

# Oversight or Overlooked?

## Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Reforming Security Systems and the Practice of Counterterrorism

A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame

ALISTAIR MILLAR  
*with David Cortright,  
Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf,  
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## Acronyms

ASSN	African Security Sector Network
CR	Conciliation Resources
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTM	Counterterrorism Measure
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
IANSa	International Action Network on Small Arms
JSMP	Judicial System Monitoring Programme
NCTC	Kenyan National Counter-Terrorism Centre
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RECSA	Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons
SADSEM	Southern African Defense and Security Management
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
SSR	Security System Reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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## Executive Summary

This report considers civil society's role in monitoring Security System Reform (SSR) and counterterrorism both in policy and in practice. The report argues that civil society engagement, particularly with local actors, is central to ensuring proper civilian oversight and the overall effectiveness of both SSR and counterterrorism efforts and examines how efforts to engage civil society may be improved.

The report begins by looking at how the concepts of both SSR and counterterrorism have evolved in recent years, tracing that evolution within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the United Nations. It highlights the linkages between SSR and UN mandated counterterrorism measures (CTMs) and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It notes that a conceptual shift has occurred at the international level within the OECD DAC and at the United Nations, which emphasizes the need for more holistic and inclusive approaches to implementation of both SSR and CTMs and a broader and more active role for civil society.

The report notes this evolution appears to have proceeded independently, without lessons from the SSR experience informing efforts to engage civil society on counterterrorism or vice versa, and without coordination efforts at the international level aimed at addressing the linkages and overlaps in counterterrorism and SSR.

The report then examines engagement with civil society in SSR and counterterrorism in practice. It cites examples of the involvement of CSOs in the implementation of SSR on the ground but finds that the conceptual shift toward more holistic approaches is not occurring in practice at the country level, where entry points for civil society involvement in SSR and in monitoring CTMs remain limited.

The report discusses some of the main challenges to greater civil society engagement on SSR and counterterrorism and examines several best practice examples, including the African Security Sector Network, and the lessons those examples may offer for engaging civil society on counterterrorism matters.

It concludes with a series of recommendations for more effectively engaging civil society in the development, implementation, and oversight of CTMs and SSR, including through the formation of regional and subregional networks to facilitate engagement and interaction between civil society and other relevant stakeholders.





# **Oversight or Overlooked?**

## **Civil Society's Role in Monitoring and Reforming Security Systems and the Practice of Counterterrorism**

### **Introduction**

After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the United Nations Security Council called upon all states to implement stringent counterterrorism measures (CTMs).<sup>1</sup> While arguably intended to support good governance and respect for human rights, UN counterterrorism mandates have been used by certain states as a pretext to enact repressive CTMs that have led to an erosion of civil liberties and human rights, with significant repercussions for civil society groups, particularly in the global South. Emphasizing expediency over effectiveness and established standards of human rights, CTMs and related capacity-building efforts have in some instances proven counterproductive. They have, in some cases, served to bolster dysfunctional state security services and eroded gains in responsible policing and the working of the military in internal affairs that were made over the past decade. These have been to the detriment of the general public's security, sustainable development, and the space afforded to civil society.

The concept of Security System Reform (SSR)<sup>2</sup> emerged in the 1990s in response to the recognition that development and security are inextricably linked and that efforts to bolster security must be carried out within a framework of strengthening democratic governance. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) describes SSR as the “transformation of the ‘security system’—which includes all the actors,<sup>3</sup> their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”<sup>4</sup>

Emphasizing accountability and democratic oversight first and foremost, SSR may, therefore, offer a useful framework for a necessary course correction in counterterrorism. It does so by making operational the increasing recognition that implementation of CTMs, UN mandated and otherwise, will not be effective without state security systems that are professional, accountable, and protect human rights and civil society.

As both SSR and the UN counterterrorism agenda have evolved in recent years, civil society<sup>5</sup> has played an important role in shaping more holistic approaches to both. There is growing acknowledgement among states and within the United Nations that nongovernment actors and parliamentarians can perform crucial civilian oversight and monitoring functions. As the DAC describes, “the involvement of civil society in SSR programs is a precondition for wider and more inclusive local ownership and, ultimately, sustainability. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have an important role to play owing to their potential for giving voice to the interests and concerns of the wider population and encouraging reforms that respond to popular security and justice needs.”<sup>6</sup> Independent oversight comprises a necessary element of SSR and good governance efforts and is crucial to effective implementation of UN mandated CTMs. Unfortunately, in practice, the role for on-the-ground CSOs in SSR, counterterrorism, and counterterrorism capacity building has been rather limited.

This report considers civil society's role in monitoring and reforming security systems and counterterrorism both in policy and in practice and examines lessons that may be gleaned from civil society engagement in SSR. It looks at linkages between SSR and UN mandated CTMs and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and notes that a conceptual shift has occurred at the international level within the OECD DAC and at the United Nations. The new paradigm emphasizes the need for more holistic

and inclusive approaches to implementation of both SSR and CTMs that include engagement with civil society. This report cites a few examples of the involvement of CSOs in the implementation of SSR on the ground, where SSR remains a largely *ad hoc* undertaking. It finds that it is not clear that this conceptual shift is occurring in practice at the country level where entry points for civil society involvement in SSR and in monitoring CTMs remain limited. Moreover, there are no coordination efforts underway at the international level aimed at addressing the linkages and overlaps in counterterrorism and SSR programs and ensuring that those efforts are mutually reinforcing and do not undermine one another. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations for how to more effectively engage civil society in the development, implementation, and oversight of CTMs and SSR.

## Civil Society and SSR

Debate at the United Nations about SSR and strategic counterterrorism has increased in recent years, leading to official recognition that more attention to good governance, development, and human rights is essential for overcoming the limitations of narrower hard-edged security focused approaches in both areas. As both discourses have evolved, each has envisioned, at least rhetorically, a broader role for civil society. A recent handbook edited by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, outlines numerous important contributions that CSOs can make to SSR, such as:

facilitating dialogue and debate on policy issues; educating politicians, policy makers and the public on special issues of concern; empowering groups and the public through training and awareness-raising on specific issues; sharing specialized information and knowledge of local needs and conditions with policy makers, parliamentarian and the media, improving the legitimacy of policy processes through broader inclusion of societal groups and perspectives, encouraging security policies that are representative of and responsive to local communities; representing the interests of groups and communities in the policy environment; putting security reform issues on the political agenda; providing a pool of independent expertise, information and perspectives, undertaking policy-relevant research, providing specialized information and policy input; promoting transparency and accountability of security institutions; and monitoring reform and policy implementation.<sup>7</sup>

On SSR, it has been noted that “the security agenda has broadened to include the well-being of populations and human rights, SSR being part of the wider ‘human security’ framework. In this context, security and development have become increasingly linked—international security actors have realized that their short-term operations will not bring sustainable benefit without coordinating their activities with longer-term development work.”<sup>8</sup>

During the Cold War funding and restructuring the armed forces in states allied with Washington or Moscow was provided for the narrow purpose of furthering the security interests of each superpower.<sup>9</sup> Since then efforts to enhance the capacity, effectiveness, and democratic behavior of security actors have evolved so that in the last two decades a more holistic concept of SSR has emerged to encompass a policy agenda that encourages a high degree of professionalism among security actors along with the promotion of human rights and civilian oversight from government and nongovernment stakeholders.

Civil society has rather specific and concrete contributions to make to SSR processes in terms of monitoring and oversight but also in policy development and the conduct of security sector and defense reviews. The UK Department for International Development (DFID), for example, has noted that,

Improving civic awareness of security issues is a starting point for improving relations between the security forces and the public, creating a national consensus on a reform programme, and building political coalitions to sustain the process. Civil society can also play more specific roles by facilitating dialogue, monitoring the activities of the security forces, and expressing views on security policy as well as providing policy advice. This may be particularly useful

where state capacity is weak: the role of legislatures or other government departments in analysing security issues, for instance, can be greatly enhanced by assistance from specialist external campaigning groups or think tanks providing research and analytical support.<sup>10</sup>

In 2004, the OECD DAC produced, and the membership endorsed, a policy paper titled *Security System Reform and Governance*.<sup>11</sup> The DAC paper urges stakeholders to “redefine security and move the debate from the realist version to a more comprehensive and co-operative approach.”<sup>12</sup> It highlights a growing recognition among a number of independent experts and government officials, particularly in some donor countries, that reform processes need to be locally “owned and led”<sup>13</sup> and coordinated with other state functions. The programs should demonstrate clear institutional divisions/boundaries within the various functional sub-sectors, including the police, military, border guard, and intelligence personnel.<sup>14</sup> The paper also highlights the importance of understanding the context in which reform takes place, including the needs and capacities of the target sectors as well as the interests and expectations of those involved and of the wider community.

The importance of subjecting the security sector to regular parliamentary scrutiny has also become a core element of the design and implementation of SSR programs and can open avenues for civil society input. Open and transparent processes with possibilities for civil society participation are recognized as an important part of security sector governance. According to the DAC,

[c]ivilian oversight and accountability is [sic] needed to ensure that state-military relations are conducive to democratic politics and that human security is promoted as well as national security. This can be difficult to achieve where there are complex technical issues, vested interests and a culture of secrecy at stake. Approaches in this area often include building the capacity and expertise of a variety of state institutions, including governments, legislatures, judicial institutions, ombudsmen and complaints bodies. Non-state actors can also play an important role.<sup>15</sup>

In a process led by DFID and the OECD Directorate for Development Co-operation, the OECD produced a handbook in 2007 to provide “guidance to operationalise the OECD DAC guidelines on SSR and close the gap between policy and practice.”<sup>16</sup> The handbook builds upon an *Implementation Framework for Security System Reform*, which was endorsed in a ministerial statement by the DAC and was informed by a consortium of experts from Bradford University, Clingendael, Saferworld, Kings College, and the African Security Sector Network. On the subject of civil society involvement in SSR, the handbook asserts that, “CSOs can serve as beneficiary, informal overseer, partner and advocate of reforms as well as service provider. Support to SSR can also be provided by international civil society actors that can play a role in building capacity and designing, advocating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating reforms.”<sup>17</sup> The handbook also states that:

SSR programs should include a firm analysis of the context, role and position of civil society organizations, since their capacity, effectiveness and space to engage vary greatly from country to country. Civil society assessments must take into account the range of local actors beyond those ‘approved’ by the state, and identify those that genuinely focus on improving the security of the poor, of women, of children and youth, and of other groups often excluded from security debate.<sup>18</sup>

It then provides a set of questions to address in a civil society assessment, including inquiring about the political, policy, and legal frameworks in which civil society operates and whether civil society plays a role as an informal oversight actor.<sup>19</sup>

The handbook also discusses points of entry for civil society in SSR. These include peace processes, where implementation usually entails processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) coupled with the (re)establishment of the security system/sector. This presents a considerable challenge for countries emerging from conflict, but it can provide opportunities for civil society input while donor and UN interest is present. National budget processes and security and defense reviews can also provide opportunities for civil society input, as discussed later.

Although SSR, as it has evolved conceptually, suggests a number of entry points and concrete roles for civil society in the development, implementation, and oversight of security sector reform, the reality, as Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley argue, is that “civil society organizations are often relegated to a mere consultative role, for example, by canvassing their views on draft security reviews.”<sup>20</sup>

### **SSR, the United Nations, and Civil Society**

As a conceptual framework, SSR is similarly and increasingly gaining currency within the UN system, but its practical implementation and the entry points for civil society remain limited. Without labeling it as such, the United Nations had been involved in many aspects of SSR since before it was first articulated and discussed as a strategic concept in the late 1990s. Aside from work on development, human rights, and peacekeeping, the United Nations has been engaged in police and judicial reform [also part of peacekeeping]; DDR; and assistance on issues related to civil management and parliamentary oversight of the security sector.<sup>21</sup> Only more recently has the United Nations started discussing and developing a system-wide SSR strategy. Innovative member states and research nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have helped to start what is still a fledgling process, one which, as the DAC’s 2007 handbook points out, has yet to be implemented in practice.

In 2006, Slovakia—then an elected member of the Security Council—convened a series of workshops on SSR in preparation for a thematic debate on the subject in the Council in February 2007. Slovakia worked with UN member states, including Canada, the Netherlands, and South Africa, to host the workshops before and after the Council debate.<sup>22</sup> It partnered with the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, a non-government research organization, creating a “track one and a half process” which has helped to ensure that independent and innovative thinking on SSR is on the agenda for discussion among states. The first workshop, which focused on development of a UN concept for SSR, provided an opportunity for the OECD to unveil its Implementation Framework for SSR within the United Nations. Another important outcome of the process was that it led to a more informed debate within the Security Council and a Presidential Statement, which, *inter alia*, expressed interest in receiving a report on UN approaches to SSR<sup>23</sup> echoing an earlier General Assembly request for such a report.<sup>24</sup> The materials from the earlier workshops made it clear that the Slovakian-led initiative had a profound impact on the report of the Secretary-General that was ultimately released in January 2008.<sup>25</sup>

The Secretary-General’s report is clear about the normative role the United Nations plays in supporting SSR, including by providing legitimacy and offering guidelines. It also outlines “potential operational roles” that the United Nations can play, including supporting an enabling environment for SSR and facilitating national dialogue with government and nongovernment stakeholders.<sup>26</sup> The report candidly acknowledges, however, that despite the United Nations’ “extensive experience” in assisting national actors, “SSR has remained a largely *ad hoc* undertaking.”<sup>27</sup>

At an operational level, the United Nations has only taken up the issue of SSR in the past five or so years. Starting in 2004 and again in 2006, the UN Security Council began including references to SSR in resolutions renewing the mandates of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo and resolutions relating to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2006 and January 2007. Resolutions relating to the UN Missions in Kosovo, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, and Timor-Leste have contained or implied some reference to SSR. Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer point out, however, that “it is premature to judge whether the Security Council is tending towards a broad interpretation of SSR. What is clear though is the scarcity of references in mission mandates to the civilian oversight and good governance dimensions of security sector reform.”<sup>28</sup>

The Secretary-General’s January 2008 report offers a series of suggestions for enhancing the development of a “coherent United Nations approach to SSR.”<sup>29</sup> Although an SSR Working Group exists within the UN Secretariat, the report proposed the creation of a “United Nations inter-agency security sector reform unit” hosted by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which led to the establishment of an SSR team within DPKO’s Office of Rule of Law and Security

Institutions. The team provides advice and support to peacekeeping operations that are involved in supporting national SSR initiatives. It is also reviewing and compiling SSR best practices as a basis for developing guidance and training.<sup>30</sup>

A localized version of such a unit has been integrated into the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.<sup>31</sup> With regard to the role of civil society, the Secretary-General's January 2008 report asserts that

experience has shown that such issues as normative and consultative frameworks, institutional management and oversight mechanisms are often neglected in a security sector reform process, which can undermine the objectives intended to be achieved by such reform and result in a net decrease in security. Lack of attention to the rule of law, governance and oversight can also limit the practical effectiveness and durability of external support for security sector reform. The participation of non-state actors such as civil society organizations and the media is critical.<sup>32</sup>

For decades civil society organizations have been recognized by the United Nations for having an indispensable role to play in furthering the objectives of the UN Charter, yet no provisions have been created to ensure that civil society participation in SSR and counterterrorism oversight actually occurs. As the Chair of the UN Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations noted, CSOs are “the prime movers of some of the most innovative initiatives to deal with emerging global threats.”<sup>33</sup> The Secretary-General's report, however, limits the United Nation's role to that of supporting national actors. The role that civil society would play on the ground and the extent to which the United Nations would help facilitate that role are not clear. To date there is little evidence of how civil society will be afforded a more prominent role in UN-sponsored SSR initiatives as result a of the report. According to the DAC handbook, “[t]oo often, SSR programmes are focused primarily on the state and fail to adequately engage civil society. While in some situations short-term progress may be possible by working solely with state structures, longer-term effectiveness requires the development of a popular and vibrant local constituency for change.”<sup>34</sup>

### **CTMs and Civil Society**

A parallel—but separate—evolution has also taken place on the issue of counterterrorism at the United Nations in recent years. The Security Council dominated the UN program in the aftermath of 9/11, imposing sweeping legal obligations on UN member states under Security Council Resolution 1373. The resolution requires every country, among other things, to freeze the financial assets of terrorists and their supporters, deny travel or safe haven to terrorists, prevent terrorist recruitment and weapons supply, and cooperate with other countries in information sharing and criminal prosecution. As part of its efforts to monitor states' implementation of the resolution, the Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (consisting of the Council members). The committee's work includes assessing the extent to which states have the necessary laws and regulations in place to ensure that charities and other non-profits are not being used to finance or otherwise support terrorism. This emphasis on the non-profit sector derived from policy recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, which were issued without corroborating evidence and without regard to the impact of such measures on CSOs.

The Council's focus on harder edge security issues led to a backlash, as many states perceived the Council's actions as inseparable from the US-led “Global War on Terror.”<sup>35</sup> In September 2006, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. For the first time the United Nations' global membership agreed that long term efforts to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism are an essential part of an effective and comprehensive strategy to combat and prevent terrorism, thus moving beyond the Council's emphasis on law enforcement and other security measures. The Strategy is also clear about the imperative for respecting human rights and promoting the rule of law. Further, it acknowledges the wide range of stakeholders, beyond states, that have a role to play in its implementation. It is the first UN document on counterterrorism to include a role for civil society organizations.

The UN Strategy specifically encourages “non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy.”<sup>36</sup> The inclusion of the clause “as appropriate” leaves it to states to determine

the role (if any) to be given to civil society organizations, thus reflecting the range of views on civil society among the UN membership.

Despite this ambiguity in the Strategy itself, nongovernmental and other civil society organizations can play important roles in promoting implementation of a number of its discrete elements, for example those elements that are related to SSR. While the United Nations has yet to engage with civil society in practice on counterterrorism matters, the Strategy has been hailed as a “living document” that will evolve over time and that may offer the potential to expand the call for civil society involvement.

Despite the strategic shift represented in the UN Strategy, there are few examples of UN efforts to engage civil society in counterterrorism practice. One notable exception on the ground is a Danish-funded UNDP project in Kenya designed to help, *inter alia*, promote the adoption and effective implementation of national counterterrorism legislation that safeguards human rights and raises awareness among the general public of the reasons why such a law is needed. Although the project is in many ways the exception that proves the rule and has suffered a number of setbacks, it does offer a potential model and offers some lessons for the type of civil society engagement the United Nations could be encouraging in this area.

In 2006, UNDP started working in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Kenyan National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) under the Office of the President to assist with the finalization of Kenya’s anti-money laundering bill and antiterrorism bill, which has still not been passed by parliament. The project convenes sensitization and awareness-raising workshops; organizes training workshops for officers from the judiciary and the security sectors; assists in the establishment of a financial investigation unit; and produces and disseminates informational materials. UNDP has worked with local civil society groups to conduct public awareness-raising workshops in different parts of the country, focusing mainly on police chiefs and subchiefs. However, much of the work has yet to take place because many of the project activities were contingent upon the passage of the counterterrorism bill, which remains stalled in parliament due to strong public objections. Political groups and civil society organizations expressed concern that the draft bill targets Muslims and expands the powers of a police force already accused of abusing its current authority. The continuing political sensitivities surrounding this issue have not allowed UNDP to bring together officials from the NCTC and civil society to discuss the difficult issues surrounding the legislation as was planned. Despite the problems caused by tying the program’s mandate to the passage of a specific piece of legislation, UNDP Kenya has played an important role by working with stakeholders including Kenyan counterterrorism officials and civil society to improve the legal process and enhance parliamentary oversight.<sup>37</sup>

### **Integrated Approaches to Security?**

An evolution towards a holistic approach that integrates development, human rights, and good governance as well as a larger role for civil society, at least at the conceptual level, is clear in both of the United Nations’ recent efforts to design and implement strategic approaches to SSR and CTMs. This evolution appears to have proceeded completely independently, however, without any lessons from the SSR experience informing efforts to engage civil society on counterterrorism or vice versa. For example, the Secretary-General’s Report on SSR does not mention counterterrorism, and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy does not mention SSR. Despite the obvious commonalities and linkages with SSR, the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change failed to look at crosscutting issues when it started the process of refining the UN counterterrorism program in 2004.

SSR and counterterrorism strategy appear to have been sequestered to their narrow issue-specific areas within the UN system. Valuable inputs from experts and practitioners working on SSR were not shared and therefore not considered in what became the “design phase” of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. For example, civil society was identified as one of the stakeholders in implementation of the Strategy, but no guidelines were offered for a division of labor between civil society and other actors to carry out the various elements of the Strategy. It may be useful, therefore, for states and CSOs to articulate more clearly the role of civil society in implementing the UN Strategy. It is perhaps too much to expect the United Nations itself to provide such guidance, but interested member states and CSOs could work together to produce and disseminate guidelines, as the OECD DAC has done with their handbook on SSR.



## What is Happening in Practice?

Although much thinking has gone into conceptualizing civic oversight of SSR, it has yet to be truly implemented in practice. On paper there is increasing recognition that democratic governance is key to effective reforms and practices in the security sector and that a vibrant civil society is critical to responsive and representative government. Yet in reality, these lofty principles are often ignored. As Nicole Ball, *et al.*, have noted, “the challenge is to align national laws with basic principles and norms and to progressively adjust ‘accountability on the ground’ to the national legal framework and the guiding principles enshrined in the international norms.”<sup>38</sup> Studies by other scholars reflect this observation across a variety of sectors, where efforts to harmonize security and governance policy objectives have fallen short of their expectations. This is not a problem confined to the security sector. In 2004, participants at a conference hosted by the International Peace Academy reviewed international norms and corresponding implementation related to governance, security sector, and rule of law and found that “the policy commitments to integration have yet to be systematically mainstreamed into programming.”<sup>39</sup>

At the conceptual level research NGOs have had a role in shaping SSR by participating in and informing the work of governments (*e.g.*, the UK and the Netherlands), the OECD DAC, and the United Nations. This collaboration has had a positive impact on the development of a more holistic concept that is now being given serious consideration by states, as evidenced in efforts to include SSR within some international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

There are significant challenges, however, when it comes to implementing SSR in a holistic manner that includes civilian oversight and active roles for CSOs on the ground. In most cases, SSR programs are not being implemented in a coordinated and integrated manner and entry points for civil society remain limited. This is not only the case at the United Nations but also within the European Union, where numerous programs that fall under the rubric of SSR are neither being labeled as such, nor coordinated within an SSR framework. The realities of budget restrictions, specified funding streams, limited staff resources, and short attention spans within donor countries make it very difficult to implement in practice the long term strategic framework envisioned in SSR.

To a large extent, donors are still only tinkering around the edges of SSR. Few have fully committed themselves to the principle of implementing a community-driven security agenda or been willing to lean too heavily on recipient states to be more inclusive in their reform agendas. Marina Caparini notes that challenges also include a lack of understanding about the roles that CSOs can play in the context of SSR among security actors, who are often secretive and view CSOs as overly critical adversaries. Other challenges include a lack of interest, capacity and expertise among civil society groups that would be best placed to play a sustained oversight role in their own communities; and donors often tending to focus narrowly on increasing the amount of support, training, and equipment for security actors without supporting the capacity of other stakeholders to perform oversight functions.<sup>40</sup> As the main drivers of SSR, however, donors have an obligation to engage civil society actors early in the process and guarantee them a place at the table when programs are being conceptualized and when donor grants are being decided.

For example, human rights CSOs play a very important monitoring and oversight role by reporting human rights abuses and criticizing repressive security measures. It can be difficult, however, to translate what is frequently an adversarial relationship between governments and human rights CSOs into constructive engagement when most human rights groups are reluctant or entirely unwilling to engage in SSR processes. The same sort of adversarial relationship has also limited constructive engagement on counterterrorism issues despite the important contributions that human rights groups and civil society more broadly have to make.

There has also been an increasing, if contentious, convergence of development, foreign policy, and security agendas since 9/11, with bilateral aid donors linking their development assistance programs to counterterrorism and other security and foreign policy objectives. The OECD DAC has helped to stimulate this shift by endorsing the 2003 policy statement, “A

Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action.”<sup>41</sup> Parts of the paper have been interpreted as allowing for a new definition of aid to include expenditures relating to a donor-driven counterterrorism agenda.<sup>42</sup> The result has been that more donor funds are being diverted toward security objectives with questionable development purposes. This has prompted some develop groups to assert that Official Development Assistance funds are now “being used to support military budgets at the expense of help to poor people.”<sup>43</sup> This so-called “securitization of aid” has tended to increase the tensions between governments and development and humanitarian CSOs and thus created an additional barrier to deeper engagement among these stakeholders.

### **Worse Practices**

There are numerous examples of how these challenges inhibit civil society engagement in SSR on the ground. One report which examined various examples of SSR efforts found that “in all of the countries studied, civil society is rarely a full partner and the programs remain more focused on supply of security and justice than demand for them.”<sup>44</sup> In the case of Jamaica it notes that “there was little evidence of there being direct involvement of civil society in security sector reform.”<sup>45</sup> Another multi-case review of integrated missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo found that in each case “negligible attention was granted to the development of parliamentary or civil society oversight mechanisms for the security sector. Support to strengthening the capacity of legislatures or civil society actors such as media and NGOs is generally provided by UNDP, albeit rarely with specific focus on the security sector.”<sup>46</sup>

Studies focused on parliamentary institutions in security sector oversight have also pointed to challenges. In Liberia, for example, researchers found “lack of independent and credible parliamentarians, and lack of capable parliamentary administration.”<sup>47</sup> In the Philippines the Officer-in-Charge of the Senate Economic Planning Office cites a variety of factors including lack of resources, inefficient procedures, and the presence of former military and police personnel acting as lobbyists for the security sector in the Senate that are limiting the effectiveness of legislative oversight of SSR.<sup>48</sup> CSOs have an important role to play in by providing expert analysis and by lobbying parliamentarians who have opportunities to improve the SSR process through legislative and budgetary oversight. The Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces-UNDP handbook for example, highlights several ways that CSOs can contribute to parliamentary oversight of SSR including: fact-finding studies, briefing members of parliament, giving evidence to parliamentary hearings or to committees, drafting legislation for members of parliament, and critiquing existing or pending legislation.<sup>49</sup> Impediments to CSO support of parliaments should be addressed by donors urging national governments and parliamentarians to encourage more CSO participation.

### **Are There Best Practices?**

Despite the challenges, there are some important examples of successful civil society engagement in SSR that may offer some lessons for engaging civil society on counterterrorism.

The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) was established in Ghana in 2003 with the aim of supporting and facilitating security sector governance in Africa through efforts including research, advocacy, capacity building, and proving points of contact for interaction and sharing information with partners and other actors. The ASSN includes not only CSOs but the full range of actors relevant to SSR, *i.e.*, policy makers, practitioners, donors, and civil society. While it is supported by external donors through the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, it was formed around a core of existing local expertise and includes both research-focused and more community-oriented CSOs. The ASSN has developed courses on security sector governance which are being offered, for example, by the Southern African Defense and Security Management Network,<sup>50</sup> which is a donor supported activity within the security sector that aims to increase the professionalism and accountability of a broad range of security sector actors (including civil society) and of the interaction between them. The value of both networks is that they offer “space” for security officials to interact with academics and civil society and thus



play an important sensitization, as well as capacity-building, role. The ASSN might provide a model for similar types of multi-stakeholder donor-supported regional networks on counterterrorism that could provide a forum for engagement between civil society and other relevant stakeholders. In regions and subregions where the notion of counterterrorism is particularly sensitive it may be easier to engage civil society on related issues, rather than “counterterrorism” *per se*, or within existing frameworks on other security issues.

The DAC’s 2007 handbook cites a number of other positive examples of civil society engagement, including work being done in Kenya by the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), in partnership with the UK research NGO Saferworld, to carry out research to inform the police reform process, including by developing national guidelines on community-based policing.<sup>51</sup> There are also some examples of local stakeholder CSOs playing a valuable oversight and monitoring function. As an example, the DAC highlights the case of a World Bank Poverty Reduction Process in Sierra Leone where CSOs were part of “civic engagement processes, sensitization meetings, focus group discussions, district consultations and participatory poverty assessments,” noting that “the consultative process ensured better understanding of the process.”<sup>52</sup> The Conciliation Resources’ (CR) West Africa Programme has recently been highlighted for its important work in support of CSOs relating to SSR in Sierra Leone over the last decade.<sup>53</sup> CR has facilitated meetings between local CSOs and security sector officials in an effort to overcome a historic lack of trust and establish more empathetic relations between them.<sup>54</sup>

The Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) established in East Timor in 2001 has been cited by several observers as a success story for the work it has done to monitor courts; provide legal assistance to build a more accountable and effective justice system; and work to improve police behavior towards women.<sup>55</sup> In an external study published by the United Nations, Edward Rees cites the JSMP as a notable exception after examining SSR implementation efforts generally in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where he concluded that “there exists little to no civil society oversight of the security sector with the exception of one or two specialized NGOs which monitor judicial activities. However, defense, police and intelligence activities remain almost unobserved.”<sup>56</sup>

Despite some encouraging examples of civil society engagement, it remains to be seen to what extent these efforts contribute to SSR’s bottom line of transforming security services into a protector of, rather than a threat to, the security of ordinary people. While networks in Africa and elsewhere are making a positive impact in some areas, some, including the ASSN, still have difficulty translating concepts into policy at the government level and action at the grassroots level. There are a number of factors contributing to this problem. Networks are often disconnected from grass roots actors on the ground. Furthermore, governments generally permit SSR to take place only because they control the agenda and can control civil society engagement.<sup>57</sup>

On other security issues, such as small arms and light weapons, government-civil society engagement has been relatively more successful. Governments often have more incentive to seek cooperation on these issues because of a desire to get weapons out of the hands of their enemies. Motivation is more uncertain when governments are required to establish oversight and democratic restraint on their security forces. Nonetheless, the methods employed to stimulate and sustain cooperation in these other areas could offer a useful model and/or entry point for engagement on SSR and counterterrorism. For example, the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) in Nairobi coordinates the joint effort by national focal points in member states in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions to implement the Nairobi Declaration on small arms. RECSA is a subregional component of the larger International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which is working with considerable success in several regions to foster dialogue and joint action among governments and NGOs.<sup>58</sup> The United Nations has worked closely with IANSA, whose members have been invited to participate in the UN working group meetings on the subject. This partnership has helped to sustain awareness and action on the issue.

In addition, both international and local NGOs and civil society groups played pivotal roles in lobbying the United Nations and its member states on issues surrounding the negotiation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court. These groups continue to remain significantly engaged in monitoring the implementation of these agreements. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines is a network of more than 1,400 NGOs in 90 countries working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate anti-personnel mines. With a diverse membership that includes human rights, humanitarian, children, peace, disability, veterans', medical, humanitarian, mine action, development, arms control, religious, environmental, and women's groups, it offers another example of a broad-based, multidisciplinary coalition promoting a comprehensive approach to a security issue.<sup>59</sup>

## Conclusion

SSR and CTMs are evolving concepts within the international community. With significant and influential input from research NGOs, there is a growing recognition by the United Nations that civil society can and should play important roles in both SSR and counterterrorism. As discussed, research NGOs and local CSOs can perform important functions, such as monitoring counterterrorism and other security-related measures; reviewing and providing input on relevant legislation; overseeing the actions of security services and publicizing violations of the law or negative consequences of inappropriate laws or policies; conducting investigations into alleged corruption and other abuses; and recommending guidelines for improved SSR and counterterrorism practice.

Having emerged from the development community, SSR has in many ways sought to emphasize accountability over effectiveness, while the opposite may be the case with regard to counterterrorism, where expediency and effectiveness have often trumped accountability. SSR, with its emphasis on good governance and accountability, offers a useful conceptual framework for a necessary course correction in counterterrorism and could provide a template for improved civil society engagement.

More must be done, however, to expand civil society engagement. Civilian oversight is too often merely a principle rather than actual practice. Although certain research NGOs have helped to shape the SSR agenda and there are some examples of CSO involvement in the implementation of SSR on the ground, these success stories appear to be the exception rather than the rule. In the main, impediments stand in the way of multi-stakeholder participation, and guidelines for civilian oversight and monitoring are not implemented. There is also a lack of coordination at the United Nations to ensure that comprehensive SSR—with civil society playing a role in oversight and monitoring—is being promoted as part of counterterrorism mandates. Asking states to impose stringent CTMS, such as restrictive counterterrorism laws and tighten border controls, without assessing the health of the security sector, can be counterproductive.

Engaging civil society more effectively in the development, implementation, and monitoring of CTMs and SSR is central to ensuring proper civilian oversight and the overall effectiveness of those efforts. The following recommendations outline a series of steps to help improve the practical engagement of civil society in both SSR and counterterrorism.

## Recommendations

- Raise awareness among stakeholders (including the United Nations, UN member states, researchers, and others) about the valuable role that civil society can play in the development, implementation, and oversight of SSR and counterterrorism.
- Articulate more clearly the role for civil society in implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in combating terrorism more generally. Although the conceptual framework largely exists for civil society engagement on SSR, references to the role of civil society in counterterrorism-related UN documents are for the most part perfunctory. Specifically, states and CSOs should work together to more clearly articulate the role of civil society in implementing the UN Strategy. Interested member states and CSOs could work together to produce and disseminate guidelines, using as a model the OECD DAC handbook on SSR.
- Identify potential local partners and civil society representatives who could serve as focal points for oversight and accountability functions and who could liaise with other local actors to promote awareness and participation.
- Build and reinforce networks of stakeholders on counterterrorism and SSR. The ASSN might provide a model for similar types of multi-stakeholder donor-supported regional networks on counterterrorism that could provide a forum for engagement between civil society and other relevant stakeholders. In regions and subregions where the notion of counterterrorism is particularly sensitive it may be easier to engage civil society on counterterrorism-related issues, rather than “counterterrorism” *per se*, or within existing frameworks on other security issues.
- Convene regional and subregional symposia involving relevant stakeholders on counterterrorism, including national practitioners, representatives from multilateral organizations, and local and international civil society actors to discuss how civil society can be further empowered to contribute to counterterrorism efforts and to lay the foundations for regional counterterrorism-related networks.
- Engage civil society and leverage counterterrorism- and SSR-related assistance to ensure that civil society has a voice in those efforts. As SSR and counterterrorism capacity building are largely donor driven activities, it is incumbent on donors to make sure there is a place for civil society ‘at the table.’
- Engage civil society early in the policy development and planning stages of SSR, CTMs, and counterterrorism related capacity building. States and donors cannot expect civil society to play a constructive role in implementation of SSR and CTMs unless they are given a stake early on in those processes.
- Support and provide assistance directly to civil society groups to improve their capacity to constructively engage in SSR and counterterrorism efforts. It is important to focus not only on supporting civil society groups that are conducting formal research and analysis. It is also necessary to support participatory research, advocacy, and communication and outreach skills that enable groups to take security and counterterrorism debates into the broader population, allow participatory grassroots monitoring, and empower communities in their relations with security forces. It is also important to include CSOs with practical experience on the ground rather than mediating those experiences through research NGOs.
- Conduct independent assessments of the contextual issues (social and political) related to SSR and counterterrorism capacity-building programs to identify potential problems and limitations related to democratic accountability *before* SSR and counterterrorism capacity-building programs are approved, so that appropriate provisions for greater civilian oversight and local ownership can be established prior to the delivery of assistance.

## Notes

1. For a more detailed discussion of these measures see, David Cortright with George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar, and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, "Friend Not Foe: Civil Society and the Struggle Against Violent Extremism," A Report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, October 2008, [http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/08\\_10\\_Friend\\_Not\\_Foe.pdf](http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/08_10_Friend_Not_Foe.pdf).
2. Also referred to as "Security Sector Reform," a term still used by the United Nations.
3. According to the DAC, the actors are: "1.) Core security actors—armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias). 2.) Security management and oversight bodies—the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions); 3.) Justice and law enforcement institutions—judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems; and 4.) Non-statutory security forces—with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias." This last group of actors is an important part of the security sector but is not the focus of this paper.
4. "Security System Reform and Governance: A DAC Reference Document," OECD, 2005, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>.
5. The DAC defines "civil society" as "the political space between the individual and the government, expressed by membership of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social groups, associations and other organizations and networks. Civil society organizations include NGOs at the national level, community-based organizations, faith groups, professional and interest groups such as trade unions, the media, private business companies, bar associations, human rights groups, independent consultants, universities and independent policy think tanks." OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007). This paper does, however, draw a somewhat forced distinction between: 1) Research NGOs, which include academic and nonprofit think tank organizations; and, 2) local stakeholder civil society organizations, which operate in local communities affected by SSR and CTM implementation and have a role to play in overseeing/monitoring implementation. Both sets of groups can and often do work together and receive funding from third party sources such as foundations or donor governments. There is clearly overlap between functions of CSOs and some perform advocacy and monitoring functions as well as conduct research/provide policy recommendations. This paper noted that there has been considerably more involvement by the former in shaping the concept of SSR. Whereas there are fewer examples of the monitoring and oversight by the former.
6. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007).
7. Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, and Katrin Kinzelbach (eds), *Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations*, United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 21, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=95396&nav1=5>
8. Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, *A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform*, December 2007, [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR\\_A\\_Beginners\\_Guide\\_to\\_SSR\\_v2.pdf](http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR_A_Beginners_Guide_to_SSR_v2.pdf).
9. For a good discussion of SSR during the Cold War and the emergence of a security policy agenda since the 1990s see, Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, "Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Policy, Practice and Research," a paper prepared for the Workshop on "New Directions in Security Sector Reform," Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, 3-4 November 2005, (Revised 27 January 2006).
10. UK Department for International Development, "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf>.
11. OECD Development Assistance Committee, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, Paris: OECD, 2004.
12. Ibid.
13. For example, according to the UK Department for International Development's terms of reference for a SSR program in Southern Sudan, the program "will involve the development of effective relationships with key actors in GOSS, the SPLA, the SSA, civil society and with the international community. This will require a consistent presence in Juba and a strong understanding of the context and the political environment within southern Sudan, the country as a whole, and the regional dynamics. Lessons identified from programmes elsewhere indicate that the overall objective will only be achieved and sustained if the programme is locally owned and led." Draft Terms of Reference, Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation in Southern Sudan, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/procurement/files/SSDDFinalor.pdf>.
14. Fin Skadkaer Pedersen, Julian Brett, and Alistair Millar, "Building States' Counter-Terrorism Capacity: Development Assistance, Support to Good Governance and Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building," Draft Working Paper, COWI/FFF, April 2006, Copy on file with the author.

15. OECD Development Assistance Committee, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, Paris: OECD, 2004.
16. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007).
17. Ibid, p. 226.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley, "Deconstructing Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Review of the Literature," *African Security Review*, Vol. 17 No. 2, June 2008.
21. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, United Nations Approaches to Security Sector Reform Background paper for the workshop on "Developing a SSR Concept for the United Nations," co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic with the assistance of DCAF, Bratislava, July 2006.
22. For an overview of the workshop series see: "Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept Report," Roundtable co-organised by Slovakia and Canada, with the assistance of DCAF, New York, 8 December 2006, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%202%20Slo%20Can%208.pdf>.
23. Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2007/3, New York, 21 February 2007.
24. "Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform," Report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, 23 January 2008.
25. "Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept," Report from the Roundtable co-organised by Slovakia and Canada, with the assistance of DCAF, New York, 8 December 2006, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%202%20Slo%20Can%208.pdf>.
26. "Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform," Report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, 23 January 2008.
27. Ibid.
28. Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, "Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Review and Recommendations," Geneva DECAF, November 2007, [www.dcaf.ch/un\\_ssr\\_pcpb/recent-experience-un-integrated-missions-071203.pdf](http://www.dcaf.ch/un_ssr_pcpb/recent-experience-un-integrated-missions-071203.pdf).
29. "Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform," Report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, 23 January 2008.
30. "The UN's Emerging Approach to SSR," *GFN-SSR Security Bulletin*, Issue No. 21, October 2008, p.3, [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/ssrbulletin/ssrbulletin\\_oct08.pdf](http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/ssrbulletin/ssrbulletin_oct08.pdf).
31. In the case of Timor-Leste, Security Council Resolution 1704 (2007) called for the establishment of a Security Sector Support Unit within the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), "[t]o assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector, including the FFDTL [Defense Forces], the Ministry of Defense, the PNTL [National Police] and the Ministry of Interior with a view to supporting the Government, through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening institutional capacity-building, as appropriate." A subsequent resolution, 1802 (2008), called for "inclusive and collaborative processes, including the High Level Coordination Committee and the Trilateral Coordination Forums." In June 2008 a project proposal was submitted for the United Nations to conduct a comprehensive review of the security sector initiated by the government of Timor-Leste and chaired and driven by the aforementioned committees assisted by UNMIT experts and UNDP consultants. The project also includes roles for civil society in monitoring and evaluating reforms, but it is too early to tell whether they will be able/allowed to perform that function.
32. "Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform," Report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, 23 January 2008.
33. Ibid.
34. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007), p. 226.
35. The desire for improvement and change was expressed by a unanimous General Assembly in December 2005 when it adopted its annual counterterrorism resolution. This included a request to the Secretary-General to propose ways "to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and enhance coordination of United Nations activities in this regard." "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel," United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/42, December 8, 2005. The Secretary-General's Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force is currently studying these issues. After extensive consultations with his Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Secretary-General released his



report in April 2006 with his recommendations to the 191 UN member states on how to enhance the UN's counterterrorism program. See Report of the Secretary-General: "Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy," A/60/825, 27 April 2006.

36. United Nations General Assembly, *United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288*, A/RES/60/288, New York, 8 September 2006, para. 3(e).

37. UNDP, e-mail communication, 7 December 2007.

38. Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska with Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf, "Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector," BICC paper 21, 2002, <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper21/content.php>.

39. Agnès Hurwitz and Gordon Peake (Rapporteurs), "Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s," Conference Report, International Peace Academy, New York, 2004.

40. Marina Caparini, "The Relevance of Civil Society," Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, August 2004, [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2\\_caparini.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_caparini.pdf).

41. "Conflict Security and Official Development Assistance (ODA): Issues for NGO Advocacy," BOND (British NGOs for Development), 2007, <http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/advocacy/gsdpaper.pdf>.

42. "A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Entry Points for Action," DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, 2003, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf>. The paper notes that "[d]evelopment co-operation does have an important role to play in helping deprive terrorists of popular support ... and donors can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the conditions that give rise to conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular ... this may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria."

43. Christian Aid, "The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War," 2004, <http://www.un-ngls.org/politics%20of%20poverty.pdf>.

44. Christopher Stone, Joel Miller, Monica Thornton, and Jennifer Trone, "Supporting Security, Justice, and Development: Lessons for a New Era," *Vera Institute of Justice*, June 2005, p. 9, [www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/security-justice-development.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/security-justice-development.pdf).

45. Ibid.

46. Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, "Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Review and Recommendations," Geneva DECAF, November 2007, [www.dcaf.ch/un\\_ssr\\_pcpb/recent-experience-un-integrated-missions-071203.pdf](http://www.dcaf.ch/un_ssr_pcpb/recent-experience-un-integrated-missions-071203.pdf).

47. DECAF et al, "Liberia National Dialogue on Security Sector Reform," Summary report, Monrovia, Liberia, 3-4 August 2005, [http://www.dcaf.ch/news/\\_diarydetailskms.cfm?param0\\_219=2005&lng=en&id=15704&nav1=2](http://www.dcaf.ch/news/_diarydetailskms.cfm?param0_219=2005&lng=en&id=15704&nav1=2).

48. Jean Encinas Franco, "The Senate and Security Sector Reform: The Philippine Case," in SSR Update, Issue #1, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, May 2007. Franco explains that, "[w]hile it may seem that they are in the position to conduct sound oversight and craft good policies because of their first-hand experience, they can sometimes act as a form of lobby group for the security sector. This then affects their objectivity in conducting legislative activities relative to security sector institutions."

49. Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, and Katrin Kinzelbach (eds), *Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations*, Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 38, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=95396&nav1=5>.

50. The SADSEM network comprises ten partner institutions, which implement the program in the 14 member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is managed by the Centre for Defence and Security Management in the Graduate School of Public and Development Management of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa and most of its funding comes from the Danish government.

51. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007).

52. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007), p. 225. However other observers have noted that "Many donors and civil society representatives recognise that there is extremely weak PRSP monitoring and evaluation structures in place, at present in Sierra Leone. See, for example, Eurodad, "A new development agenda? Sierra Leone's first PRSP," 29 July 2005, <http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/reports.aspx?id=716>.

53. Rosalin Anson-Alp, "Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007: Civil Society's Role in Sierra Leone's Security Sector Reform Process Experiences from Conciliation Resources' West Africa Programme," International Alert/GFN-SSR Paper No.12, October 2008, <http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/SierraLeoneWPs/working%20paper%2012.pdf>.

54. Ibid, p.12.

55. More information about the program is available online at: [www.jsmp.org](http://www.jsmp.org).

56. Edward Rees, "Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: 'Improvisation and Confusion' from the Field," External Study for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, March 2006.
57. Ibid.
58. For more information about IANSA see: <http://www.iansa.org/about.htm>.
59. For more information on the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines see: [http://www.icbl.org/tools/faq/campaign/what\\_is\\_icbl](http://www.icbl.org/tools/faq/campaign/what_is_icbl).









FRONT COVER PHOTO: UNMIT Police provide security for returnees in Dili, Timor-Leste, 29 March 2008 (UN Photo/Martine Perret).