining sensitive to the concerns of those that do not wish to be too closely associated with or have their ongoing work labeled as “counterterrorism.” In this regard, the goal should be trying to identify complementarities and synergies between the traditional and nontraditional counterterrorism actors and to encourage better coordination, including regular information sharing, among them.



6. It was argued that the Task Force should be at the center of the international effort to combat terrorism. It was also highlighted that providing it with the necessary resources to carry out its mandate should be at the top of the agenda going into the September 2008 review of the Strategy by the General Assembly, while another opinion offered that institutionalization of the Task Force should be considered within existing resources as stipulated in the Strategy. In addition, some called for finding or creating a forum to allow for more regular interaction between member states and the Task Force. The point was also made that there should be a mechanism to allow for proper coordination among UN bodies, programs, and funds to allow the United Nations to engage with regional, subregional, and functional bodies and member states on Strategy implementation issues. Absent such a mechanism, it was noted, the Strategy lacks the necessary grounding to become operationalized. Rather than such a permanent mechanism, it was suggested that a more flexible oversight mechanism is needed to guide the Task Force.

7. It was further mentioned that the September 2008 review is an opportunity for member states to provide the Task Force with direction regarding its future activities, something that is currently lacking.

8. Alternatively, the view was also expressed that the Task Force should remain a Secretary-General–run body and that states should not have a role in providing it with direction or oversight. Allowing member states to assume such a role, it was argued, risks placing the Task Force in a straitjacket and limiting the innovative work of which it is capable under its current loose structure.

I. Assessment of Strategy-Related Vulnerabilities and Capacity-Building Needs and the Role of the United Nations: Successes and Areas for Improvement

9. It was widely accepted that capacity building is a key element of the Strategy and that a holistic approach is needed to ensure that vulnerabilities are identified and addressed in the region before those gaps are further exploited by terrorists.

10. A number of examples of national and regional efforts in Southeast Asia to assess needs were provided. Discussions highlighted the following challenges and efforts and suggestions to overcome them:

- At the national level, effective coordination across government departments and agencies on a broad array of issues is required to ensure that vulnerabilities and needs are identified effectively. To this end, a number of Southeast Asian nations have established national coordination mechanisms and are beginning to address this issue. Examples were cited of instances where the CTED and bilateral partners, such as Australia, are working to improve interdepartmental coordination.
- Some countries in the region are among the least developed economies in the world. It was noted that only with the generous help of donors are some of these



countries even able to attend the relevant ASEAN meetings related to counterterrorism and other issues.

- The point was made that threat or vulnerability assessments by states in Southeast Asia are often undertaken purely from the perspective of the government. This approach can create tensions between the state and the public at large, suggesting the need to involve grassroots perspectives in developing national and regional assessments, including community-based ones to bridge that gap and garner greater buy-in from the public by showing an understanding of the practical needs of all stakeholders at the local level. There is a need for more independent local assessments that can present clear and actionable recommendations that can stimulate informed interaction with donors to meet priority needs on the ground.
- Academic studies that have been conducted on threats and vulnerabilities are not reaching or being absorbed by policymakers but should be.

11. It was also pointed out that the sharing of national assessments that identify and acknowledge vulnerabilities of individual states at the regional level remains difficult, largely due to the continuing relevance of the cherished norm of noninterference among ASEAN countries. Yet, it was also noted that individual ASEAN countries have partnered with donor countries outside the region to develop and implement counterterrorism capacity-building programs.

12. It was noted that it often takes too much time for discussion within ASEAN to translate into action when identifying needs and building capacity. It was pointed out that binding standard operating procedures are sometimes necessary to strengthen bilateral judicial cooperation and information sharing in the field of counterterrorism but they are difficult to achieve while sensitivity to issues of sovereignty and noninterference remains an overarching concern among member states. It was also pointed out that this dynamic is slowing down the fulfilment of the creation of an ASEAN Security Community.

13. It was suggested that a UN focal point in the region was needed to work with existing regional partners, such as ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum, and help transport Strategy implementation into a local context and make it more in tune with priorities on the ground. It was pointed out, however, that before identifying such a focal point, more attention should be focused on improving the cooperation and coordination among the three Security Council counterterrorism-related bodies and their expert groups, which still lag considerably.

14. It was also suggested that, in order for the United Nations to be able to engage more effectively in the region, the ASEAN Secretariat will need to be provided the mandate and resources to become a reliable partner.

15. The need to develop an inventory of the myriad Strategy-related capacity-building activities in ASEAN was highlighted as a priority. This development would help to reduce duplication and allow countries in the region and donors to more clearly identify the priority gaps.

16. The importance of building trust and confidence among experts in the region was also highlighted as a priority, which would lead to the sort of informal exchanges of information needed to overcome the reluctance to share at the official level. Regional capacity-building workshops were cited as excellent vehicles for doing this.

17. The United Nations needs to have a better understanding of local conflicts and other contextual issues in the region if it wants to be able to work effectively and enhance its credibility on Strategy-related issues with ASEAN countries. For their part, ASEAN countries need to share information and otherwise communicate more regularly with the CTED and other relevant members of the Task Force in New York.

18. It was noted that, at the end of the day, the key to implementation of the Strategy is national action. The Task Force can contribute most effectively to national implementation when it has a good understanding of what each country perceives to be its priority needs, where there is local ownership of capacity-building efforts, and where a regional organization is working to reinforce national efforts.

19. It was also noted that UN bodies such as the CTED, which have limited resources and expertise on the region, should focus more on linking up with the regional actors in Southeast Asia to avoid duplication and maximize use of these resources.

20. More broadly, there is need for the United Nations to more clearly identify its comparative advantages in a region that already receives so much bilateral donor attention and where the CTED is starting to work on assessment and matching. It was pointed out that the Task Force should play a complementary role and identify how it can best contribute to building Strategy-related capacity without being too idealistic. It was also suggested that given the political sensitivities surrounding counterterrorism cooperation within ASEAN, it might be easier for the UN Development Programme and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), two bodies not clearly identified with counterterrorism, to develop Strategy-related projects with the ASEAN Secretariat.

II. The Facilitation and Delivery of Capacity-Building Assistance on Strategy-Related Issues and the Role of the United Nations: Successes and Areas for Improvement

21. With respect to the CTED, it was noted that although it has the necessary tools to conduct needs and vulnerability assessments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, it has been struggling with facilitating the delivery of technical assistance. It was pointed out that the new technical assistance strategy it will soon present to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) for its approval will aim to address some of its shortcomings to date and structural limitations.

22. Rather than trying to be everything to everyone, the CTED should seek to get involved in a few targeted areas but to do the job right. It should limit itself to countries where it has the necessary information to provide needs assessments with the required



specificity so as to make them useful to donors. Further, the CTED needs to develop closer links with UN actors on the ground as well as gain a better understanding of the different donor interests and expand its donor engagement.

23. The importance of identifying the CTED's comparative advantage was also stressed, with a view to minimizing the overlap with other UN activities and regional and bilateral programs. Three such advantages identified were engaging on remedial capacity-building activities, where existing donor engagement is limited; providing the UN stamp of approval; and offering a macroscopic overview of capacity gaps.

24. It was also pointed out that some countries in Southeast Asia have been reluctant to work with the CTED on an ongoing basis and to use CTED assessments to inform their counterterrorism policy development. Ideally, the states and ASEAN and other regional bodies and mechanisms could rely on these assessments more.

25. Participants discussed the pros and cons of providing the CTED with a mandate to support wider Strategy implementation efforts and the work of the Task Force. It was suggested that there is a need to transform the CTED into a mechanism that member states can more widely accept. Some cautioned against giving it a broader role, noting that, as a Security Council body, it is probably not well placed to assume one. Attention, it was argued, should instead be placed on further improving the effectiveness of the CTED and other existing mechanisms. Resources of the CTED and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) could be harnessed to support the work of the Task Force, for example, in particular the activities of its integrated implementation working group, which is due to conduct pilot projects in two countries.

26. Nevertheless, it was asserted that existing mechanisms need to be adapted to the new situation that now exists following the adoption of the Strategy, in a manner that appeals to all member states.

27. Participants also reflected on some of the lessons learned as a result of UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch's (TPB) criminal justice-related delivery of technical assistance, the effectiveness of which depends on the ability to generate local ownership. This effort requires in-depth knowledge and experience in the local legal and criminal justice system, striking the right balance between applying global standards and respecting the local legal system and adopting a comprehensive approach in terms of criminal justice reform, respecting human rights, and promoting the rule of law.

28. The participants recognized the importance of deepening engagement between the United Nations and local and regional actors on Strategy-related capacity-building issues.

- Rather than establishing a local presence for the CTED or the Task Force, however, it was suggested that efforts be made to identify an existing UN actor in a particular country or region to serve as a focal point for discussing these issues.
- Another way to deepen such engagement, as well as to promote the whole government approach to counterterrorism that is embodied in the Strategy, is for each country to appoint a national focal point for Strategy implementation. Such focal points would have an overview of national counterterrorism efforts,



broadly speaking. The Task Force or one of its entities, such as UNODC, could provide a platform where focal points could meet to share information and experiences on Strategy-related issues.

- Further, it was recommended that both member states and regional bodies become more involved in the work of the Task Force, including via invitations to participate in its work.

29. There was also discussion of the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue, which was mentioned as an example of an effective regional framework for discussing and embarking on concrete capacity-building projects, which enhance regional counterterrorism capabilities.

30. It was stressed that one of the keys to effective counterterrorism capacity building is the existence of the necessary political will on the part of the recipient country. In some cases, building this will requires raising awareness of the threat and vulnerabilities in the particular country or region.

31. Finally, participants noted that most of the Strategy-related capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia have so far focused on the traditional counterterrorism areas, i.e., law enforcement and other security-related issues, where bilateral donors and the CTED have been most active. In addition to finding ways to engage with a range of UN and other actors involved in capacity building in the nontraditional areas, more attention should be given to enhancing the coordination between traditional and non-traditional counterterrorism actors. It was noted that, in nontraditional areas, identification of assistance needs is more difficult. The suggestion was made for the United Nations to stimulate information and experience sharing among these actors at the country or regional level.

III. The Role of Regional Bodies and Mechanisms in Providing and Facilitating the Delivery of Capacity-Building Assistance on Strategy-Related Issues: Successes and Areas for Improvement

32. Examples of successful capacity-building programs in Southeast Asia were noted, including the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, which, through funding from the Australian government and others, has conducted more than 100 courses for more than 3,000 participants from 17 countries, and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which has focused on common concerns about threats to member economies, including cyberterrorism and potential threats to the food supply. Further, it was pointed out that the APEC forum plays an important role by offering an opportunity for leaders at the highest level from around the Pacific Rim to engage on counterterrorism issues.

33. It was noted that ASEAN has strengths through the diversity of its membership and its desire to look outward in order to cultivate trade partnerships for its exports and it often acknowledges that it needs help from others to build its capacity. This characteristic could be built on to further capacity building on an array of Strategy-related issues



34. It was pointed out that, in the context of promoting the Strategy, ASEAN has recognized the relevant UN counterterrorism resolutions and is putting pressure, albeit nonbinding, on its members to make headway on ratifying the relevant UN conventions. ASEAN could be doing more to address Pillars I and IV of the Strategy. Moreover, the establishment of a “People’s ASEAN” offers an opportunity for wider stakeholder participation from civil society that could help to further Strategy implementation at the community level.

35. The important work by the CTED in the region, including providing valuable input to the development of an ASEAN plan of action to implement its Convention on Counter Terrorism, was cited. It was suggested, however, that the Task Force could help ASEAN develop its own framework for addressing regional Strategy-related needs across all four pillars.

36. The point was made that, in order for the Task Force to be able to engage more effectively with ASEAN, the ASEAN Secretariat must be given the mandate and resources to work with the Task Force. It was suggested that donor countries could provide these resources, just as they support the counterterrorism activities of some regional bodies in Africa.

37. During the time it will take for the ASEAN Secretariat to build its capacity, it was suggested that a more informal step could be taken to build more support for Strategy implementation efforts in the region and to ensure effective coordination and cooperation among the wide range of relevant UN and regional stakeholders. Specifically, an individual state in the region would convene a regional Strategy implementation meeting, with donor support and under the auspices of ASEAN, to which all of the key stakeholders, including the Task Force, would be invited, and where a regional Strategy implementation plan, along with a division of labor, could be developed.

38. The need for more transparent and efficient information sharing was highlighted. It was noted that terrorists have often communicated and cooperated efficiently to coordinate attacks. At the same time, factors such as the preference for a national approach among ASEAN members, the reluctance to communicate among peers across the region, and the confidentiality of CTED country reports are hindering the pace of crucial counterterrorism data-exchange efforts within and between countries in the region.

39. Finally, working with nongovernmental research centers and networks, such as the Council for Asian Terrorism Research, which regularly convenes leading experts with access to data on vulnerabilities and capacity gaps, was cited as an example where policy-relevant information is available to Strategy-related stakeholders in the region. In order to enhance their ability to produce more-credible needs assessments, it was suggested that the relevant Task Force entities not only be provided with this information but engage more directly with nongovernmental organizations on the ground.

IV. The Provision and Coordination of Capacity-Building Assistance in the Key Areas of the Strategy and the Role of the United Nations: Successes and Areas for Improvement

40. The importance of enhanced coordination and cooperation within the UN system to operationalize the linkages among development, peace, security, and human rights that are reflected in the Strategy was stressed. It was also noted that the United Nations has a role to play in serving not only as a clearinghouse for the exchange of information but as a platform for member states to overcome challenges faced in capacity building.

41. The role of the CTED as a facilitator of capacity-building assistance received attention. It was noted that the CTED is seeking to move from playing a more passive role in this area, where it has traditionally relied on cataloging donors' profiles and recipients' needs on its Web site, to a more proactive one. Examples cited of the new approach include:

- The October 2007 fifth special meeting of the CTC with international, regional, and subregional organizations where the CTED focused on a specific thematic issue: the strengthening of border controls. Workshop participants highlighted the importance of ensuring that the CTED and relevant organizations take the necessary action to follow up on what is contained in the action plan adopted at the conclusion of that meeting. The July 2007 informal meeting convened by the CTED in New York brought together relevant donor states to discuss the needs of a particular region: West Africa. The point was made that although such a meeting is a step in the right direction, the New York discussions need to be translated into action in the field. To this end, the importance of convening relevant stakeholders in the region itself was emphasized.
- Development of a more productive relationship with the Group of Eight's Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG). These efforts are focused on providing the CTAG with more timely and relevant analysis of county or regional needs and priorities to allow the donor group to focus on particular countries, regions, or themes. The CTAG, particularly if its practice of convening local CTAG meetings is reinvigorated, offers an opportunity for enhanced donor coordination on the ground and stronger synergies with the CTED. Participants welcomed the efforts to reinvigorate the CTAG.
- However, in order to make the CTAG's work more relevant, it was suggested that consideration be given to expanding its mandate beyond the narrow law enforcement and other security-related issues being addressed by the CTED and covered under Resolution 1373 to include the broader set of issues covered by the Strategy where enhanced coordination and cooperation among donors is needed. The view was expressed that although in theory this idea made sense, in practice it might be difficult to implement because the current CTAG representatives may not have the expertise in the broader set of issues covered by the Strategy.
- In addition, it was suggested that the CTAG membership be expanded to include all of the major counterterrorism donor countries.

42. The CTED's work in the field of countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) was discussed. It was reported that the CTED is mindful not to duplicate the work that the



Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the leader in this field, is undertaking. In terms of Southeast Asia, it was noted that the CTED is working with the Asian Development Bank to encourage it to become a more active donor on issues related to Resolution 1373 and is trying to devise an understanding with the CTC on how to share information and experiences with the The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the relevant FATF regional-style body. Despite these efforts, the point was made that there remains a need for improved coordination among the different entities undertaking assessments of national CFT efforts. For example, it was noted that one country in Southeast Asia received separate and, in some instances, incompatible assessments from the CTED and APG, which created confusion among experts in the capital.

43. Participants discussed the role of UNODC's TPB in delivering technical assistance related to the ratification and implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, now numbering 16. It was reported that TPB has carried out 30 national training workshops already this year and plans to hold 30 more before the end of the year. The concrete results from all of TPB's national and regional workshops and regional meetings of ministers of justice are considerable. For example, there have been more than 400 new ratifications of the relevant instruments, and 48 of the 80 countries to which TPB provided bilateral assistance now have counterterrorism legislation in place. With respect to the useful regional meetings of ministers of justice that TPB convenes to discuss the ratification and implementation of the universal instruments, it was suggested that these fora be used to discuss the wider set of criminal justice reform issues contained in the Strategy.

44. Despite TPB's successes so far, challenges remain. For example, it was noted that no country has yet to ratify all 16 universal instruments, although Switzerland is expected to do so soon. In addition, only 98 countries have ratified all 12 of the original instruments. Thus, more legislative drafting assistance is needed. Further, additional specialized training of criminal justice officials to implement the conventions is required. To this end, TPB is interested in launching a systematic and more comprehensive training program in 10 pilot countries. In addition, the point was made that TPB and the CTED should be mindful not always to equate the ratification of the universal instruments with the ability to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorists and engage in international legal cooperation in terrorism cases. In some cases, it noted, governments have the necessary legal tools in place despite not having joined a number of the universal instruments.

45. Participants discussed the planned activities of the Task Force working group on integrated implementation of the Strategy, which is intended to offer "one-stop shopping" for countries interested in receiving assistance from the United Nations in implementing the Strategy. It is intended to complement the work of individual Task Force entities and take into account the needs assessments already undertaken by them. The group has received requests from two countries and will undertake a mapping of ongoing and planned capacity-building activities in each one. The working group has developed an automated information-exchange system that will compile all of the information submitted by Task Force members regarding their previous and ongoing work with the country at issue. Although this system was welcomed, a question was raised about ensuring not only the accuracy of the information provided, but that the infor-



mation is obtained across all four pillars of the Strategy to ensure a truly integrated UN response to the country concerned.

46. With regard to the Task Force working groups as a whole, the importance of minimizing the overlap between these activities and the work of the CTED and its new thematic working groups was stressed. (For example, each has one on terrorist financing.) The point was made that increased CTED participation in the Task Force, which has been endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 1805, will help maximize the synergies between the Task Force and CTED. It was also suggested, however, that the most effective way to minimize the overlap would be to provide the CTED with the mandate to service both the Task Force and its working groups and the CTC. Thus, there would no longer be any need for separate CTED and Task Force working groups. This task could be accomplished, for example, by making the CTED an office or department in the secretariat.

47. Participants recognized that the Task Force will be needed after the September 2008 General Assembly review, as there remains a need for some entity to coordinate the Strategy-related work of the UN system. It is up to member states to come up with ideas for ensuring the Task Force has the necessary resources and mandate to allow it to play this coordinating role most effectively. States should be open-minded, it was argued, about how to do this. Finding ways in which CTED resources could be used to support the Task Force would be a good start.

48. It was also suggested that the General Assembly mandate the Task Force to serve as a centralized registry via a password-protected Web site for all UN counterterrorism programs. In such a role, the Task Force could challenge all of its members to register their ongoing individual and joint programs, specifying in what particular countries these programs are ongoing. The countries could then verify the accuracy of this information and inform that Task Force of the name of their chosen national Strategy-related focal point.

49. The work of the UN Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) received attention. UNAFEI, it was reported, offers training courses and seminars on crime prevention and criminal justice for experts and officials, including from Southeast Asia. As a result of its work, it has identified a number of challenges to more effective legal cooperation between states in Southeast Asia, including the refusal of a request for international legal cooperation because of the nonexistence of a treaty, the lack of dual criminality in relevant national laws, the continued use of the political offense exception, and the failure to make the criminal activity in question an extraditable offense. A number of suggestions were made for overcoming these obstacles, including revising national laws, adopting more bilateral treaties, and ratifying the universal legal instruments, which have clauses that would address these shortcomings. In addition, the importance of building a network of legal and other law enforcement experts among countries in Southeast Asia as a means to building trust was cited as essential to improving the information sharing and other practical cooperation that is needed.



50. Participants discussed the activities of the Task Force working group on radicalization, emphasizing that the process of radicalization is a complex interaction of factors that do not necessarily lead to violence and that not every radical becomes a terrorist. The working group is setting out to map the measures being taken in various countries and regions to prevent radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. The process, which has been ongoing since January 2008, will culminate in a report that will be submitted to the Secretary-General by the end of July 2008 and made available to states upon their request at the end of August.

51. It was pointed out that a number of states in Southeast Asia have developed effective “deradicalization” programs and activities, from which countries from outside the region could learn. The United Nations, it was asserted, can help facilitate and encourage not only the development of regional capacity, but the cross-regional sharing of information and experiences as well, which it is attempting to do through the Task Force’s radicalization working group.

52. It was suggested that after September, assuming member states decide that the Task Force and its working groups should continue to operate, this working group could carry out joint activities with states, regional organizations, and civil society with a view to undertaking two case studies on radicalization and good practices on deradicalization in two countries or regions. At a minimum, such an approach will foster greater consideration of radicalization and deradicalization issues with a more regional perspective, as well as encourage the development of regional work programs that address these issues based on local knowledge of the complex politico-socioeconomic issues germane to the region. The point was also made that because addressing violent radicalization requires a wide range of measures that cut across all four pillars of the Strategy, these studies could offer a clear sense of how the implementation of the Strategy can be operationalized at the national level across these pillars.

53. The participants agreed that quality education is a crucial component of any effective long-term strategy to counterterrorism. In this regard, it was noted that UNESCO is seeking to increase existing programs for strengthening the capacities of educational systems worldwide to integrate human rights education, internationally shared values, conflict prevention, and critical thinking into every aspect of these systems, including the development of curriculum standards, the training of teachers, and the approval of school textbooks. To this end, UNESCO is working with its member states to (1) update and revise education and cultural policies to reflect a human rights–based approach, cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, and sustainable development; (2) ensure quality education to foster a climate of tolerance and security; (3) facilitate teacher training and the revision of textbooks and curricula to help ensure the removal of hate messages, distortions, prejudice, and negative bias from textbooks and other educational media; and (4) ensure basic knowledge and understanding of the world’s main cultures, civilizations, and religions.

54. Participants recognized that many ongoing UNESCO activities are furthering the implementation of the Strategy and encouraged UNESCO to become more actively involved in the work of the Task Force without necessarily giving these activities a “counterterrorism” label. In addition, participants recognized the importance of more field-



based engagement among the relevant Task Force members, with a view to developing region- or country-specific projects relevant to the implementation of the Strategy. The point was also made that it might be more effective in some cases to provide UNESCO with the funds to implement a counterterrorism-related capacity-building project in the field of education rather than implementing it through a national development agency. It was also suggested that UNESCO and other nontraditional actors be further encouraged to participate in CTED visits so that Task Force members can enhance coordination at the local level.

Next Steps

55. At the end of the workshop, it was announced that the Government of Switzerland will be hosting the final workshop in the International Process on 10–11 July 2008 in New York, which will provide an opportunity for the participants to consider the range of proposals for strengthening the implementation of the Strategy that have been put forward during the International Process. It was announced that these proposals will be included in a paper to be circulated to the participants in the July workshop by 30 June 2008. This paper will then form the basis for discussion in July. The paper will be revised following the workshop and submitted to the cosponsors of the International Process for their consideration, with a view to presenting it at or around the time of the September 2008 General Assembly review of the Strategy.



FINAL WORKSHOP **Enhancing Implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

10–11 July 2008 | New York

PROPOSALS TO CONSIDER

Although member states have the primary responsibility to take measures to prevent and respond to terrorism, the United Nations nevertheless has a central role to play in what must be a global effort. The adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the creation of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force are significant achievements in that regard. Further advances in coordination and coherence in the overall UN effort and greater engagement with counterterrorism experts in the field could lead to increased effectiveness. So too could a greater reflection in the work of the United Nations of differing local and regional threat perceptions, vulnerabilities, and needs. The first formal review of the Strategy in September 2008 offers an opportunity for member states to address some of these issues and more clearly identify the role that the United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies, civil society, and, most importantly, states can play in furthering implementation of the Strategy.

The purpose of the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, which is being cosponsored by Switzerland, Costa Rica, Japan, Slovakia, and Turkey, was to provide an opportunity for frank and open, off-the-record discussion among a broad array of states from the global North and South and other relevant Strategy stakeholders focused on assessing the overall UN contributions to the fight against terrorism over the past seven years and identifying ways to make its institutions more relevant to national and regional counterterrorism efforts and better able to support implementation of the Strategy. Throughout this process, participants put forward a wide range of concrete proposals aimed at advancing implementation of the Strategy, many of which will be further considered at the final workshop in the International Process on 10–11 July 2008.

This paper reflects recommendations identified during the workshops held in the International Process. As the workshops were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, the contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of countries and organizations to which the participants of the workshops belong.



This paper, which will serve as the basis for discussion at the final workshop, identifies a number of these proposals for consideration under each of the agenda items on the first day of the workshop. These proposals are not mutually exclusive. Some could be implemented in the short, medium, or long term. Some require a decision to be taken or resolution to be adopted by an intergovernmental body; others only require action to be taken at the national level.

This paper will be revised to take into account the discussions at the final workshop and then submitted to the cosponsors by the middle of July for their consideration. The final form and content of the paper will, in the end, be for the cosponsors of the International Process to decide.

I. The Role of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and Its Constituent Entities in Supporting Implementation of the Strategy: Coordination, Cooperation, and Capacity Building

1. There remains a need to improve the coordination (e.g., information sharing, division of labor, and integration of programs) and cooperation on a range of thematic areas addressed in the Strategy among relevant entities involved in Strategy-related capacity-building work in the traditional (e.g., law enforcement and other security-related) and nontraditional (e.g., education and dialogue and deradicalization) counterterrorism fields. In the traditional fields, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) has been playing a central role, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has also been providing assistance in legal areas. On the other hand, the Task Force should play a role in more closely engaging wider UN bodies working in areas relevant to the traditional fields and those working in the nontraditional fields so that the Strategy can be implemented in a balanced way.

2. With respect to the Task Force, its role should be continuously examined on the basis of the value it can usefully add. The options for enhancing its effectiveness might include:

- Providing it with the necessary resources to ensure that it can carry out its coordination and information-sharing role more effectively over the longer term and that it has the capacity to support the work of its various working groups.
 - This task could be accomplished, for example, through voluntary contributions or through reallocation of resources within the existing UN regular budget. One could also ask the CTED to second to the Task Force one or two experts on a rotating basis to provide support to the Task Force's capacity-building activities.
 - More significantly, the CTED mandate could be adjusted to allow it to service both the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Task Force, with the CTED becoming the body within the United Nations responsible for coordinating and facilitating the delivery of Strategy-related assistance. A more far-reaching step could involve transforming the CTED into a UN secretariat office or department and combining the CTED thematic working groups with those of the Task Force.



- Recommending that all of the individual members of the Task Force, in particular those that have as yet proven reluctant to engage on the Strategy, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), take policy decisions at the headquarters level to actively support its implementation.
- Recommending that the Task Force focus more attention on raising awareness of the Strategy outside of New York and beyond member states' foreign ministries and providing it with the resources to do so, for example, by providing information about the various Task Force working groups and other pertinent Strategy-related updates on its Web site.
- Ensuring member states provide the Task Force with clear direction as to the issues on which it should focus its attention. For example, the Task Force could be asked to:
 - Focus increased attention on its working group on “Facilitating the Integrated Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”; and
 - Establish a working group on good governance and development to ensure more attention is paid to Pillar I issues and another working group on international legal cooperation to focus more attention on helping states overcome the legal and other obstacles to more effective judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance in this field.
- Having the Task Force develop concrete, nonbinding recommendations in a number of working group activities to promote counterterrorism “solutions.” These recommendations could be modeled on those issued by the Financial Action Task Force.
- Identifying a lead entity within the United Nations to promote a packaged multi-stakeholder approach to needs assessments and other essential elements of capacity-building assistance and mandate it to create a centralized online registry (password protected if need be) for all Strategy-relevant programs in each region and country. A similar effort appears to be under way via the working group on “Facilitating the Integrated Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” which is being led by the Executive Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, UNODC, and the CTED.
- Appointing a full-time Task Force chairperson.

3. There must be more active engagement from those UN entities involved in promoting good governance and the rule of law to achieve greater coordination in this area. Relevant UN agencies should share concrete projects that align with the Strategy in a common, user-friendly database managed by the Task Force, with a view to devising project collaborations among the different actors without necessarily identifying the project as counterterrorism per se.

4. UN efforts to promote a human rights–based approach to counterterrorism should be enhanced, including by:

- Reinforcing the support of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) for the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism;



- Including human rights expertise on CTED site visits and UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) training courses;
- Encouraging short-term exchanges of experts between the human rights and counterterrorism arms of the United Nations; and
- Increasing the CTC/CTED's human rights focus, including by enumerating those rights that are nonderogable in the fight against terrorism.

5. It is recommended that the CTC/CTED should:

- Explain its work in the context of the Strategy, particularly by indicating to states why better coordination across agencies and departments is important not only for implementing Resolution 1373 but also for implementing the Strategy in a holistic manner across all four of its pillars;
- Continue to strengthen its cooperation and on-the-ground engagement with states, other parts of the UN system regional bodies, and other stakeholders, including by moving some of its New York-based staff into the field where appropriate and institutionally possible;
- Make its assessments and other analytical work more easily accessible to non-CTC members, regional organizations, and nongovernmental experts;
- Convene regional meetings and workshops in the field that bring together practitioners from the relevant countries and, where appropriate, current and potential donors;
- Gain a better understanding of the different donor interests and expand its donor engagement;
- Share information and consult more with non-Security Council members;
- Invite key donor and recipient countries that are not on the council to relevant CTC meetings and more generally give them an opportunity as potential donors and recipients to provide more input and identify gaps that are not currently being identified or filled;
- Provide a comprehensive and regularly updated survey of capacity-building programs, which would help increase efficiency and avoid duplication; and
- Broaden its concept of relevant capacity-building programs that could be shared with states (e.g., to include those related to deradicalization).

6. It is recommended that UNODC's TPB should:

- Provide unified training to law enforcement and other criminal justice officials in often underresourced countries on how to implement the various UN terrorism, transnational organized crime, money laundering, and corruption instruments, rather than offering separate programs, so as to maximize the synergies among the different thematic areas and better reflect the links between terrorism and other crime;
- Develop and implement a comprehensive program to train law enforcement and other criminal justice officials in all interested countries on the implementation of the universal legal instruments against terrorism at the national level;
- Increase its field presence, and
- Expand its efforts to convene regional meetings of ministers of justice to all regions and use these fora to discuss the wider set of criminal justice reform issues



in the Strategy, i.e., not limiting them to the universal legal instruments against terrorism.

7. It is recommended that the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) should:

- Do more to ensure that information concerning the growing number of initiatives at the local, national, subregional, regional, and global levels aimed at promoting interreligious and cultural dialogue is shared;
- Encourage its regional offices to communicate and coordinate with other Task Force members in the region to enhance implementation of the Strategy on the ground;
- Identify a range of concrete UNESCO-sponsored, -funded, or -facilitated initiatives around the world that relate to the Strategy and place this information on the Task Force's Web site as UNESCO good practices that contribute to the implementation of the Strategy; and
- Nominate a single focal point within its secretariat to represent the organization at each Task Force meeting, spearhead UNESCO's participation in the relevant working groups, and serve as a repository for UNESCO Strategy-related activities gathered from its various field offices, institutes, and centers.

8. It is recommended that UNDP should:

- Deepen its engagement with the Task Force, including through active participation in its working group on "Facilitating the Integrated Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy" and its Strategy-related interactions with Task Force entities in the field;
- Contribute to CTED activities, including by participating in its field visits and sharing with the CTED on a regular basis relevant information on UNDP's rule of law, crisis prevention, and other activities relevant to the implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1624; and
- Seek to ensure that counterterrorism elements are integrated into national development strategies.

II. The Role of Regional and Functional Bodies and Civil Society in Implementing the Strategy and Engagement With the United Nations

9. States should be encouraged to instruct their representatives in each relevant inter-governmental body to push for a more coordinated and integrated vertical and horizontal approach to Strategy implementation.

10. It is recommended that each relevant regional and subregional body should:

- Formally endorse the Strategy and develop its own plan for implementing it;
- Ensure that its secretariat has the mandate and resources to engage with its member states and the United Nations on Strategy issues; donor countries could provide the necessary resources;
- Approach the Task Force and its representative entities directly to articulate the vulnerabilities, needs, and priorities of their members;



- Identify which Task Force entities should be pulled in to engage the relevant countries on Strategy implementation issues; and
- Establish regional and subregional Strategy implementation task forces, with the relevant regional or subregional body serving as the focal point for engagement with the United Nations in New York and with relevant Task Force members in the region.

11. The United Nations could meet with the relevant regional body and member states, preferably in the relevant region, to develop a Strategy implementation action plan and could have a follow-up meeting each year on what has been done and what more is needed. The existing UNODC mechanism, where it discusses criminal justice issues with regional bodies and governments, could be used for this purpose.

12. The outreach efforts of the Task Force and its constituent entities should be carefully coordinated to avoid overlap and duplication. To this end, consideration should be given to centralizing outreach efforts within the Task Force.

13. With respect to the Security Council counterterrorism-related bodies:

- The CTED should be encouraged to promote its work, including its interaction with states in the context of the Strategy.
- The CTED should continue to become more proactive in identifying opportunities in which to work with regional and subregional bodies and mechanisms. These efforts might enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the CTED in the region and lead to more engagement with national counterterrorism officials on the ground.
- The council counterterrorism-related bodies should engage with regional bodies in a single channel on technical assistance issues where appropriate.

14. The Task Force should be mandated to assist and otherwise engage with regional and subregional bodies and other nonstate stakeholders. For example, it is recommended that the Task Force:

- Invite these bodies to become more involved in the activities of its working groups and consult regularly with them to inform them of its work and invite some regional bodies to become full members of the Task Force. Thus, the original purpose of the Task Force, which was limited to coordination within the United Nations, should be revisited.
- Establish region-focused working groups to engage with interested regions on implementation of the Strategy. Such working groups could (1) develop or stimulate the development of country- or region-specific projects aimed at promoting Strategy implementation, which donors could then fund; (2) promote partnerships between the relevant Task Force working groups and regional and subregional bodies and civil society; and (3) articulate clearly what roles the different stakeholders in each region might play in contributing to implementation, outlining a division of labor in the “hard” and “soft” areas of the Strategy.
- Appoint one of its members to serve as the Task Force focal point in each region with a view to working with existing regional partners and helping transport Strategy implementation into a local context and attune it with priorities on the ground.



15. Member states and the Task Force should clearly articulate the ways in which civil society groups can help further Strategy implementation and how these actors can benefit from such involvement and should provide more opportunities for civil society groups to engage with the member states, regional and subregional bodies, and the Task Force and its constituent entities on Strategy implementation issues.

16. Ensure effective engagement with functional issues related to the Strategy, including with those bodies not represented on the Task Force; engagement should not be at the expense of the core work of those bodies. Achieving this goal will require ensuring that experts within these functional bodies have sufficient information concerning how the Task Force operates and how their body might be able to contribute to the implementation of the Strategy.

III. Engagement Between the United Nations and States in Implementing the Strategy

17. There is a need for more formal and informal ways for member states to engage with the Task Force.

18. Member states should become more proactive in reaching out to the Task Force, for example, by organizing themselves around a thematic issue of common interest and seeking to engage with the relevant Task Force working group. Emphasis should be placed on developing a cross-regional coalition of states on certain issues.

19. UN counterterrorism activities need to be connected more directly to national counterterrorism coordinators and focal points. The United Nations should provide a forum for these coordinators and focal points to engage with each other. For example, coordinators/focal points could meet two to three times a year to discuss Strategy-related implementation efforts, capacity needs, and available assistance programs. These meetings, which could include representatives from regional, subregional, and functional bodies, could be organized by members states and the Task Force and alternate among different UN headquarters around the world (e.g., New York, Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, and Bangkok).

20. Efforts should be made to devolve much of the United Nations' counterterrorism work down to the regional and local level, including by placing UN counterterrorism experts in UN regional and country offices, with the consent of the relevant state(s), or in regional or subregional body secretariats.

21. The United Nations needs to develop a more integrated approach to Strategy implementation by UN actors at the country, subregional, and regional levels.

22. Opportunities for donor participation in Strategy-related capacity-building activities and policymaking should be expanded. Suggestions might include the idea that the CTC could hold region- and thematic-focused meetings and invite relevant non-Security Council members.



23. The Task Force and its relevant entities should focus more attention on trying to address the various obstacles to more effective interstate legal cooperation in terrorism matters.

- The CTC/CTED could do more to promote greater awareness of the problems states are facing in this field, work with the help of donors to address any capacity gaps, and report instances of political unwillingness to engage in judicial cooperation or provide mutual legal assistance, including failures to apply the “extradite or prosecute” principle, to the Security Council.
- The United Nations could further develop and maintain communication channels and provide suitable meeting opportunities for law enforcement officials in different countries as well as for counterterrorism coordinators mandated to facilitate interstate cooperation.
- UNODC could offer direct assistance to states at their request in concrete terrorism cases.
- OHCHR should be provided with the necessary capacity to participate in all relevant UNODC counterterrorism training programs, which should target not just criminal justice officials but defense lawyers and relevant executive branch officials responsible for drafting and granting extradition requests.

IV. The Role of States in Implementing and Guiding Implementation of the Strategy

24. Strategy implementation should be led by member states. In this regard, first and foremost, member states themselves should be undertaking Strategy implementation efforts, at national and regional levels, and should encourage increased participation of regional and subregional bodies and civil society in Strategy implementation efforts. In addition, states should become more involved in the work of the Task Force and its working groups on an ongoing basis, providing recommendations to the UN intergovernmental bodies engaged in Strategy implementation activities, and should allow for increased participation of regional and subregional bodies and civil society in Strategy implementation efforts. There are several ways in which this could be accomplished:

- The use of an existing forum (e.g., the General Assembly Plenary or Sixth Committee) or the strengthening of the informal briefings already offered by the Task Force, which would enable all member states to hear information updates from the Task Force and provide it with guidance and direction on its work, formally or informally;
- The creation of a new counterterrorism body (for example, modeled on the Peacebuilding Commission or Human Rights Council) or governing board (modeled on UNDP or the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees), which allows for a limited number of states to participate; or
- The formation of an informal “friends of the Strategy” group.

25. It is recommended that states appoint a focal point for Strategy implementation. Such focal points, which could be the state’s national counterterrorism coordinator, would have an overview of national counterterrorism efforts, broadly speaking, i.e., including both traditional and nontraditional efforts related to all four pillars of the



Strategy. Member states, the Task Force, or a Task Force entity such as UNODC could provide a platform where national focal points could meet to share information and best practices and other experiences on Strategy-related issues.

26. It is recommended that states implement the Strategy in an integrated manner and use the Strategy to:

- Further national efforts to develop holistic counterterrorism strategies that include a wide range of government departments and agencies, including those related to law enforcement and security matters and social, health, and labor issues;
- Deepen interagency cooperation and coordination at the national level, which should not just be limited to traditional counterterrorism actors, as nontraditional ones, such as the development, health, and social services ministries, should be invited to the table as well; and
- Develop more integrated, multidimensional technical assistance projects aimed at reaching out to various actors in recipient states, such as criminal justice officials, law enforcement agencies, transport companies, the financial sector, and civil society in a more coordinated and integrated manner.

27. It is recommended that states convene regional Strategy implementation meetings, with donor support where necessary and under the auspices of a regional organization where appropriate, to which all of the key stakeholders, including the Task Force, would be invited and where a regional Strategy implementation plan, along with a division of labor, could be developed.

28. It is recommended that states use the opportunity of the September review to reaffirm the significance of all pillars of the Strategy, including Pillar I issues in the context of integrated Strategy implementation, and urge UN entities such as UNDP and UNESCO to become more involved without labeling their work as “counterterrorism.” Sharing information about Strategy-relevant activities would make a valuable contribution and could garner more resources for those efforts, without altering their original aims.

29. It is recommended that states do more to stimulate engagement by civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For example, they should:

- Engage with different ethnic and religious groups on security issues at the national level to stimulate cross-cultural and religious dialogue;
- Ensure that the views of civil society and NGOs are taken into account in the development of counterterrorism legislation;
- Provide civil society groups and NGOs an opportunity to engage directly with legislators regarding the potential impact of planned or actual impact of existing counterterrorism measures; and
- Have national counterterrorism coordinators include and, where appropriate, delegate to civil society groups in their outreach activities, without jeopardizing the independence of civil society.



30. States should instruct their delegations to the intergovernmental bodies represented on the Task Force to push those bodies to provide stronger support for and otherwise deepen their engagement with the Task Force and on the Strategy.

31. The Group of Eight's Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) should be encouraged to assume a leading role in coordinating the capacity-building activities related to the implementation of the Strategy. To this end, the CTAG should consider the possibility of:

- Expanding its law enforcement and security-focused mandate to include the broader set of issues covered by the Strategy, where enhanced coordination and cooperation among donors is needed; and
- Expanding its membership to include appropriate counterterrorism donor countries.



Remarks by the President of the UN General Assembly at the Final Workshop of the International Process on Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation

10 July 2008 | New York

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

It is my pleasure to welcome you today to the final workshop of the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.

The International Process that is cosponsored by Switzerland, Costa Rica, Japan, Slovakia and Turkey and was launched last November has been a welcomed opportunity for Member States from all regions to evaluate the contributions of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism and to bring closer relevant UN actors with the ones at national and regional levels and from civil society.

The International Process has rightly recognized that while the primary responsibility for implementing the Strategy continues to rest with member states, the UN system can and must do more to assist states in operationalizing the vision embodied in the Strategy. Through workshops in Europe and Asia and here in New York, numerous ideas have been put forward that certainly merit discussion with the wider membership.

Excellencies,

The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly almost two years ago. We also pledged to review the progress made in implementation in two years time.

The General Assembly will meet for this purpose on 4 September 2008. Therefore, the final wrap-up workshop today is indeed very timely.

Several institutional issues that were discussed at these workshops have been also at the core of the General Assembly's meetings and consultations during this session. The Facilitator, Ambassador Gert Rosenthal has swiftly started his consultations with



Member States on the outcome of the General Assembly plenary meeting in September and I would like to use this opportunity to thank him and delegations for their constructive engagement.

Questions such as resources for the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, as well as the nature of its relationship and engagement with the Member States have been recurrent and need to be resolved. Member States have voiced their desire to share responsibilities and to enhance the interaction with the UN system. Hopefully some of the proposals generated by the Independent Process will give a new impetus in finding solutions for those issues during upcoming consultations.

One of the essentials of the Strategy has been its integrated approach. In this regard, the workshops on the rule of law, good governance, education and dialogue, and capacity building have been well received. The International Process has also sought to clarify the role of and encourage different UN entities that traditionally have not had a role in countering terrorism to engage with the Task Force framework by putting forward ideas how these entities could contribute more without prejudicing their core mandates.

Many of the other proposals that have been and will be discussed here today are practical and could be implemented swiftly. For instance, I would like to highlight the proposal to raise awareness on the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy at the national and regional level and involve these actors more closely with the work of the UN organs. There is a clear need to work closely with regional organizations that have the special knowledge about the vulnerabilities and priorities of their regions. The UN should work with States to bolster those regional bodies that do not yet have sufficient counter-terrorism capacity.

The International Process has focused mainly on institutional and organizational aspects of strengthening the United Nations ability to implement the Global Strategy. But in addition to that, concrete ideas have emerged how Member States could improve their own efforts in the implementation process, such as appointing a national focal point for Strategy implementation or deepening internal interagency coordination and cooperation.

For its part, the UN could seek to convene these focal points, including at the regional or subregional levels. This would not only allow them to share Strategy-related best practices and other Strategy-related experiences and information, but to build the trust and relationships among the focal points that is needed to strengthen cross-border cooperation.

These suggestions are important in order to accentuate the role of States who are in the forefront of the implementation of the Global Strategy. While discussing the institutional arrangements of the UN, we should not forget that it is Member States that have the ultimate responsibility to ensure proper education and economic opportunities, secure borders, to curtail terrorist financing, make sure their territories are not used as safe havens for terrorists, or, that terrorists do not get hold on weapons of mass destruc-



tion, and to take these actions within the framework of relevant international norms such as human rights and the rule of law.

Excellencies,

I would also take this opportunity to emphasize some of the aspects of the upcoming General Assembly plenary meeting on the occasion of the review of the Strategy. Since the Strategy does not foresee any formal reporting mechanism, I have invited the membership to use the opportunity during the meeting to share best practices they have identified and programmes undertaken that could be beneficial for all Member States.

In September, Member States may wish to discuss ways the Strategy can be used to attune the global, regional, sub-regional and national efforts to counter terrorism. The Strategy reflects the consensus and unity of all Member States and could be used as a tool to build further collaborative projects. The commitments undertaken by Member States are numerous and comprehensive, giving abundant opportunities to work together, which is so essential in countering international terrorism.

As to the outcome of the meeting of the General Assembly, I would like to reiterate my call on Member States to send a strong and unified message against terrorism, to re-dedicate to the commitments undertaken in the Global Strategy and to strengthen the co-operation between Member States and the United Nations. We must also decide on the appropriate follow-up to ensure the continuation of the Strategy's implementation after the current session.

Excellencies,

I am glad to say that the way the International process has unfolded is a good example of the joint endeavors called for in the Strategy. A lot of work has been done since its launch in November 2007. It is important to ensure it will be brought to the attention of the United Nations as a whole and that the recommendations that emerge from the Process are given due consideration. I invite the cosponsors to use the General Assembly review meeting to highlight some of the key findings of the International Process.

We have a limited amount of time from now till the September General Assembly meeting, but the cosponsors and others may wish to find ways how to go beyond the first review meeting and I certainly look forward to the outcome of your discussions. I thank you for your attention.



List of Participants^{*}

MEMBER STATES

ALGERIA

H.E. Mr. Noureddine Ayadi, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant to the President of the Republic of Algeria for Counter-Terrorism (Algiers)

Mr. Abdelmalek Bouheddou, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

H.E. Ms. Taous Feroukhi, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (Vienna)

Mr. El Hadj Lamine, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

ARGENTINA

H.E. Eugenio María Curia, Ambassador of Argentina to Austria and Permanent Representative to the UN (Vienna)

Mr. Diego Malpede, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

AUSTRALIA

Ms. Katrina Harrigan, Third Secretary, Embassy (Ankara)

Mr. Jeremy Kruse, Counselor and Deputy Head of Mission, Permanent Mission to the UN (Vienna)

Mr. Craig Maclachlan, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (Geneva)

Mr. Bruce Miller, Minister Counselor, Embassy (Tokyo)

Mr. Andrew Rose, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Ms. Catherine Wallace, First Secretary, Embassy to Japan (Tokyo)

* The names on this list reflect those individuals who participated in at least one of the workshops organized during the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. It is neither an official nor necessarily a complete list. The names were drawn from the lists provided by the organizers of the workshops and the titles of the individuals listed reflect those at the time of their participation in the relevant workshop(s).



AUSTRIA

Mr. Konrad Bühler, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
Ms. Claudia Reinprecht, Desk Officer, Ministry for European and International Affairs (Vienna)
H.E. Mr. Thomas Stelzer, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (Vienna)
Mr. Christoph Weidinger, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy (Tokyo)

BRAZIL

H.E. Mr. Julio Cezar Goncalves, Ambassador, Embassy (Vienna)
Mr. Marcio Reboucas, Second Secretary, Embassy (Vienna)
Mr. Eric Sogocio, Second Secretary, General Coordination for Combat of Transnational Illicit Acts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia)

CANADA

Mrs. Bianca D. Bohanan, Chief, Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (Ottawa)
Ms. Clare McIntyre, Senior Policy Adviser, International Crime and Terrorism Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (Ottawa)

CHILE

Mr. Julio Bravo, Counselor, Deputy Director for Security and Counter-terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Santiago)
H.E. Mr. Juan Eduardo Eguiguren, Ambassador, Director de Política Especial, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Santiago)
Mr. Hernán Quezada, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

CHINA

Mr. Diao Junshu, Attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing)
Ms. Sun Minqin, Counselor, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing)
H.E. Mr. Chen Shiqiu, Ambassador, Head of Delegation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing)
Mr. Rao Wu, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

COSTA RICA

Ms. Carol Viviana Arce-Echeverria, Counselor, Embassy (Vienna)
Mr. Jorge Ballesteros, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
Mrs. Alejandra Solano, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
H.E. Ms. Laura Thompson, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (Geneva)
Ms. Amarilli Villegas, Minister Counselor, Embassy (Tokyo)

CROATIA

Mr. Tihomir Lulic, Third Secretary and Counter-Terrorism Expert, Directorate III for International Organizations and Security, UN Department, Section for Political Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Zagreb)



DENMARK

Mr. Jørgen Gammelgaard, Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Copenhagen)

Mrs. Mercan-Ellen Nielsen, Head of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Copenhagen)

EGYPT

Mr. Nourane Helmy, Diplomatic Attaché, Combating International Terrorism Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cairo)

Mr. Ashraf Mohsen, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister and Director of Combating International Terrorism Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cairo)

FRANCE

Ms. Salina Grenet, Chargée du dossier, UN Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris)

GERMANY

Mr. Roland Otto, Assistant Attaché, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Matthias Sonn, Head, Task Force International Co-operation on Counterterrorism, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin)

GUATEMALA

Ms. Ana Cristina Rodríguez-Piñeda, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

HUNGARY

Ms. Erika Asztalos, Legal Expert, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement (Budapest)

INDIA

Mrs. Neeru Chadha, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Ajaneesh Kumar, First Secretary, Embassy (Bern)

Mr. Rajesh Kumar Puri, First Secretary, Embassy (Bratislava)

INDONESIA

Mr. Aris Munandar, Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism, Directorate of International Security and Disarmament, Directorate General of Multilateral Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta)

Mr. Hery Saripudin, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

IRAN

Mr. Esmail Baghaei Hamaneh, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

ISRAEL

Mr. Gil Limon, Legal Adviser, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Ariel Shafransky, Deputy Director, Counter-Terrorism Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem)

Mr. Israel Strolov, First Secretary – Political, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem)



ITALY

Mr. Diego Brasioli, Counselor and Head of Counter-Terrorism Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome)

Ms. Jessica Cupellini, Second Secretary, Counter-Terrorism Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome)

Ms. Chiara di Stefano, Adviser, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Luca Maestripieri, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

JAPAN

Mr. Tomohiro Mikanagi, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Ms. Sachiyo Seya, Official, International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo)

Mr. Fumio Shimizu, Director, International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo)

H.E. Mr. Takahiro Shinyo, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Dai Sumida, Official, International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo)

Mr. Naobumi Yokota, Adviser, Political Affairs, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

JORDAN

Mr. Adi Al Hadeed, Diplomatic Attaché and Legal Consultant, Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Amman)

Ms. Tamara Al Raqqad, Attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Amman)

Mr. Eihab Sami Salem Omaish, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

KENYA

Mr. David Mwangangi, Brigadier, Director, National Counter-Terrorism Center (Nairobi)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. Dong Hyun Ha, Political Research Staff, Embassy (Tokyo)

LAOS

H.E. Mr. Sayakane Sisouvong, Director General, ASEAN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vientiane)

LIECHTENSTEIN

Mr. Stefan Barriga, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Ms. Isabel Frommelt, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vaduz)

H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

MEXICO

Mr. Alejandro Alday González, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

H.E. Mr. Luis Alfonso De Alba, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (Geneva)

Mr. Guillaume Michel Blin, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (Vienna)



NETHERLANDS

Mr. Onno Kervers, Head, Terrorism and New Threats Unit, Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague)

Mr. Peter Knoope, Deputy Director, Policy and Strategy Department, National Coordination Counter-Terrorism (The Hague)

Mrs. Brechje Schwachofer, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Ms. Peggy Vissers, Policy Adviser, Terrorism and New Threats Unit, Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague)

NEW ZEALAND

Mr. Mark Pearson, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy (Tokyo)

Mr. Philip Taula, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Ms. Jennifer Wilton, Second Secretary, Embassy (Tokyo)

NIGERIA

Mr. Olawale Maiyegun, Minister Counselor, Counter-Terrorism Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lagos)

NORWAY

Mr. Carl Salicath, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Oslo)

PAKISTAN

Mr. Khalil Ahmed Bajwa, Second Secretary, Embassy (Ankara)

Mr. Asghar Ali Golo, Counselor, Embassy (Tokyo)

Mr. Muhammad Rafiuddin Shah, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

RUSSIA

Mr. Daniil Mokin, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Vladimir Prokhorov, Senior Counselor, Department of New Challenges and Threats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow)

Mr. Ilya Rogachev, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Vladimir Salov, Senior Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Ms. Maria Visloguzova, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow)

Mr. Mikhail Vrublevskiy, Embassy (Bern)

SAUDI ARABIA

Dr. Abdurrahman Bin Abdulaziz Al Hadlaq, Assistant to the Minister of Interior for Security Affairs and Head, Counter-Radicalization Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Riyadh)



SLOVAKIA

Mr. Igor Bartho, Legal Adviser, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
H.E. Mr. Peter Burian, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
Mr. Valer Franko, Head, Counter-Terrorism Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bratislava)
Mr. Karol Mistrik, Director, Disarmament, OSCE and Counter-Terrorism Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bratislava)
Ms. Gabriela Mrugova, Third Secretary, Embassy (Tokyo)
Mr. Roman Rosina, Head, Counter-Terrorism Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bratislava)

SLOVENIA

Mr. Miha Erman, First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
Mr. Vladimir Gasparic, Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy (Tokyo)
Mr. Andrej Slapnicar, Minister Plenipotentiary, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ljubljana)

SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. Simon Cardy, Deputy Director, UN Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pretoria)
Mr. Xolisa Mabhongo, Chief Director, UN Politics, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pretoria)
Ms. JoAnn Schneeberger, Principal State Law Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pretoria)

SPAIN

Mr. Francesco Javier De Isturez Simonet, First Secretary, Embassy (Tokyo)
Mr. Miguel García-Herraiz, Deputy Director General for International Affairs of Terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Madrid)
Ms. Laura Martinez Bacos, Desk Officer for International Terrorist Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Madrid)
Mr. Ivo Herrera Pascual, Desk Officer for International Terrorist Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Madrid)
Mr. Arturo Relanzón, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)
Mr. Ángel Lossada Torres-Quevado, General Director for International Issues related to Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Disarmament (Madrid)
Mr. Albert Virella, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

SWEDEN

Mr. Andreas Norman, Counter-Terrorism Unit, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stockholm)
Ms. Cecilia Ruthström-Ruin, Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stockholm)



SWITZERLAND

Ms. Sara Behrend, Adviser, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. David Best, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN (Vienna)

Mrs. Caroline Bichet-Anthamatten, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN (New York)

Mr. Cédric Biedermann, Directorate of Political Affairs, Division III, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

Mr. Alessandro Capelli, Directorate of International Law, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

Mr. Tim Enderlin, Deputy Head of Section, UN Coordination Unit, Directorate of Political Affairs, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

H.E. Mr. Alexandre Fasel, Ambassador, Directorate of Political Affairs, Division III, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

Mr. Daniel Frank, Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism, Directorate of International Law, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

Ms. Natalie Kohli, Attaché, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN (Geneva)

Mr. Benno Laggner, Minister, UN Coordination Unit, Directorate of Political Affairs, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

Ms. Nicole Litschgi, Directorate of International Law, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

H.E. Mr. Peter Maurer, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

H.E. Mr. Jacques Pitteloud, Ambassador, Political Affairs Secretariat, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

H.E. Mrs. Christine Schraner Burgener, Deputy Director, Directorate of International Law, Counter-Terrorism Coordination, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

Ms. Valentin Zellweger, Vice-Director, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Bern)

TANZANIA

Mr. Valentine Longine Mlowola, Senior Superintendent of Police, Head of Criminal Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Unit, Ministry for Public Safety and Security (Dar es Salaam)

TURKEY

Mr. Orkie Akyamaç, Security Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara)

Mr. Lemi Atalay, Security Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara)

Mr. Bilal Çaliskan, Judge, Ministry of Justice (Ankara)

Mr. Metin Ergin, Head of Department, Security Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara)

H.E. Mr. Hasan Gögüs, Director General, Multilateral Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara)

H.E. Mr. Hayati Güven, Ambassador, General Director for Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara)

Mr. Gökay Havabulut, Inspector, Directorate General for Security, Ministry of the Interior (Ankara)

Mr. İsmail Onat, Superintendent, Directorate General for Security, Ministry of the Interior (Ankara)

Mr. Nur Özmeriç, Judge, Ministry of Justice (Ankara)

Mr. İnan Özyıldız, Deputy Director General for Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara)

Mrs. Çağla Tansu-Seçkin, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)



UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Paul Bentall, Head, International Security and Global Issues Research Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London)

Ms. Emily Maltman, Counter-Terrorism Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London)

Mr. Patrick Sprunt, Counselor, Embassy (Tokyo)

Mr. Jeremy Stickings, Social Development Adviser, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Department for International Development (London)

UNITED STATES

Ms. Stefanie Amadeo, First Secretary, Mission to International Organizations (Vienna)

Mr. James B. Donovan, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the UN (New York)

Mr. Christopher Fancher, Counterterrorism Officer, Bureau of International Organizations, Department of State (Washington)

Mr. Michael Klecheski, Political Counselor, Mission to the UN (Geneva)

Mr. Roger Moran, Foreign Affairs Officer and Chief, Sanctions & Counterterrorism, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State (Washington)

Mr. Thomas Ostrowski, Assistant, Mission to International Organizations (Vienna)

UN OFFICIALS

1540 COMMITTEE

Brad Howlett, Expert Adviser (New York)

AL-QAIDA AND TALIBAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE – RESOLUTION 1267

Mr. Richard Barrett, Coordinator (New York)

COUNTER-TERRORISM EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE (CTED)

Mr. Edward Flynn, Senior Human Rights Officer (New York)

Mr. Christian Mahr, Legal Officer (New York)

Ms. Elena Rigacci Hay, Special Assistant to the Executive Director (New York)

Mr. Mike Smith, Executive Director (New York)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mrs. Eva Busza, Principal Officer, Strategic Planning Unit (New York)

Ms. Olga Cherevko-Barrett, Strategic Planning Unit (New York)

Ms. Mirna Galic, Special Adviser for Counter-Terrorism, Strategic Planning Unit (New York)

OFFICE FOR THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR)

Mr. Mohammed Abu-Harthieh, Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism Officer, Rule of Law and Democracy Unit (Geneva)

Ms. Mona Rishmawi, Legal Adviser and Head, Rule of Law and Democracy Unit (Geneva)

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PGA)

H.E. Mr. Srgjan Kerim, President of the 62nd General Assembly (New York)

Mr. Martin Roger, Second Secretary, Legal Adviser, Counter-Terrorism, Sixth Committee (New York)



ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Mr. Dimitar Jalnev, Programme Coordinator, Action Against Terrorism Unit (Vienna)

Mr. Raphael Perl, Head, Action Against Terrorism Unit (Vienna)

Mr. Andrey Stytsenko, Senior Programme Officer, Action Against Terrorism Unit (Vienna)

Mr. Reinhard Uhrig, Adviser, Action Against Terrorism Unit (Vienna)

UN ASIA AND FAR EAST INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS (UNAFEI)

Mr. Takeshi Seto, Deputy Director (Tokyo)

UN EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO)

Ms. Dana Ziyasheva, CI Section Chief, Adviser for Communication and Information in East Asia (Beijing)

UN INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (UNICRI)

Mr. Fionn Herriott, Researcher/Analyst (Turin)

Mr. Massimiliano Montanari, Deputy Head of Security Governance/Counter Terrorism Lab (Turin)

UN OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES

Mr. Shamil Idriss, Acting Director, Alliance of Civilizations Secretariat (New York)

UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC)

Ms. Jo Flavie Lia Dedeyne-Amann, Officer, Terrorism Prevention Branch, Division of Treaty Affairs (Vienna)

Mr. Walter Gehr, Chief, Counter-Terrorism Legal Services Section 1, Terrorism Prevention Branch (Vienna)

Mr. Jean-Paul Laborde, Chief, Terrorism Prevention Branch, Division of Treaty Affairs (Vienna)

Ms. Kuniko Ozaki, Director, Division of Treaty Affairs (Vienna)

Mr. George Puthuppally, Chief, Counter-Terrorism Programme and Policy Coordination Section, Terrorism Prevention Branch (Vienna)

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

Mr. George Malcolm Moore, Senior Analyst (Vienna)

ISLAMIC EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (ISESCO)

Mr. Ahmed Said Ould Bah, Head, Cabinet of the Director General (Rabat)

ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OPCW)

Mr. Irakli Beridze, Special Projects Officer (The Hague)



REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AFRICAN UNION

H.E. Mr. Gaoussou Boubacar Diarra, Ambassador and Director, African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (Algiers)

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

Mr. Pratap Parameswaran, Head of ASEAN Regional Forum Unit (Jakarta)

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Mr. Rafael Benitez, Anti-Terrorism Coordinator and Head of Public International Law and Anti-Terrorism Division (Strasbourg)

Mr. Jean-Etienne Kautzmann, Member of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Public International Law and Anti-Terrorism Division (Strasbourg)

Mr. Jeroen Schokkenbroek, Head of Department, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs (Strasbourg)

INTEGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT'S CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM AGAINST TERRORISM (ICPAT)

Mr. Abebe Muluneh, Commander Senior Training Coordinator (Addis Ababa)

Mr. Smuel Sserwanga, Senior Legal Analyst (Addis Ababa)

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

Mr. Mohamed Benkhadra, Legal Adviser to the Secretary General, Head of Legal Department (Cairo)

Mr. Haidar A. Shehait, Third Secretary (Cairo)

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Ms. Juliette Bird, Senior Analyst, Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (Brussels)

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

Mr. Pablo Martinez, Deputy Secretary, Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Washington)

SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

Mr. Teodosio Uate, Head, Legal Affairs Unit (Gaborone)



CIVIL SOCIETY / NGOS

Mr. Rommel Banlaoi, Executive Director, Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (Manila)

Prof. Andrea Bianchi, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) (Geneva)

Prof. Thomas Biersteker, Professor, Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) (Geneva)

Mr. İbrahim Can, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Ankara)

Mr. Anton du Plessis, Head, International Crime in Africa Program, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria)

Mrs. Sue Eckert, Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies (Providence)

Ms. Naureen Fink, Program Officer, International Peace Institute (New York)

Mr. Colin Keating, Executive Director, Security Council Report (New York)

Dr. Herman Joseph Kraft, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Manila)

Dr. Edward C. Luck, Senior Vice-President and Director of Studies, International Peace Institute (New York)

Mr. Alistair Millar, Director, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (Washington)

Mr. Changavalli Murthy, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi)

Mr. Matt Pollard, Legal Adviser, "Counter Terror with Justice" Campaign, Amnesty International (London)

Mr. Eric Rosand, Senior Fellow, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (New York)

Mr. Ahmet Tuncer, Director, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Ankara)





The International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation was launched in November 2007 and included a series of workshops focusing on discrete aspects of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The International Process involved government and nongovernmental experts from different regions and disciplines and officials from the UN system and relevant regional and sub-regional bodies. It consisted of a series of workshops taking place between late January and mid-July 2008 culminating with the release by the cosponsors of the Final Document of the International Process on 24 July 2008, ahead of the General Assembly's first formal review of Strategy implementation in September 2008. The International Process focused on assessing the overall UN contributions to the fight against terrorism over the past seven years and identifying ways to make its institutions more relevant to national and regional counterterrorism efforts and better able to support implementation of the UN Strategy.

The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is an independent, nonpartisan research and policy organization that works to improve internationally coordinated responses to terrorism by providing governments, international and regional bodies, and civil society timely, policy-relevant research and analysis. Building on its years of research on regional and international counterterrorism initiatives, the Center continues to identify ways to strengthen nonmilitary counterterrorism cooperation. To learn more, visit www.globalct.org.

DC OFFICE

1111 19th Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 464-6007
Fax: (202) 238-9603

NEW YORK OFFICE

801 Second Avenue, Suite 405
New York, NY 10017
Phone: (212) 682-0998
Fax: (212) 697-3316