

UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq: a Progress Report



**A Report of the
Sanctions and Security Project
of the Fourth Freedom Forum
and the
Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
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*by David Cortright, Alistair Millar,
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Policy Brief F6

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Executive Summary

In their first two months of activity inspectors with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have received unfettered access to Iraqi facilities and have been able to conduct more than 350 on-site inspections. To date no weapons of mass destruction have been discovered. UNMOVIC chairman Dr. Hans Blix told the Security Council on 9 January, if we had found any smoking gun we would have reported it to the Council . . . We have not submitted any such reports.¹ IAEA director general Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei was more explicit in reporting that no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities has been detected.²

While Iraq has given prompt access to UN inspectors so far, it has not provided a full and complete declaration of its weapons programs as required by paragraph three of Resolution 1441. Although 12,000 pages in length, the Iraqi weapons declaration of 7 December was practically devoid of new evidence, according to Blix, and failed to resolve many of the unanswered questions about Iraqi weapons capabilities that remained from the earlier UN weapons inspection process which took place from 1991 to 1998. Recent progress has been made in addressing these issues, however. During meetings in Baghdad on 19 and 20 January UN officials reached agreement with Iraq on a ten-point plan in which Iraq pledged greater cooperation in meeting UN demands.

According to UNMOVIC chairman Blix, Iraq has given UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors prompt access to carry out their monitoring and verification work. This open doors policy, as Blix described it, is an indispensable element of transparency and a process that aims at securing disarmament by peaceful means.³ IAEA director ElBaradei likewise reported that Iraqi authorities have consistently provided access without conditions and without

delay.⁴ Even Saddam Hussein's palaces, previously off-limits to UN officials, have been inspected in recent weeks.

The prompt access granted by Iraqi officials has enabled UN monitors to conduct hundreds of on-site inspections in their first two months of activity. According to Blix, a steadily increasing number of industrial, administrative, military, scientific and research sites are again being opened for inspections under the authority of the Security Council. As a result of this accelerating inspection effort, transparency is increasing.⁵ A substantial institutional and scientific infrastructure for UN monitoring has been established in Iraq in recent weeks. There are presently more than 100 UNMOVIC inspectors and fifty-eight support staff in Iraq. A headquarters facility has been established in Baghdad, and a provisional regional office was set up in Mosul in January, with another regional office scheduled to open soon in Basrah. Eight helicopters have been delivered to UNMOVIC, and monitoring flights are now regularly conducted throughout the country. In-country chemical screening and processing facilities have been established.

The resumption of on-site monitoring has already provided substantial security benefits. The presence of more than a hundred highly trained weapons specialists, conducting dozens of on-site inspections every week, equipped with the world's most advanced monitoring technology, enables UN officials to detect any militarily significant weapons activity. Under these conditions, according to IAEA director ElBaradei, UN verification activities serve . . . as an important deterrent to the resumption of such activities by Iraq.⁶ With UN officials scouring the country to search for weapons activity, it would be extremely difficult for the Baghdad government to develop or use prohibited weapons without being detected. The continuing monitoring effort thus provides an important security guarantee against the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

If the goal is assuring Iraq's disarmament, that objective is now being met. Never before has the international community been able to mount such a comprehensive weapons verification and monitoring effort. In August 2002 U.S. vice president Dick Cheney described the previous UN monitoring effort as the most intrusive system of arms control in history.¹⁷ The new verification system is equally intrusive and is employing more sophisticated detection technology. Through the efforts of the renewed inspection regime, the UN Security Council is in the process of achieving its declared objective of assuring that Iraq does not possess and cannot develop weapons of mass destruction. If the inspections are able to continue in the months ahead, it is likely that they will be able to assure Iraq's effective disarmament.

In light of the progress of UN inspections, and despite the inadequacies of Iraq's weapons declaration, the renewed UN weapons monitoring effort in Iraq can be judged a partial success so far. UNMOVIC and IAEA officials report that they will need more time to fulfill the mandate established by Resolution 1441. If the current inspection regime is able to continue, and especially if it has the full support of the United States and other members of the Security Council, significant progress can be achieved in the coming months toward the goal of

eliminating the threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Notes

1. United Nations, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Dr. Hans Blix, *Notes for Briefing the Security Council*, 9 January 2003. Available online at the *United Nations* <<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/bx9jan.htm>> (15 January 2003).
2. International Atomic Energy Agency, World Atom, *Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq as of 8 January 2003*, 9 January 2003. Available online at the *International Atomic Energy Agency* <<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n002.shtml>> (15 January 2003) para. 16.
3. Blix, *Notes for Briefing*, 1ñ2.
4. International Atomic Energy Agency, *Status of the Agency's Verification Activities*, para. 5.
5. Blix, *Notes for Briefing*, 2.
6. International Atomic Energy Agency, *Status of the Agency's Verification Activities*, para. 16.
7. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Dick Cheney, *Don't wait for Saddam to get nukes*, Speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars, Nashville, Tenn., 2 September 2002. Available online at *AviationNow* <http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020902/avi_view.htm> (23 January 2003).

UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq: A Progress Report

After nearly two months of increasingly intensive inspection activity, UN weapons monitors in Iraq, by their own account, have achieved considerable progress in establishing the disarmament process mandated in Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002). In contrast with the experience of UN weapons monitors during the early 1990s, the inspectors with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have received unfettered access to Iraqi facilities and have been able to conduct more than 350 on-site inspections. They are employing the world's most advanced technology for detecting nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and are installing an ongoing monitoring system that will provide permanent surveillance of Iraq's weapons activities.

The early results of the intrusive inspections are unambiguous. To date no weapons of mass destruction have been discovered, and there has been no interference or obstruction by Iraqi officials with the UN inspection process. UNMOVIC chairman Dr. Hans Blix told the Security Council on 9 January, 'if we had found any smoking gun we would have reported it to the Council . . . We have not submitted any such reports.'¹ IAEA director general Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei was more explicit in reporting that 'no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities has been detected.'²

While Iraq has given prompt access to UN inspectors so far, it has not provided a 'full and complete' declaration of its weapons programs as required by paragraph three of Resolution 1441. Blix characterized the Iraqi declaration submitted on 7 December 2002 as 'inadequate.'³ Although 12,000 pages in length, the Iraqi declaration was 'practically devoid of new evidence,' according to Blix. It failed to resolve many of the unanswered questions about Iraqi weapons capabilities that remained from the earlier UN weapons inspection process which took place from 1991 to 1998. During meetings in Baghdad on 19 and 20 January UN officials reached

agreement with Iraq on a ten-point plan in which Iraq pledged greater cooperation in meeting UN demands. That agreement, if implemented, will help to clarify some of the discrepancies in the Iraqi weapons declaration.

This report provides an initial assessment of the renewed weapons inspection mission in Iraq. We examine some of the limitations of Iraq's December 2002 weapons declaration. We analyze the importance of the unfettered access provided to UN inspectors and contrast this with the record of Iraqi

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interference and obstruction during the 1990s. We offer an overview of the advanced detection technologies now being utilized by UN monitors. We review a number of the high profile claims regarding Iraqi weapons capabilities, noting the discrepancies between such claims and what the inspectors have discovered so far. We conclude with an overall evaluation of the inspection process and the political and legal implications of the partial progress that is now being achieved. The report includes an appendix listing more than 350 UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections that occurred in Iraq between 27 November 2002 and 21 January 2003.

The Unanswered Questions

The record of the scientific and military accomplishments of the earlier UN weapons inspections effort is well documented. The UN Special Commis-

sion (UNSCOM) and the IAEA achieved considerable success in eliminating most of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction during the 1990s. UN documents and the memoirs of former inspectors confirm that previous inspections dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure, accounted for all but two of Iraq's 819 Scud missiles, and destroyed all of the country's known biological and chemical weapons production facilities. UNSCOM reported in 1997 that "there are no indications that any weapons-useable [nuclear] materials remain in Iraq," and "no evidence in Iraq of prohibited materials, equipment, or activities."³ A September 2002 analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London concluded that "Iraq does not possess facilities to produce long-range missiles," and that UNSCOM eliminated most of Iraq's chemical weapons stockpiles and production capacity.⁴ An independent panel of experts established by the Security Council in 1999 came to much the same conclusion:

In spite of well-known difficult circumstances UNSCOM and [the] IAEA have been effective in uncovering and destroying many elements of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes. . . . The bulk of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated.⁵

According to former UNSCOM chair Rolf Ekëus, "Thanks to the work of the UN inspectors, not much was left of Iraq's once massive weapons program when inspections halted" in 1998.⁶

Although UNSCOM and IAEA achieved considerable success in eliminating Iraq's weapons capability, many unanswered questions remained when inspectors left the country in December 1998. The most serious concerns related to Iraq's vast chemical and biological weapons programs. UN inspectors were unable to account for thousands of chemical munitions and large stockpiles of precursor elements associated with the deadly nerve gas, VX. Many uncertainties also remained regarding germ-warfare bombs, hundreds of kilograms of biological growth media, and aerial equipment that could be used to spray deadly germs. Documentation was also lacking regarding indigenously produced ballistic missiles and the Iraqi nuclear program.

Since the return of UN inspectors in November 2002 and the submission of Iraq's weapons declaration in December, additional attention has focused on

the discrepancies and information gaps that remained from the earlier round of inspections. The 7 December Iraqi weapons declaration failed to address these issues. According to Blix, the Iraqi declaration was "rich in volume but poor in new information" and "practically devoid of new evidence."⁷ Most of the documents in the 12,000-page submission were identical to those provided in previous Iraqi weapons declarations during the 1990s. IAEA officials similarly concluded that the Iraqi documents "do not include any which are relevant to the questions and concerns outstanding since 1998."⁸ The 20 January agreement between the Iraqi government and UN officials may help to address some of these concerns, but whether Iraq will provide full disclosure on these issues remains to be seen.

The initial UNMOVIC and IAEA assessment of the Iraqi weapons declaration identified discrepancies concerning the volume of bacterial growth media

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imported into Iraq in earlier years and the disposition of Iraq's anthrax spores. They also found discrepancies concerning the number of special chemical munitions produced and reportedly destroyed by Iraq. Additional questions concerned the import of missile engines and the disposition of VX nerve agent and related precursor elements.

UNMOVIC officials expressed particular concern about the list provided by Iraq of personnel presently or formerly engaged in prohibited weapons activities. This list was mandated by paragraph 7 of Resolution 1441. The list submitted by Iraq in December consisted of 117 persons in the chemical sector, 120 in the biological sector, and 156 in the missile sector. According to chairman Blix, this was

ian inadequate response.⁹ The list did not include the names of those identified in earlier Iraqi weapons declarations or known to UN officials from previous inspections. Blix noted in his briefing to the Security Council on 9 January that it is in Iraq's interest to provide the requested list of weapons-related personnel. As the UNMOVIC chairman noted, if Iraq can verify that former weapons officers have moved to nonprohibited areas of work, this would corroborate Baghdad's oft-repeated claim that it no longer has weapons of mass destruction. Under the ten-point agreement of 20 January, Iraq promised to provide additional names of weapons-related personnel as requested by UN officials.

Open Doors

The most important fact about the inspection process so far is that Iraq has given full access to UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors to carry out their monitoring and verification work. According to UNMOVIC chairman Blix, prompt access . . . has been given to inspection teams.¹⁰ This open doors policy, as Blix described it, is an indispensable element of transparency and a process that aims at securing disarmament by peaceful means.¹⁰ IAEA director ElBaradei likewise reported that Iraqi authorities have consistently provided access without conditions and without delay.¹¹ The monitors have had unfettered access to all sites and complete freedom of movement, as required in Resolution 1441. Even Saddam Hussein's palaces, previously off limits to UN officials, have been inspected in recent weeks.

This open doors policy contrasts sharply with the behavior of Iraqi officials during the weapons inspections of the 1990s. During that earlier phase of UN weapons monitoring, Iraqi officials frequently obstructed and interfered with verification efforts and conducted a major concealment effort. Iraqi attempts to intimidate and obstruct the work of the inspectors during the 1990s have been thoroughly documented in the British government's intelligence dossier of September 2002 and in the memoirs published by former weapons inspectors.¹² Iraqi officials consistently denied access to sensitive sites, often resulting in tense confrontations or standoffs with UN inspectors. Tim Trevan, former UNSCOM special advisor, detailed the four-day deadlock in September 1991 when Iraqi officials refused to allow UN inspectors to

take sensitive documents, leading to a tense standoff in a Baghdad parking lot. Trevan concluded, UN officials knew that Iraq was not just taking centrally organized passive measures to conceal the truth about its weapons programmes but was actively seeking to undermine the effectiveness of the inspection process.¹³ Equally disruptive were Iraqi concealment efforts, which were systematically planned and administered by a specially formed Iraqi government office. According to the British dossier report, Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having a large, effective system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and possibly biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN.¹⁴ To date, UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors have not faced anything even remotely resembling the systematic obstruction of the 1990s.

Of course the absence of obstruction and interference does not mean that Iraq is cooperating

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fully with UN inspections. Iraq has not been forthcoming in providing information to UN officials and it has not acted to resolve unanswered questions. It is possible that Iraqi authorities could be withholding information intentionally to deceive UN officials. Nonetheless, the change in the pattern of Iraqi behavior toward UN inspectors is significant. The Iraqi willingness to permit unfettered access and complete freedom of movement for UN inspectors is a departure from its previous behavior. It is a positive indication of Iraq's partial compliance with Resolution 1441.

The Progress of Inspections

The prompt access granted by Iraqi officials has enabled UN monitors to conduct hundreds of on-site inspections in their first two months of activity.

According to Blix, a steadily increasing number of industrial, administrative, military, scientific and research sites are again being opened for inspections under the authority of the Security Council. As a result of this accelerating inspection effort, transparency is increasing.¹⁵ From 27 November 2002 through 8 January 2003 UNMOVIC officials conducted 150 inspections of 127 sites. During the same time period, IAEA officials conducted 109 inspections at some eighty-eight locations.

A substantial institutional and scientific infrastructure for UN monitoring has been established in Iraq in recent weeks. There are presently more than 100 UNMOVIC inspectors and fifty-eight support staff in Iraq. A headquarters facility has been established in Baghdad, and a provisional regional office was set up in Mosul in January, with another regional office scheduled to open soon in Basrah. Eight helicopters have been delivered to UNMOVIC, and monitoring flights are now regularly conducted throughout the country. Chemical screening and processing facilities have been established. UN chemical experts are now able to screen samples at the Baghdad headquarters and in the field using portable units. A modular chemical laboratory will arrive in Iraq by the end of January. Improved facilities for biological sampling and analysis are being established as well.

The resumption of on-site monitoring has already provided substantial security benefits. The presence of more than a hundred highly trained weapons specialists, conducting dozens of on-site inspections every week, equipped with the world's most advanced monitoring technology, enables UN officials to detect any militarily significant weapons activity. Under these conditions, according to IAEA director ElBaradei, UN verification activities serve . . . as an important deterrent to the resumption of such activities by Iraq.¹⁶ With UN officials scouring the country to search for weapons activity, it would be extremely difficult for the Baghdad government to develop or use prohibited weapons without being detected. The continuing monitoring effort thus provides an important security guarantee against the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

UN inspectors are now installing an Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) system. The OMV program involves the installation of an elaborate array of radiological, biological, and chemical sensors, cameras, seismographs, and other detection

systems at numerous locations throughout Iraq. This is supplemented by no-notice inspections in which UN monitors verify the disarmament of designated locations. The OMV system is designed to provide monitoring of potential weapons sites on a permanent basis. Once this system is in place, UN monitors will have a sophisticated capability to detect nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons activity. The OMV system will provide a further degree of assurance against any potential Iraqi weapons activity.

If the goal is assuring Iraq's disarmament, that objective is now being met. Never before has the international community been able to mount such a comprehensive weapons verification and monitoring effort. In August 2002 U.S. vice president Dick Cheney described the previous UN monitoring effort as the most intrusive system of arms control in history.¹⁷ The new verification system is equally intrusive and is employing more sophisticated detection technology. Through the efforts of the renewed inspection regime, the UN Security Council is in the

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Technology Improves Efficiency of Today's Inspections

A distinctive feature of the current inspection regime is that UN inspectors in Iraq are equipped with more advanced verification and detection tech-

nologies than their predecessors in the 1990s. Inspectors are now able to use an array of devices including hand-held sensors and high-speed communications technologies to analyze data and receive encrypted intelligence in a fraction of the time required only five years ago. According to Blix: "The rapid expansion of the need for international inspection and the development of technology have led to the employment of powerful new means of verification:

Satellite imagery provides important overview and is . . . now becoming available commercially.

On-site videos and sensors may provide continuous surveillance and may even transmit images automatically reducing the need for inspector presence.

Environmental sampling of air, soil or water and subsequent analysis for relevant chemical, biological or nuclear substances are becoming ever more powerful means of inquiry.¹⁸

In the 1990s UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors installed 140 surveillance cameras at twenty-nine sites and thirty sensors at twenty-three sites. They also applied 1,929 labels and seals on 1,832 facilities and pieces of equipment at 161 sites. Improved technology now available to UN inspectors will increase the effectiveness of the cameras, sensors, and seals presently being installed at hundreds of sites in Iraq. With more advanced cameras and communications equipment, UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors can send and receive data more efficiently than their predecessors.

The following is an overview of some of the equipment now available to UN inspectors:

Auroral Large Imaging System. These tamperproof and weatherproof cameras are now digital, requiring no film or videotape and less maintenance. Many of the new cameras are smaller than a shoebox and are capable of sending encrypted satellite images directly to IAEA headquarters in Vienna for detailed analysis. They will be essential to the ongoing monitoring process in Iraq.

Analytical equipment. New technology available in the field enables inspectors to perform chemical and biological analyses on site rather than sending swabs and samples back to laboratories thousands of miles away. According to Ewen Buchanan, chief spokesman for UNMOVIC, "a lot of equipment that might have required a whole room has been shrunk and is more usable in the field."¹⁹ DNA fingerprinting, chemical analysis kits, radiation sensors, and radars are much smaller and in some cases can fit inside an inspector's protective clothing.²⁰ New devices are on hand to detect the alloys used in uranium enrichment and to check for weaponized chemical or germ traces in air ducts and waterways.

Some of the handheld devices now available include:

- Alex alloy detector, to register the presence of hardened metal alloys used in nuclear weapons applications.
- Hanaa (Hand-held Advanced Nucleic Acid Analyzer), which can detect anthrax or plague in less than fifteen minutes.
- Fieldspec digital spectrometer and dose meter. Connected to a desktop or notebook PC, the unit gives the user a spectrum display for qualitative and quantitative in-situ analysis.²¹
- Ranger handheld weatherproof portable radionuclide detectors designed to meet nuclear spectroscopy requirements in demanding field conditions and environments.²²

Ground Penetrating Radar. Improvements in radar allow the inspectors to detect materials buried up to 100 feet underground.²³ Inspectors are using Geophysical Survey Systems, Inc.'s equipment to detect the presence of underground facilities.²⁴ The GSSI underground radar allows inspectors to retrieve and process data more efficiently than in the past.²⁵

Enhanced Computer networks. Inspectors are able to receive encrypted intelligence in the field and send confidential data to each other and to their colleagues outside Iraq with ease. Sandia National Laboratories equipped UNSCOM inspectors with a classified network just before they pulled out of Iraq in 1998.

This array of technology provides for an empowered system of inspections that can detect traces of material and date their movement. This capability provides an effective cross-check on both declared and undeclared information provided by the Iraqi government. The ability of UNMOVIC teams to install continued monitoring equipment enhances the prospect that future violations of the ban on Iraq's weapons programs can be detected.

Clarifying Claims

The British government dossier of September 2002 acknowledged that without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult . . . to be sure about the true nature of Iraq's facilities.²⁶ Yet U.S. and UK officials have used intelligence estimates to make public claims about purported Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The renewed UN weapons verification efforts have now provided sufficiently detailed information to test the validity of some of these claims.

In September 2002 U.S. and British officials raised concerns about unsuccessful Iraqi attempts to import high-strength aluminum tubes, alleging that these tubes could be used for the enrichment of uranium. The British government dossier claimed that Iraq had made repeated attempts to obtain aluminum tubes with potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium.²⁷ The U.S. government also reported in September 2002 that Iraq tried to obtain aluminum tubes intended for uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development.²⁸ According to the January 2003 preliminary assessment of the IAEA, however, these aluminum tubes were not intended for nuclear weapons development but for the reverse engineering of 81-millimeter rockets. According to IAEA director ElBaradei, the IAEA's analysis indicated that the specifications of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appeared to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets.²⁹ The director noted that these aluminum tubes are not directly suitable for the manufacture of uranium centrifuges.

Another claim about Iraqi weapons was the concern expressed by President Bush regarding new construction at nuclear facilities. In a 7 October speech Bush asserted that satellite photos of construction activity at Iraqi nuclear facilities indicated that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons.³⁰ IAEA inspectors visited these sites to find the alleged proof and detected no evidence of prohibited nuclear weapons activity. ElBaradei noted that the sites had been inspected when he reported to the Council in January that no nuclear weapons related activity had been detected in Iraq.

In the case of Iraq's suspected nuclear weapons program, the British government's dossier presented a more alarming prognosis than a CIA report issued a month later. The British report asserted that if [sanctions] were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously.³¹ Less than a month later the CIA report, which received much less attention, noted that "Saddam probably does not yet have any nuclear weapons" and that Iraq would be unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade.³² After conducting dozens of inspections, ElBaradei assessed the Iraqi nuclear threat as less urgent than previous intelligence estimates have suggested, stating that "Iraq has not concealed a near-complete nuclear weapons development program."³³

Estimates regarding Iraq's biological weapons program have also been downgraded after recent on-site inspections. The British government dossier report cited the Al Dawra site used for the production of biological weapons in the 1990s as a "facility of concern" and a possible site for a "resurgent biological warfare programme."³⁴ Al Dawra was near the top of the list of sites for UNMOVIC to inspect when UN monitors returned to Iraq. On 29 November a UN inspection team spent four hours at the site before concluding that the former animal vaccine plant is in serious disrepair and no longer capable of producing anything. The *New York Times* said that "reporters who were allowed to wander through the plant after the inspectors left found the place largely in ruins. Apparently, it had been abandoned by the Iraqis after 1996, when the weapons inspectors took heavy cutting equipment to the fermenters, containers and pressurized tubing and valves used in the toxin production."³⁵

Into the Breach

If the accelerating pace of UN weapons inspections continues for several more months without the discovery of any prohibited weapons activity, or with the discovery and destruction of materials found, this would very likely indicate that Iraq's weapons capabilities are minimal, nonexistent, or under control. An absence of evidence would not prove that no prohibited weapons exist, but as a practical matter it would indicate that any remaining weapons capability is minimal and unlikely to pose a major threat to security. The absence of evidence would make it equally difficult to prove the contrary case, that Iraq still possesses prohibited weapons of mass destruction. If months of rigorous UN inspections do not find proof of a major weapons capability, it would be difficult to argue that such a capability exists.

While Iraq has cooperated with UN inspections through its open doors policy, Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations to the Security Council because of its failure to provide a full and complete declaration of its weapons activities. Iraq submitted several weapons declarations in the 1990s, to fulfill the requirement in Resolution 707 (1991) to provide full, final and complete disclosures. None of these declarations was full or complete. The December 2002 weapons declaration followed the same pattern, failing to resolve unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons capabilities. Until Iraq provides satisfactory answers to these questions, UN officials will be unable to certify Iraq's disarmament.

This does not mean that there has been no progress toward disarmament, however. If Baghdad fulfills its pledges in the 20 January agreement, and if its open doors policy continues, with UN monitors thoroughly inspecting Iraqi facilities and territory, the resulting situation is likely to become less ambiguous legally and politically over time. While some discrepancies in Iraq's weapons declaration are likely to remain unresolved, the overall UN disarmament mission will be able to achieve continuing progress toward the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The 20 January agreement between Iraqi officials and UN inspectors may indicate further cooperation aimed at resolving some of the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons capabilities.

Although Iraqi officials agreed to the ten-point plan only under the threat of military attack, implementation of the agreement could result in further progress toward the completion of the UN disarmament mandate. The ten-point agreement included Iraqi pledges to:

- Create a team to investigate the discovery of 122-millimeter chemical shells and to search for similar capabilities at other sites,
- Supplement the list provided to UN inspectors of personnel presently or formerly associated with Iraq's weapons programs,
- Encourage scientists to accept private interviews with UN inspectors,

In the case of Iraq's suspected nuclear weapons program, the British government's dossier . . . asserted that if [sanctions] were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously. ³¹ Less than a month later the CIA report, which received much less attention, noted that 'Saddam probably does not yet have any nuclear weapons' and that Iraq would be unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. ³²

- Enact national legislation prohibiting the development of proscribed weapons, and
- Conduct technical discussions with UN inspectors to clarify issues related to aluminum tubes, the import of uranium, and the use of high explosives.

Iraqi officials also agreed to provide additional documentation to UN inspectors and to respond to other questions raised in connection with its 7 December weapons declaration. The 20 January agreement was a step toward greater Iraqi cooperation with the UN disarmament mission.

Iraq's failure to provide an adequate weapons declaration does not provide a legal or political basis for taking military action. Indeed there is nothing in Resolution 1441 that authorizes the use of military force. The resolution finds Iraq in material breach because of its failure to provide adequate weapons declarations to the Council, but it does not mandate any particular action or consequences as a result of this finding. The resolution states that, in the event of further material breach, the Council will meet to determine the serious consequences Iraq should face as a result. The diplomatic understanding among members of the Council in adopting the resolution was that a finding of further material breach would come only if Iraq interfered with the ongoing UN weapons inspections process. U.S. and British officials agreed to this interpretation in the political maneuvering that led the adoption of Resolution 1441. An inadequate weapons declaration alone would not constitute further material breach. There would also have to be obstruction of the ongoing monitoring effort, which to date has not occurred.

The determination of whether Iraq is in further material breach is a matter to be decided by the full Security Council, not a single government. Under the terms of Resolution 1441 it is up to the Security Council to meet and decide whether Iraq is in further violation of its obligations. It is also up to the Council to consider the nature of the serious consequences that Iraq should face in the event of defiance. If the Council were to find Iraq in further material breach, there are a range of robust, nonmilitary options for applying serious consequences in response to Iraqi defiance. These options include the following:

- Imposing additional targeted sanctions, including travel and financial restrictions, on senior Iraqi government officials associated with prohibited weapons activities;
- Strengthening the continuing arms embargo and military sanctions on Iraq through the creation of an effective

monitoring system and the installation of advanced detection technology on Iraq's borders;

- Tightening controls on the marketing of Iraqi oil by restricting and imposing reporting requirements on companies purchasing Iraqi crude;
- Imposing UN financial controls on the Iraq-Syria pipeline; and
- Strengthening collective deterrence against potential Iraqi aggression or actual development of prohibited weapons.³⁶

Conclusion: More Time for Monitoring Makes Sense

While the inadequacies of the Iraqi weapons declaration remain a matter of concern, the 20 January agreement indicates that a number of critical pieces of missing information may become available in the coming weeks. The issues of concern about the Iraqi weapons declaration do not pose an immediate threat to U.S., regional or international security. There is no indication that any of the reported omissions or discrepancies involves the capability to develop nuclear weapons. Nor is there confirmed evidence that Iraq has functional long-range missiles. The concerns about chemical or biological capabilities involve mostly precursor elements and growth media. There is no evidence from the assessment of UN inspectors so far that Iraq has rebuilt its weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary, UNMOVIC and IAEA officials report that they have found no evidence yet of any new weapons-related activity.

In light of the realities and trends sketched in this report, and despite the inadequacies of Iraq's weapons declaration, the renewed UN weapons inspection effort in Iraq can be judged a partial success to date. UN monitors are visiting a steadily increasing number of potential weapons and documentation sites. The presence of UN inspectors serves as a deterrent to the development or use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq.³⁷ UNMOVIC

and IAEA officials report that they will need more time to fulfill the mandate established by Resolution 1441. As this report indicates, allowing time for the further progress of inspections is likely to yield significant security benefits. If the current inspection regime is able to continue, and especially if it has the full support of the United States and other members of the Security Council, significant progress can be achieved in the coming months toward the goal of the effective disarmament of Iraq.

**Link to Appendix A:
UNMOVIC and IAEA Inspections in Iraq: 27
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**[http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/
inspections_chart1.pdf](http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/inspections_chart1.pdf)**

Notes

1. United Nations, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Dr. Hans Blix, *Notes for Briefing the Security Council*, 9 January 2003. Available online at the *United Nations* <<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/bx9jan.htm>> (15 January 2003).

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26. British Government, *Iraqis Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 21.
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28. John Diamond, 'Report Recites Litany of Misdeeds,' *USA Today* 13 September 2002, 12A.
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30. In his speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center President Bush stated, 'Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.' U.S. Government, George W. Bush, *President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat*, Speech delivered at Cincinnati Museum Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, 7 October 2002. Available online at the *White House* <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html>> (16 January 2003).
31. British Government, *Iraqis Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 27.
32. U.S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraqis Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, October 2002. Available online at *Central Intelligence Agency* <http://www.cia.gov/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf> (22 January 2003) 1, 6.
33. In an interview conducted on 12 January 2003, IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei stated that Iraq might be hiding some computer studies or R. and D. on one single centrifuge. These are not enough to make weapons. There were reports from different member states that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes for enrichment, that they were importing uranium from Africa. Our provisional conclusion is that these tubes were for rockets and not for centrifuges. They deny they have imported any uranium since 1991. (From) the U.S., the U.K. and others we need to get specifics of when and where. We need actionable information. See Marge Michaels, 'Q&A with the Top Sleuth: Chief weapons inspector El Baradei searches for substance from the Iraqis,' *Time*, 12 January 2003. Available online at *Time* <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030120-407286,00.html>> (23 January 2003).
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This table was compiled directly from data reported in *UNMOVIC/IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq* <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/P_release/> (22 January 2003).

Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
27 November 2002				
IAEA	Al Tahidi	Science Research Centre.	Y	Team completed inspection as planned.
UNMOVIC	Al Rafah (two sites)	Graphite Plant and Missile engine testing facility. Graphite plant of interest for dual-use purposes.		All monitoring equipment had been taken away.
28 November 2002				
IAEA	Dhu Al Fiqar	Dual-use capabilities as of 1998.	Y	No problems gaining access to sites or locations in the sites.
IAEA	Nassr Company	Dual-use capabilities as of 1998.	Y	No problems gaining access to sites or locations in the sites.
UNMOVIC	Al Dawrah	Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant.	Y	The site was declared by Iraq as being used for production of biological weapons (BW) agent starting in 1990. Equipment declared to have been in the BW programme was destroyed under inspectors' supervision in 1996. Significant dual-use equipment remains.
UNMOVIC	Small veterinary medicine facility	Site of equipment transfer from Al Dawrah.		
30 November 2002				
IAEA	Um Al Maarik Company of the Military Industrialization Committee (MIC)	Dual-use capabilities.		Team completed inspection as planned. No problems gaining access to sites or locations in the sites. Team verified accuracy of Iraq's declarations and updated IAEA knowledge on activities and capabilities of site. Inspection team announced arrival in advance in order to review video surveillance.
IAEA	Al Meelad Company (MIC)	Location of former Al Furat centrifuge facility.		Team completed inspection as planned. No problems gaining access to sites or locations in the sites. Team verified accuracy of Iraq's

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Al Qa Qaa Company	Explosives plant. Facility contained air samplers to be refurbished, upgraded, and reinstalled in near future.		<p>declarations and updated IAEA knowledge on activities and capabilities of site.</p> <p>Teams completed inspections as planned, had no problems gaining access to sites.</p> <p>Four air samplers removed.</p> <p>Inspection team announced arrival in advance in order to request help in removing air samplers.</p>
UNMOVIC	Balad Chemical Defence Battalion	Military training activities for chemical, biological, and radiological defence.	Y	Inspection team arrived unannounced at the site and was granted immediate access. The team was able to perform all the activities in the inspection plan.
2 December 2002				
IAEA	Three industrial sites	Sites dedicated to production of alcohol.	Y (one site) N (other two sites)	Access granted immediately and inspections completed as planned.
UNMOVIC	Waziriyah site of Al Karama General Company	Principal missile development site. Al Samoud liquid propellant missile development.	Y	Inspection team able to carry out the inspection tasks as planned.
3 December 2002				
IAEA and UNMOVIC	Sijood	Presidential site.		Unannounced joint inspection. Team entered site within minutes and froze site (to permit exit) until inspections completed. Access to entire site provided without incident. Team completed inspection as planned.
6 December 2002				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Operated by Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear facility.	Y	Inspectors reviewed changes that have taken place since 1998. Most changes observed had been recorded in Iraq's declarations submitted to the IAEA in October 2002. Team completed inspection as planned with Iraqi cooperation.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC	Al-Mutanna	Once part of chemical weapons programme.	Y	Thousands of CW shells and agents were destroyed by the UN weapons inspectors in the 1990s.
7 December 2002				
IAEA	Shaklyi	Warehouse complex adjacent to Tuwaiitha.		Inventory of current status of major equipment and material storage areas; will be reconciled with IAEA's database and Iraqi declaration of October 2002. Team completed inspection as planned without Iraqi delay.
UNMOVIC	Al-Kudus Company (MIC)	New research center supporting military applications.	N	This company was formed in September 2002 and occupies a site that was previously intended to house a wind tunnel. Objectives of the inspection completed as planned.
8 December 2002				
IAEA	State Establishment for Geological Survey and Geo-Pilot plant facilities	Facilities had been involved in mapping ore assays and processing of the ores.		Team completed inspections as planned without Iraqi delay.
UNMOVIC	Falluja III (Al-Tariq Company)	Chemical factory engaged in the production of pesticides, insecticides, and rodent poisons.	Y	Previously-tagged dual-use equipment accounted for during inspection. All key buildings inspected and objectives of the visit achieved.
9 December 2002				
IAEA	Tuwaittha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Started a physical inventory of nuclear materials. Conducted visual inspections, gamma surveys, water sampling, and swipe sampling.
IAEA	Ash Shaklyi			Conducted detailed inspection. Inspected and sampled for radiological materials.
IAEA	Al Qa Qaa	Explosives plant.		Began inventory of known explosive materials from past nuclear programme (previously under IAEA control). Inspected key buildings and outdoor sites.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC	Falluja II (Al-Tariq Company)	Chlorine and phenol production factories.	Y	Previously-tagged dual-use equipment accounted for during inspection. All key buildings (including chlorine and phenol plants) inspected and objectives of the visit achieved.
10 December 2002				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Continued taking physical inventory of nuclear materials.
IAEA	Sumood-4 (outlying site of Al Qa Qaa)	Associated with a past program.		
IAEA	Sadda Cement Factory (outlying site of Al Qa Qaa)	Dual-use capabilities.		
IAEA	Al Furat State Company for Chemical Industries	Industrial chemical production facility.		
IAEA	Al Karama facility (complex, 4 individual sites inspected including: Ibn al Haytham, [MIC], Al Fatah Company, and Al Sumood Factory)		Y	Review of current activities and activities undertaken since 1998. Determined disposition and use of machines and equipment previously known to IAEA.
IAEA	Qaim Phosphate Complex	Site previously associated with production of uranium ore.	Y	Inspectors verified destruction of equipment and determined if extraction activities have resumed.
UNMOVIC biological team	National Project for Controlling Brucellosis and Tuberculosis (NPCBT)	Site contains limited equipment for small batch animal vaccines.	Y	Rebaseline inspection based on October 2002 declaration. Inspectors accomplished objectives smoothly.
UNMOVIC biological team	Saddam Center for Biotechnology (SCB)		N	Newly-declared site; baseline inspection completed. Inspectors accomplished objectives smoothly.
11 December 2002				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Completed inventory of nuclear materials.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Al Qaim chemical and cement facilities	Site previously associated with production of uranium ore.	Y	Al Qaim uranium extraction site destroyed in 1991, has been monitored by IAEA ever since. Completed inspections of Iraq's capability to extract uranium. Inspection of all buildings on site, included sampling of raw materials, ore, and concentrate.
IAEA	Ibn Sina Company (formerly Tarmiya)	Uranium enrichment plant destroyed in 1991. Possible dual-use capabilities.		Team verified that no nuclear activities have taken place since 1991. Dual-use industrial activities inspected, demonstrated no contribution to nuclear programme.
IAEA	Amil	Liquid nitrogen plant.		
IAEA	Saddam GE and Amir Factory	Facilities support military armaments.	Y	Reviewed activities at site (which transpired since 1998) and inspected for dual-use machine tools and equipment formerly known to IAEA.
UNMOVIC	Al Fatah Factory (Al Karama State Company)	Manufactures mechanical parts for Al Samood ballistic missile and other missile system components.	N	New site, included in October 2002 declaration. All key buildings inspected and objectives of the visit achieved.
UNMOVIC	Al Razi Research Centre	Produces small amounts of diagnostic reagents for human and animal diseases.	Y	Site was previously-declared and monitored. Inspectors completed full detailed inspection of all buildings to verify declaration. Inspectors completed objectives.
12 December 2002				
IAEA	Al Nida (MIC)	Engineering facility.	Y	Reviewed activities and personnel since 1998, reviewed dual-purpose machine tools and equipment formerly known to IAEA.
IAEA	Al Zawraa (MIC)	Electronics fabrication facility.	Y	Reviewed activities and personnel since 1998, reviewed dual-purpose machine tools and equipment formerly known to IAEA.
IAEA	Al Mutasim (MIC)	Missile plant on grounds of Former nuclear facility.		Inspected new and destroyed former nuclear buildings. Observed rocket production facilities (with UNMOVIC expert).
IAEA	Al Hatteen	Firing range.		Inventoried equipment previously monitored by IAEA.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Ibn Sina (formerly Tarmiya)	Former uranium enrichment facility.		Conducted follow-up visit for full inspection of production and laboratory facilities. Conducted Gamma survey of site and surrounding areas.
UNMOVIC	Test range	Team attended test launch of short-range ballistic missile.		Missile falls within range allowed by UN resolutions.
UNMOVIC	Arab Company for Antibiotics Industry (ACAI)	Pharmaceutical plant (antibiotics).		Plant not operating on day of inspection; detailed inspection completed to verify declaration. Inspectors completed objectives.
13 December 2002				
IAEA	3 major Iraq surface water drainage basins (Tigris and Euphrates)	Hydrological sampling.		Several samples of water, sediment, and vegetation taken from each site.
IAEA	Baghdad area	Wide-area gamma survey.		Area included Karama Sumood missile facility.
UNMOVIC	Communicable Diseases Control Centre	Government facility under direction of Ministry of Health.	N	New site, included in October 2002 declaration. Facility closed due to Holy Day, several rooms tagged and sealed for later inspection because guard did not have the key.
UNMOVIC	Al Kadhimiya plant and Shumouk stores	Site involved with Al Samood missile programme.		
UNMOVIC	Al Mussaib Pesticide Store	Sells pesticides.		National Monitoring Directorate brought facility representatives with keys (upon request); inspectors completed objectives.
14 December 2002				
IAEA	Shaheed	Facility involved in manufacture of non-ferrous alloys; was involved in Electro-magnetic Isotope Separation programme prior to 1991.	Y	Inspectors reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Theo al Fukar factory (in Nassr complex)	Site previously involved in centrifuge project.	Y	Inspectors reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998. Hydrological sampling of various waste streams.
IAEA	Tahidi facility		Y	Inspectors reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998.
IAEA	Hatteen and Iskanderiya facilities	Factories with civilian and military missions.		Inspectors reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998. Teams sampled sites for dual-use or prohibited activities. Inspected new research complex.
IAEA	Daura	Heavy engineering facility.		Inspection of disposition and use of dual-purpose machine tools.
IAEA	Saddam City and Tahidi Science Facility			Conducted random gamma survey.
UNMOVIC biological team	Communicable Diseases Control Centre	Government facility under Ministry of Health.		Return visit. Inspectors removed seals and conducted inspections. Did not discover any sign of forced entry into the locked rooms.
UNMOVIC biological team	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Samood Factory	Manufactures major components for Al Samood missile.	N	Factory commenced operations in 1999.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Fat'h (MIC)	Conducts research and development on solid propellant missiles and rockets.		Operations transferred from Al Kadimiya in 1999.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Qa Qaa complex	Explosives plant.		Inspected sulphuric acid plant and main storage area. Inspectors verified equipment and chemicals. Director of the facility briefed team on changes since 1998. Inspection went smoothly.

15 December 2002

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This table was compiled directly from data reported in *UNMOVIC/IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq* <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/P_release/> (22 January 2003).

Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Al Maarik (MIC)	Manufactures civil and military engineering projects; previously involved in EMIS programme.	Y	Reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998. Reviewed disposition and use of dual-purpose machine tools.
IAEA	Kadessiya (MIC)	Provides engineering support to the military.	Y	Reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998. Reviewed disposition and use of dual-purpose machine tools.
IAEA	Badr (MIC)	Previously involved in centrifuge programme, now provides general engineering.	Y	Reviewed activities of personnel and departments since 1998. Reviewed disposition and use of dual-purpose machine tools.
IAEA	Ramadi - The Glass and Ceramic Company			Gamma survey team went along to carry out measurements in Ramadi area.
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Obtained water and silt samples for radiological analysis.
IAEA	Mahaweel military base	Contained high explosives, needed IAEA verification.		Inspection carried out after dark. Team inspected bunkers with rockets to verify intended use.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Tho Al Fekar factory (Al Rasheed State Company)	Manufactures mechanical parts for solid propellant rockets.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mutassem Solid Rocket Plant (MIC)	Final assembly of Ababil and Al Feta'h solid propellant rockets.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Qa Qaa complex	Explosives plant.		Ongoing inspection. Updated information about sulfuric acid plant and explosives production plant. Focused on new production unit built between 1998 and 2002.
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Amiryah Serum and Vaccine Institute			Inspection of all buildings including new constructions.
16 December 2002				
IAEA	Hatteen State Company			Inspectors had discussions with site operators, took environmental samples, inspected machine tools, and took radiological survey of the sites.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Iskanderya Foundry			Inspectors had discussions with site operators, took environmental samples, inspected machine tools, and took radiological survey of the sites.
IAEA	Iskanderya State Enterprises for Mechanical Industries			Inspectors had discussions with site operators, took environmental samples, inspected machine tools, and took radiological survey of the sites.
IAEA	Al Qa Qaa	Explosives plant--part of unit which produces and tests munitions.		Monitored production of small rockets.
IAEA	Mussayib Army Munitions Depot	Part of unit that produces and tests munitions.		Monitored production of small rockets.
IAEA	Al Motaseem Factory	Part of unit that produces and tests munitions.		Monitored production of small rockets.
IAEA	Hatteen Establishment testing range	Part of unit that produces and tests munitions.		Monitored production of small rockets.
IAEA and UNMOVIC	Saad General Company	Engineering firm. Employs personnel from former nuclear weapons programme.		Conducted as a joint inspection.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Taji Fiberglass (part of Thaat Al Sawary plant)	Produces fiberglass tubing.	Y	Very few employees when inspected in 1998, now employs over 200 people.
UNMOVIC biological team	Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (Baghdad University at Al Jadiriya)	Institute involved in training, teaching, and research in biotechnology and genetic engineering.	N	New site included in October 2002 declaration. Team completed full inspection with assistance of Institute director and chiefs of two departments.
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Amiryah Serum and Vaccine Institute			Revisited to seek clarifications from former director. Team took physical inventory and samples.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Nassir Al Atheen State Company	Formerly known as Heavy Engineering State Company; main processing equipment production facility.	Y	Inspectors conducted rebaseline inspection of changes since 1998. Team inspected all buildings and dual-purpose equipment.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
17 December 2002				
IAEA	Radwan Factory (MIC)	Previously declared site.		
IAEA	Iraqi Plant	Previously declared site.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Department of Biotechnology- College of Sciences (Baghdad University at Al Jadiriya)	Previously declared and monitored site, carries out basic research and teaching for Master's and Doctoral degree students.	Y	
UNMOVIC biological team	Ninevah Pharmaceuticals Company	Previously declared biological site.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Oxidiser Production plant	Plant owned by Ministry of Industry and Minerals, includes small plant involved in missile fuel production.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al-Almeen Factory	Produces Al-Fet'h and Al-Abour missile system components.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Falluja II			
18 December 2002				
IAEA	Saidiya Specialized Institute for Engineering Industries			
IAEA	Hydraulics Factory			
IAEA	Daura Industrial Engine Factory			
IAEA	Two underground facilities near Mosul	Projects associated with electricity generation and irrigation.		Inspected to determine function and recent activities.
IAEA	Al Jesira	Former nuclear facility, carrying out common industrial chemical projects.		Verified sites associated with movements of materials and equipment.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Jaber bin Hayam	Produces chemical protection equipment for military and civilian products.		
IAEA	Al Kindi State Company	Associated with missile and rocket development. Produces electronic and industrial products for civil sector.		
UNMOVIC	Nassr Company for Mechanical Industries	Engaged in production of steel structures, forging casts, moulds, and fixtures for industrial uses.		All key buildings were inspected and tagged dual-use pieces of equipment were identified.
UNMOVIC biological team	Mosul Bakery Yeast Factory	Previously declared biological site.		Inspected buildings related to yeast and alcohol production.
UNMOVIC biological team	Department of Biology-College of Sciences (Mosul University)			Inspected several buildings and took samples.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Taji Project 144	Location where prohibited missile items were previously excavated and now stored.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Area on Al Saklawiya River (3.5 km on either side of river)	Former destruction area for gyroscope parts.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Modern Paints Industries	Site comprises production buildings, stores, and supporting facilities. Uses imported chemicals.	Y	Site previously inspected but not included in October 2002 declarations.
19 December 2002				
IAEA	Nahrawan	Metals machining plant.		Monitored for dual-use equipment known to IAEA, and for new equipment.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Mamoun factory of Rasheed State Company	Produces propellant for solid fuel missiles and was associated with nuclear programme.		Monitored for dual-use equipment known to IAEA, and for new equipment.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Ibn Firnas State Company (MIC)	Conducts research and development work on aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles for the Armed Forces.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al-Harith Missile Maintenance Workshop	Anti-aircraft missile maintenance facility for missile systems.		Over 30 buildings inspected.
UNMOVIC	Guesthouse in Al Rashidiya region			Team delayed for 20 minutes at gate for discussion on procedural matters. Team leader entered two buildings and completed inspection accompanied by interpreter and Iraqi NMD official.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Falluja III (part of Al Tariq Company)			Second visit to the site. Inspected for current status and activity of site.
UNMOVIC biological team	Ibn Al-Baetar Centre (at Al Taji)	Previously declared site.	Y	Inspected Veterinary Drug Research Production Centre, Chemical Production and Analysis facility, and Biological Research and Development Department.
20 December 2002				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Requested access during non-standard hours, observed work-shift levels.
IAEA	Shaklyli stores	Store for dual-use equipment from past nuclear programme.		Inspected during non-work day. Carried out environmental radiation surveys in the area.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Tuwaitha--Industrial Chemical Research Centre	Nuclear facility.	Y	Muslim holy day, site closed. Guard made site available to full inspection. All department managers arrived after start of inspection and briefed inspectors about current activities.
21 December 2002				

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	14 Ramadan Factory	Wool and textile facility.		
IAEA	Binwalid Factory	Manufactures metal goods, has high-quality machine tools.		
IAEA	Al Raya State Company	Materials science centre; researches metals, ceramics, and plastics for industry.		
IAEA	Al Zahef Al Kabeer	Metal and plastic production (recycling metal and producing waterproof coatings).		
UNMOVIC	Samoud Scrap Yard (owned by Samoud Company)	Scrap sent to Al Samoud factory for reprocessing.		Chemists, toxicologists, and missile experts inspected all areas of site.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Research and Analytical Centre for Pesticides (formerly part of Tariq State Company)	Merged with Quality Control Department of Falluja III.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Furat State Establishment for Chemical Industry	Previously declared site.	Y	Inspectors updated information about the site and verified data provided in last semi-annual declaration.
UNMOVIC biological team	Samra Drug Industry	Pharmaceutical company owned by Ministry of Industries and Minerals, produces wide range of pharmaceutical products.		23 inspectors inspected entire site. Confirmed all tags and inventories and discussed site activities with site representatives.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Qa Qaa double base propellant plant			Over 40 buildings inspected as part of on-going monitoring of Iraqi missile propellant capability.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al-Fedaa Hydraulic Plant	Plant actively engaged in manufacture of missile and rocket launchers and refurbishment of tank transporters.		
22 December 2002				
IAEA	Mansour State Company	Electronics factory subordinate to MIC,		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Farabi Computer Centre (MIC)	produces piece components and finished electrical goods for military and civilian sectors. Produces industrial gases and purified water. Programs computers for business, provides contract services for documentation, archiving, and data processing.		
IAEA	Tahrir Institute of Welding Technology (MIC)	Teaching institute in MIC structure--prepares welders in 2-year programme.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Battanee Centre (Baghdad Space Research and Development Centre)	Scientific group conducting space technology, space optics, atmospheric studies, and remote sensing. Provides telemetry systems for Al Samoud missile system.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Taji Technical Battalion	Site belongs to Iraqi military, missile storage area and former Scud dumpsite.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Nahrawan site (part of Al Basil Company of MIC)	Several pilot plants involved in production of chemicals. Previously declared site; dual-use equipment and chemicals.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Kindi Company for the Production of Veterinary Vaccines	Mixed sector company owned by Ministry of Agriculture. Previously declared site.	Y	Site produces variety of viral and bacterial veterinary vaccines.
23 December 2002				
IAEA	Al Razi Company (MIC)	Created in 1997 with staff and equipment from former nuclear programme. Involved in laser development and military projects.		
IAEA	Beytar Factory	Storage for equipment salvaged from nuclear facilities.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC biological team	Abu Gharib Baby Milk Plant	Factory owned by Ministry of Industry and Metals, out of operation for three years. Previously declared site.	Y	Site contains dual-use equipment which is tagged and accounted for.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Ibn Al Baytar Research Centre	Centre focuses on research and production of chemicals for pharmaceutical purposes.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Taji Technical Battalion	Missile storage area.		Continued work of the previous day.
24 December 2002				
IAEA	Salah al Din General Establishment	Electronics factory, produces radars, fuses, communications equipment for military and civilian sectors.		Associated with nuclear programme until 1990.
IAEA	Baghdad Technical University	Major technical university.		Inspectors requested private interview with particular Iraqi scientist; interview conducted in randomly selected, unmonitored office.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Nidaa Factory	Factory constructs mechanical parts and equipment for missiles.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Abdul Kareen Abass Plant	Manufactures ammonium perchlorate (used in solid propellant).		Newly declared site.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Tarmiya (under control of Taji Technical Battalion)			Team checked and applied identification tags to missiles and warheads.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Baquba (under control of Taji Technical Battalion)			Team checked and applied identification tags to missiles and warheads.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Taji (under control of Taji Technical Battalion)			Team checked and applied identification tags to missiles and warheads.
UNMOVIC biological team	College of Veterinary Medicine at Baghdad University	Limited research capabilities in veterinary medicine and bacteriology.	Y	Inspected entire site and checked previously tagged equipment.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC biological team	(Abu Ghraib) National Company Food Industries brewery.	Site contained previously tagged dual-use equipment, fermenters, and filter press.	Y	
UNMOVIC chemical team	Hutten State Establishment (Iskandariyah Ammunition Filling Plant)	Site produces ammunition.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Oil facilities in the Basra region.			
25 December 2002				
IAEA	Hatteen Fateh Explosives Factory	Produces explosives for military bombs, shells, and rockets.	Y	Inspectors focused on changes at site in the last four years that could aid a nuclear programme.
IAEA	Um Al Maarik Factory	Produces metal parts for military programmes.		Part of ongoing attempt to monitor production of indigenous materials with potential dual-use capabilities.
IAEA	Al Qa Qaa	Explosives plant.		Cooperative venture with Iraqi auditors. Made item counts of potential dual-use materials. Results will be used as part of verification of Iraq's use of special metals.
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Taji Single Cell Protein Plant	Plant now remodeled and used by liquid propane gas filling company.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Kadhimiya Plant and Shumouk Stores			Team inventoried storage buildings.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Basra State Establishment for Paper Industry			
26 December 2002				
IAEA	Tho Al Fekar	Has large stocks of high-strength aluminum with dual-use purposes.		Inspectors met with senior members of the National Monitoring Directorate. Purpose to independently compare inventories of IAEA and Iraq.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Private trading company	Represents companies outside of Iraq.		Unannounced inspection. Inspectors reviewed purchases made on behalf of Iraqi military programmes. Company recently involved in attempts to procure high-strength aluminum.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Rasheed Headquarters			Inspectors held technical talks with Iraqi experts about site declarations, future plans, and status of solid propellant missile programmes. Some team members inspected administration building.
UNMOVIC biological team	Food Examination and Analysis Laboratory of Al Jadiriyah	Laboratory belongs to Ministry of Trade, previously declared site with tagged equipment. Laboratory tests for food and pharmaceutical contaminants.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Mussayib Pharmaceutical Complex		Y	Site under construction when visited in 1998, still under construction.
UNMOVIC	Baghdad Technology University			Inspectors met with Dean of university on activities of the university.
27 December 2002				
IAEA	Dr. Kathem Mujbel	Iraqi scientist. Key metallurgist from Al-Raya state company.		Interview conducted. Scientist provided technical details of a military programme with suspected possible prelude to nuclear programme. Answers provided will be very useful in conducting assessment.
UNMOVIC biological team	Modern Chemical Industries	Private company that produces alcohol. Previously declared site due to dual-use equipment.	Y	Site closed for Christmas holiday but access granted to offices, production areas, and laboratory.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Nasser Al Athim (Al Adheem) State Company	Facility for heavy engineering.		Inspectors rebaselined facility. Access granted to all buildings.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Nasser Al Athim (Al Adheem) State Company	Company conducts metal working for civilian and military purposes.		Some inspectors met with site personnel while others inspected buildings.
28 December 2002				
IAEA	Private trading company	Handles procurement matters for MIC.		Reviewed files concerning procurement and international offers. Team also went to last known address of another private trading company but the building was abandoned.
UNMOVIC	Hadre Air Force Munitions Test Site			
UNMOVIC biological team	National Food Industries Company (Yaffa Juice Plant)	Previously declared site. Contains dual-use equipment.	Y	
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Kindi Veterinary Vaccines			Follow-up visit from inspection of 22 December. Site contains monitoring cameras installed by UNSCOM.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Qaib Warhead-Filling Factory of Al Qa Qaa complex	Site fills Al Samoud and Al Fatah missiles.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Ibn Younis Centre	Mechanical design establishment.		Site part of a larger compound containing: Ibn Rasheed Company (maintenance of fire-fighting equipment, water analyses, and quality control of construction materials), General Automobile Company, SCANIA, Aria Center (mechanical repair centre), and regional Baath Party Office. All sites inspected.
29 December 2002				
IAEA	Eyz Company	Produces generic electronic equipment.		
IAEA	Salam Factory	Produces communications equipment for military and civilian sectors.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC chemical team	Chemical Engineering Design Centre (Saad Company)	Involved in projects for chemical and petrochemical production.		Inspectors examined archives and current projects. Examined management and personnel.
UNMOVIC	General Commission of Customs	Iraq's central customs authority.		
30 December 2002				
IAEA	Al Sawary Est-Jihad	Site consists of a resin factory and a fiberglass plant.	Y	Resin factory produces resins, fiberglass factory no longer operational. Purpose to determine if changes have taken place since 1998.
UNMOVIC biological team	Central Public Health Laboratory	Provides primary and reference clinical laboratory services.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Plant Protection Division #1 (Abu Ghraib Plant)	Facility in charge of agricultural quarantine centers, screens imported and exported agricultural products and distribution of pesticides.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Nida'a State Company	Mechanical company with dual-use items.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Samood Factory	Produces major components of Al Samood missiles and assembles missiles.		Previously visited on 14 December, purpose to conduct accurate accounting of missile engines.
UNMOVIC	Al Mahamoudiayah	Water treatment plant. Central chlorine store for water treatment plants outside Baghdad.		
31 December 2002				
IAEA	Mechanical Engineering Design Centre	Consists of several technical design departments; serves local industry in design of		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
		general and specialized equipment.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mamoun Plant			Inspectors visited to observe casting process of solid propellant motor for Al Ubour missile.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mansour Plant	Produces semiconductors, industrial gases, drinking water.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Ibn Seena Research Centre	Conducts research and testing into new pharmaceutical formulations.		
UNMOVIC biological team	National Centre of Drug Control and Research	Owned by Ministry of Health, analyzes imported and locally manufactured drugs.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Chemical Engineering Research Design Centre (Saad Company)			Inspected on 29 December. Verified status of current activities and activities since 1998.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Petrochemical Research and Development Centre	Under auspices of Ministry of Oil.		Verified status of current activities and activities since 1998.
UNMOVIC	Chemical Corp's Training Centre	Conducts live training.		
1 January 2003				
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Harith Factory at Taji Camp	Inspectors removed tags from SA-2 missiles for required maintenance, reinspected facility.	Previously inspected on 19 December	
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Najd Al Amiriyah Stores	Contains electronics and corrosion-resistant materials.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Baghdad Alcoholic Drinks Company	Brewery.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC biological team	7-Up Plant	Plant produces carbonated beverages.		
2 January 2003				
IAEA	Falluja Lead Recovery Plant	Operates gas-fixed furnaces.		
IAEA	Khan Dari	Contains materials and equipment.		Inspected storage site.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Hadar State Company (formerly known as Ash Sharqat Uranium Enrichment Facility)	Chemical plant, produces nitric acid and ammonium nitrate.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Fatah State Company	Iraqi Solid Propellant Missile Programmes.		Site inspected on 14 December. Inspectors returned to hold technical talks with key personnel.
UNMOVIC biological team	Technical Military Depot for Air Force Al Taji	Large military site, houses spare aircraft parts.		
UNMOVIC	Ibn Firnas State Company (MIC)	Engineering and procurement facility supporting the Air Force.		
UNMOVIC	Al Fatah State Company	Visited to verify information on aviation-related matters.		
3 January 2003				
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mamoun Plant (owned by Al Rasheed Company)			Inspectors tagged declared equipment manufactured between 1998 and 2002.
UNMOVIC	Ammunitions Depot	Used as chemical weapons storage facility prior to Gulf War.	Y	
UNMOVIC	Area adjacent to ammunition depot.	Used in 1980s for chemical weapons munitions tests.	Y	
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Basil Narawan (part of Al Basil Centre)	Produces chemicals including sodium carbonates.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
4 January 2003				
IAEA	Al Mamoud Plant	Manufactures composite propellant fuel for missiles. Has small civilian manufacturing sector.		
IAEA	Al Aboor SE (Iraqi Plant) Plant	Refurbishes machine tools. Produces spare parts for military and civilian sectors.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Ibn Sina Centre at Farmiyah	Chemical research centre and former uranium enrichment facility.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Khalis Alcohol Factory	Produces alcohol.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Baghdad University College of Agriculture and the Biology Department of the Baghdad University College of Education			
UNMOVIC	Shayk Mahzar Airfield	Large airfield located in southern no-fly zone.		Gathered information to rebaseline the site.
5 January 2003				
IAEA	Saddam Graphite Plant	Manufactures graphite electrodes for use in induction arc furnaces for iron and steel industry.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Basil Centre-Jadriyah	Chemical and petroleum research centre.		Team froze all entrances, people and vehicles allowed to leave subject to search.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Nissan #7 Factory	Contributes to missile programmes.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mamoun Plant	Solid propellant production.		Inspectors returned to finish equipment tagging started on 3 January.
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Rasheed Central Military Medical Laboratory and Al Rasheed Military Hospital	Located in complex owned by Ministry of Defence.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC biological team	Microbiology Department of College of Medicine (Basra University)			
UNMOBIC	Marine Science Centre (Basra University)			
UNMOBIC	Biology Department of the College of Science (Basra University)			
UNMOVIC	Al Aziziyah Firing Range	Previously stored proscribed munitions.		
UNMOVIC	Ibn Sina Teaching Hospital			
6 January 2003				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Inspected several locations: Nuclear Physics Academic Research Centre, Physics Research Materials and Electronics Studies Centre, and Laser and Plasma Research Centre. Conducted to ascertain level of activity.
UNMOVIC biological team	Ibn Seena Centre	Facility for the production of veterinary drugs.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Iraqi army base south of Baghdad			Team tagged ground-to-ground solid propellant rockets (Al Fatah). Remaining rockets will be tagged this week.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Falluja III (Al Tariq Company)	Pesticide formulation plant.		Previously inspected on 8 and 19 December.
UNMOVIC	Al Fao Company	Repairs engines, pumps, compressors used by water-treatment and other industries.		Inspectors visited maintenance section.
UNMOVIC	Free Trading Zone Commission	Affiliated with Ministry of Finance. Independent		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
	(FTZC)	investment commission.		
7 January 2003				
IAEA	Bakir Air Base			Performed to verify information associated with another site.
IAEA	Kubaisa Cement Factory			Performed to verify information associated with another site.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Qaim State Company for Phosphate	Fertilizer plant.		Airborne inspection. Successful use of helicopters in inspection. Accompanied by Iraqi helicopters.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mamoun Plant (Al Rasheed Company)			Inspected critical equipment that had been tagged by missile team.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mutaseem Plant (Al Rasheed Company)			Checked static test stand where upcoming missile test is planned.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Samoud Factory			Team checked two missile engines that will be static tested in coming days.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Fallujah			Team continued tagging Al Fatah ground-to-ground solid propellant rockets.
UNMOVIC biological team	Saddam Centre for Cancer and Medical Genetics	Performs cancer research.		
UNMOVIC	Ukhaider Ammunition and Missile Storage Area			
UNMOVIC	College of Education and the Chemistry Department of the College of Sciences at the University of Mosul			Team visited library, related laboratories, and storage facilities.
8 January 2003				
IAEA	Kufa (Qufaa) Cement Plant			
IAEA	Samawa Cement			

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Plant Karbala Cement Plant			
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mamoun Plant (Al Rasheed Company)			Third day of inspections; tagged solid propellant motors for Al Fatah rockets, witnessed casting of solid propellant into Al Fatah motor case. Conducted discussions with site experts regarding missile production capabilities.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Falluja II	Chemical plant		Last inspected on 17 December. Inspected storage buildings and sought clarification on various issues.
UNMOVIC biological team	Saddam College of Medicine at Saddam University	Educates students to become doctors. Research institution.		
UNMOVIC	Mechanical Workshop of the Al Nasr State Company for the Maintenance of Irrigation Projects			
UNMOVIC	Nineveh Drug Industry			
UNMOVIC	Nineveh Factory for Intravenous Drugs Production			Conducted follow-up inspection.
9 January 2003				
IAEA	Baquba Electrical Plant (state company for Electrical Industries)	Produces electrical goods.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Rafah Liquid Engine Test Facility			Team visited to observe static test firing of Al Samoud missile engine. Witnessed test.
UNMOVIC missile	Al Meelad Military Research and	Designs and develops missile guidance and		Inspectors questioned technical staff about status of Al Fatah

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
inspectors	Development Company	control systems.		programme.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Harith Missile Maintenance Workshop			Missile inspectors temporarily removed UNMOVIC identification tags from missiles for required maintenance and repair.
UNMOVIC biological team	Central Veterinary Diagnosis Laboratory	Laboratory analyzes animal blood and tissue samples for disease diagnosis.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Siniya Small Refineries Project	Small refineries.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Rayad State Company	Research centre for materials and catalysts.		
UNMOVIC	General Public Health Laboratory	Laboratory conducts bacteriological diagnostic tests.		
10 January 2003				
UNMOVIC biological team	State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing (two sites)	Company imports medical equipment and supplies.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Mamoun Factory of Al Rasheed State Company			Team inspected polyester plant, chemical stores, and rubber and plastic workshops.
11 January 2003				
IAEA	Saddam GE Plant	Engineering machine tools capability.		
IAEA	Qa Qaa Sumood Explosives Plant	Produces civilian and military explosives.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Ibn Sina Centre (Tarmiyah)	Inspectors visited to verify equipment and raw materials used in chemical processes linked to missile activities.		
UNMOVIC	Airfield 300 km west northwest of Baghdad			Inspectors traveled via helicopter to inspect an airfield that no longer functions as an airfield.
UNMOVIC	Tiklit University	Team inspected Colleges of		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
chemical team		Science, Agriculture, Engineering, Medicine, and Women's Education.		
UNMOVIC biological team	State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing (two sites)	Team returned to continue inspections from previous day.		
UNMOVIC	Mosul Dairy Plant	Inspectors visited to determine status of current activities and to verify previously tagged equipment.		
12 January 2003				
IAEA and UNMOVIC chemical team	Sharqat EMIS Facility	Formerly housed an electromagnetic isotope separation facility, currently a factory that produces nitric acid.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Rafah Liquid Engine Test Facility	Team observed static test of Al Samoud engine.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mutaseem	Team observed static test of Al Uboor motor (planned for use in ground-to-air missile system).		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Basra	Inspectors tagged Al Farah missiles.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Department of Microbiology of the College of Medicine, Baghdad University	Department teaches third-year medical students microbiology and parasitology.		
UNMOVIC biological team	College of Pharmacy, Baghdad University			
UNMOVIC biological team	Technical Military Depot for the Air Force (Al Taji)	Inspectors conducted follow-up visit from 2 January inspection.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Army unit north of Basra	Inspectors attached inventory tags to Al Fatah missiles.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	National Chemical Plastic Industry	Plastics manufacturer.		
UNMOVIC	Jaber Ben Hayan State Establishment	Company produces chemical protection equipment.		
13 January 2003				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.	Y	Inspectors confirmed certain components of October 2002 declaration.
IAEA	Technology University, Baghdad	Inspectors verified scientific and technical activities.		
IAEA	Ibn Roshd Company	Quality Control Centre for MIC.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Ameer Factory (Saddam State Establishment)	Prior to 1991 factory assembled SCUD components, now fabricates artillery equipment.		
UNMOVIC	Al Muhammadiyah area (airstrip, adjacent storage area, and bombing range)	Inspectors investigated debris from bombing range.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Technology University, Baghdad			Team rebaselined entire site and inspected Department of Chemical Technology.
UNMOVIC biological team	Baghdad University College of Science for Women	College instructs future women high school teachers.		Some graduates enter fields other than teaching.
UNMOVIC biological team	Department of Biology at Baghdad University College of Science	Department teaches microbiology, zoology, botany, and environmental science.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
14 January 2003				
IAEA	Tho Al Fukar Mechanical Plant	Mechanical manufacturing engineering plant.		
IAEA	Sumood Factory	Operates a foundry.		
IAEA	Nassr State Establishment	Operates a foundry.		
IAEA	Qa Qaa Stores	Storage of high explosives.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Al Rabia Centre for Agricultural Research	Conducts research on seeds, plants, and plant by-products for agricultural or industrial uses.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Technical Military Depot for the Air Force, Al Taji			
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mutaseem	Inspectors tagged Al Fatah missiles as part of process of accounting for all Al Fatah missiles.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Inskandariya Explosives Research and Development facility (split into Al Kudus and Al Numan Companies)			
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Zaafaraniya Rocket Motor Test Stand	Inspectors verified that site is ineffective.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Munitions depot outside Baghdad.			
15 January 2003				
IAEA	Isakandariya State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries	General-purpose heavy equipment engineering plant.		
IAEA	Al Mutaz Technical Institute	Conducts mechanical engineering.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
IAEA	Hatteen State Company	Ammunitions and armourments organization.		
UNMOVIC	Government office buildings adjacent to a Presidential compound in Baghdad	Inspectors did not enter the Presidential compound.		
UNMOVIC	Tiklit Munitions Depot			
UNMOVIC chemical team	Saad State Company	Design centre for refineries.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Khan Dari Stores	Storage facility.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Nassr Al Adheem State Company	Heavy equipment manufacturer.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Agricultural site south of Baghdad	Privately owned farm.		Several doors were locked and keys were not available. Inspectors sealed doors until keys were found several hours later.
UNMOVIC biological team	Anbar University in Ramadi	Inspectors visited four colleges: College of Education for Women (Biology Department), College of Science, College of Education, and College of Medicine.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Ameen Factory (belongs to Al Rasheed State Company)	Prior to 1991 factory involved in BADR 200 solid propellant missile project, currently responsible for fabrication of parts for other solid propellant missiles.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Rasheed SC Headquarters	Inspectors verified information provided by Al Ameen staff.		
UNMOVIC	Mosul Technical Institute	Institute conducts agricultural research.		
UNMOVIC missile	Al Zafaraniya Military College of	Inspectors verified information provided by Al		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
inspectors	Engineering	Ameen staff.		
16 January 2003				
UNMOVIC	Residences of two Iraqi scientists.	Inspectors searched for documents.		Some documents were removed for evaluation.
UNMOVIC	Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area	Inspected large group of bunkers constructed in late 1990s.		Inspectors discovered empty chemical warheads.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Nidaa State Company	Manufactures equipment used in production of solid propellant rocket motors.		Inspectors held discussions with plant representatives to verify information found elsewhere.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Nissan 17 Factory	Factory produces moulds and casts for military and civil applications, including Al Samoud ballistic missile.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Storage facilities in and around Rasheed State Company for Production of Construction and Building Materials			
17 January 2003				
UNMOVIC biological team	As Suwayrah (nearby farm and ice-making factory)	Several areas of the farm were surveyed using multi-frequency electromagnetic detectors.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Falluja I	Storage of farm products.		Largely deserted site.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Falluja II	Comprises headquarters of Al-Tariq Company and factory area, produces phenol and chlorine.		Chlorine plant is inoperative.
18 January 2003				
IAEA	University of Baghdad, Baghdad	Inspected College of Science (Ibn Al Haytham Campus) and College of Education (Jaderia).		
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility.		Conducted motorized survey.

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
UNMOVIC	Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area	Team visited to conduct further analysis of 12th warhead found on 16 January.		Team took samples from warhead and resealed warhead and storage building.
UNMOVIC	Al-Numan General Company	Manufacturing plant specializing in finishing plastic and metal parts.		Status of current activities assessed.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Site deep inside northern No-Fly-Zone.			Mission cancelled for safety reasons due to Iraqi insistence to fly alongside UNMOVIC helicopters.
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Qa Qaa complex	Conducted survey using multi-frequency electromagnetic detectors.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Kufa University	Team visited three colleges: Microbiology Department at College of Medicine, College of Science, and Biology Department at the College of Education for Women.		
UNMOVIC biological team	State Company for Foodstuff Trading under Ministry of Trade	Inspected quality control laboratories and two mobile laboratories (declared).		
UNMOVIC	Textile factory in Mosul.			
19 January 2003				
IAEA	University of Baghdad	Team visited four colleges: College of Engineering, Second College of Engineering, College of Education for Women, and College of Science for Women.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Basil Centre-Jadriyah	Research centre for petroleum products.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Fallujah II	Phenol and chlorine production facility.		Inspectors used metal analyzing instrument.
UNMOVIC	Al Qa Qaa complex	Inspectors returned to	Y	Inspectors used mobile sampling

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
chemical team		investigate storage facilities.		equipment.
UNMOVIC biological team	Babil University Colleges of Medicine and Science			
UNMOVIC biological team	Amiryah Serum and Vaccine Institute	Team inspected three warehouses, refrigerated trucks, and containers.	Y	Previously-declared site.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mutaseem			Inspectors used electromagnetic detectors.
UNMOVIC	Al Rasheed Factory (Heteen State Company)	Company manufactures fuses for artillery munitions.		
UNMOVIC	Al-Mishraq Sulphur State Company	Previously-declared site. Conducts sulphur mining and comprises sulfuric acid and aluminum sulfate plant.		
20 January 2003				
IAEA	Two previously uninspected sites north of Baghdad.			Simultaneous inspections, conducted with help of UNMOVIC geophysical and chemical inspectors.
UNMOVIC biological team	Communicable Diseases Control Centre	Responsible for infectious diseases epidemic control.		Inspectors carried out discussions related to site activity.
UNMOVIC biological team	Kham Vani Saad	Declared site with tagged equipment.	Y	Inspected two large hangars.
UNMOVIC biological team	Baghdad Alcoholic Drinks Company	Inspectors visited quality control laboratory and inspected tagged equipment..		
UNMOVIC biological team	Agricultural site south of Baghdad	Completed inspections of buildings sealed on first visit of 15 January.		
UNMOVIC chemical	Al Qa Qaa complex	Inspected production units.		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
team				
UNMOVIC	Rashdiya Munitions Filling Plant			
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Qa Qaa complex	Inspectors examined static test stands, used to test small rocket motors.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Harith Workshop	Inspectors retagged SA-2 missiles (tags removed week prior for maintenance) and removed other tags for missile maintenance.		
21 January 2003				
IAEA	Tuwaitha	Nuclear facility. Inspectors conducted motorized radiation survey, checked sealed equipment, and inspected buildings.	Y	
UNMOVIC	Location of four 122mm rocket warheads.	Inspectors examined, X-rayed, and tagged warheads; sealed bunker.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Al Mutaseem	Team observed static test of Al Fatah motor.		
UNMOVIC missile inspectors	Shahiyat Test Facility	Inspectors visited to verify that site has been abandoned.		
UNMOVIC chemical team	Al Qa Qaa complex	Inspectors used portable analytical instrument to analyze metal. Inspected some units producing chemicals.		
UNMOVIC biological team	College of Agriculture, Baghdad University (Abu Ghraib)	Inspectors verified tagged equipment.		
UNMOVIC biological team	Agricultural Research Centre (Abu Ghraib)	Centre researches plant diseases, development of disease resistant plants, and soil improvement.		
UNMOVIC	Lime production	Site produces lime from		

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Inspecting Body	Site Inspected	Type of Site and/or Reason for Inspection	Inspected previously?	Comments
	facility (near Mosul).	limestone.		