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# Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation in eastern Africa

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## Introduction

The Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) recently noted that 'due to its geographical location, persistence of conflict, absence of state structures, despair from the loss of hope and the growth of extremism, the IGAD region is considered to be the most vulnerable to terrorism of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa'.<sup>1</sup> While innovative collaborative efforts among eastern African states, external donors, and civil society through the establishment of the IGAD's Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) are making significant strides toward the development of a coherent approach to counterterrorism capacity building in the sub-region, significant challenges to effective cooperative action in eastern Africa<sup>2</sup> remain. These include severe intra- and inter-state conflict, increasing violent radicalisation,

lack of state capacity, competing priorities, and political sensitivity surrounding the very notion of counterterrorism. To date, most counterterrorism efforts have focused on short-term security and law enforcement measures to the near exclusion – at times even to the detriment – of longer-term efforts to address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

This article begins with an overview of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities in eastern Africa and the capacity of governments to respond. It then looks at the response at sub-regional level and what has developed into the primary mechanism for fostering deeper sub-regional cooperation, ICPAT, and how they may be improved. It also examines how the United Nations can help to strengthen that cooperation and the opportunity offered by the September 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ('the Strategy').<sup>3</sup> It concludes that ICPAT, with its technical focus and relative success to date, offers a solid foundation on which to improve counterterrorism cooperation in eastern Africa and has a key role to play in carrying forward implementation of the UN Strategy serving as an interlocutor between the sub-region and the international community. It argues, however, that more must be done to rationalise and coordinate the division of labour between the various actors engaged and recommends that ICPAT assume a lead role in that regard. It concludes that counterterrorism efforts need to be grounded in the needs and priorities of countries in the region and that more must be done by key counterterrorism donors, UN agencies, and others to address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and the radicalisation which fuels much of extremist violence in the sub-region.

## **The terrorist threat, vulnerabilities and capacity in eastern Africa**

All countries in eastern Africa have been victimised by terrorist acts, whether perpetrated by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause or focused on 'extra-national or extra-regional targets, for example, Western targets located in [eastern Africa]'.<sup>4</sup> Most casualties of terrorism in eastern Africa are not linked to international terrorism but to domestic insurgencies in the sub-region. Most incidents of international terrorism, which is the focus of the United Nations' counterterrorism agenda, have targeted Westerners or Western-related assets, which has led to the perception that terrorism is a predominantly Western concern. This has complicated efforts by some governments in eastern Africa to support international counterterrorism efforts without being seen as promoters of external interests.<sup>5</sup> Regardless of the type of terrorism, however, local communities in Africa have borne the brunt of the loss of life and property and other economic damage from the attacks.

The sub-region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and inter-state conflict, leading to instability, poverty, and political isolation that make it vulnerable to terrorist

exploitation. According to many experts, the unstable situation in Somalia – which has been without a fully functioning national government since 1991, despite more than a dozen attempts at national political reconciliation – is a particularly important factor fuelling the spread of violent radicalism in eastern Africa today. The situation in Somalia has deteriorated even further in the last couple of years with the growth of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a group believed to have terrorist ties, which defeated a coalition of US-backed warlords in 2006. The subsequent US-backed Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia briefly dislodged the UIC, but a festering insurgency has complicated efforts by Ethiopia, the Transitional Federal Government, and the African Union (AU) to bring stability to the country and may have in some ways strengthened the hand of hard-line Islamists fighting for control of the country.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the ongoing conflict in Somalia, states neighbouring Somalia with better developed communications, transportation, and financial infrastructures – but weak institutions and long stretches of unsecured border territory – may in fact be considered by terrorists to have a more conducive environment for their operations. Kenya, with a large international population and significant tourist sector, or Djibouti, which hosts US and Western European troops, offer international terrorists more ‘high-value’ and Western-related targets.<sup>7</sup> The impact of the situation in Somalia on neighbouring states is significant. For example, northeastern Kenya has been severely affected by the near absence of state control in Somalia, where inter-clan rivalry and banditry have further weakened border security and created additional space for criminal and terrorist elements to operate.<sup>8</sup>

The poor response to the rise in expectations for better socioeconomic conditions and democratic reforms has contributed to the frustration and even radicalisation of some, particularly younger, sectors of society in eastern Africa. The spread of extremist religious ideology into this combustible mix of frustrations and contradictions has contributed further to the radicalisation of susceptible groups. Because the region is populated by people of different faiths, the growth in religious assertiveness has resulted in further tensions and created an enabling environment for the resort to terrorist violence.

The heightened sense of insecurity has accentuated the weakness of state institutions to assure peace and stability. The sub-region’s significant capacity gaps – including porous borders, insufficiently patrolled coastlines, lack of a sound legislative framework to counter terrorism, and swaths of barely governed territory – have become a growing concern among stakeholders on the ground and outside the sub-region.

To further complicate matters in a sub-region where people move relatively freely across borders, there are no formal mechanisms for extradition, mutual legal assistance, or the sharing of relevant information between countries. The lack of a formal framework for such cooperation has contributed to the use of extrajudicial renditions of terrorism

suspects between countries in the sub-region, which has helped undermine public support for and confidence in counterterrorism efforts in eastern Africa.

To their credit, political leaders in eastern Africa have acknowledged the sub-region's vulnerabilities and that capacity-building across many areas is needed to address current weaknesses.<sup>9</sup> Countries in the sub-region are in critical need of support in terms of equipment, training for police, judges and prosecutors, improving border control and monitoring, strengthening interdepartmental cooperation, upgrading communications equipment and facilities, combating terrorist financing, detecting document forgery, and combating arms trafficking. Some countries would benefit from further assistance in drafting and passing counterterrorism legislation, while others require assistance in refining existing legislation. Support is also needed to address more fundamental capacity issues such as strengthening democratic institutions and the judicial system, combating corruption, improving governance, dealing with internal and external conflicts, and supporting vulnerable communities. Many of these needs can only be met by bilateral assistance, while others can be met by regional and sub-regional capacity-building programmes such as ICPAT, and international and other donors and assistance providers.

With this in mind, states in the sub-region, often at the behest of the United States and other outside actors which consider eastern Africa as a main concern of the 'Global War on Terror,' have acted to try to fill these gaps, albeit with mixed success. Despite being a major counterterrorism priority for important donor countries such as the United States, the focus of much of this assistance has been imbalanced in both its geographic scope (certain countries have received substantial amounts of assistance – for example Kenya and Djibouti – while others have received very little) and its temporal perspective (in other words, it has primarily emphasised short- and medium-term measures, aimed at catching and bringing terrorists to justice and strengthening national counterterrorism infrastructures). Much of this assistance has emphasised training military, intelligence, criminal justice, and border security officials and pushing for more robust counterterrorism legislation. To a certain extent, UN counterterrorism efforts in the sub-region have followed this path with their emphasis on joining and implementing the international counterterrorism instruments, adopting and implementing comprehensive counterterrorism laws, training criminal justice officials, and generally encouraging countries in eastern Africa to enhance their operational counterterrorism capacity.

Yet, as Peter Gastrow and Annette Hübschle point out, this call for tough action by governments in eastern Africa, 'where democracy is fragile and governance weak,' may in the end be counterproductive as it can escalate rather than diminish the threat.<sup>10</sup> In general, lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law by governments has undermined public support for counterterrorism efforts in eastern Africa and further undermined confidence in the law enforcement and security services of some countries in the sub-region. To exacerbate matters, the lack of information currently being

provided to the public has helped galvanise human rights advocates against governments in the sub-region.

A broader based, long-term strategy is needed not only to thwart and respond to terrorist attacks, but to prevent the violent radicalisation of local populations which might resort to terrorist acts in the future, which may be the greatest strategic challenge to counterterrorism efforts in the sub-region.<sup>11</sup> Such a strategy should include measures aimed at addressing the political, economic, and social factors that lie at the root of much of the insecurity in the sub-region.

One of the most significant challenges to developing and implementing such a strategy in the sub-region relates to the political sensitivity surrounding the issue of counterterrorism and the difficulties in garnering support in eastern Africa for initiatives labelled as such. The international counterterrorism rhetoric may simply be too muscular and unnecessarily polarising for a sub-region where the concept of counterterrorism is sometimes seen as an external or specifically Western agenda. Therefore, framing counterterrorism initiatives in the context of more easily understandable notions, such as promoting good governance and combating transnational crime, may resonate better with states and other stakeholders in the sub-region.

Another significant challenge in eastern Africa is overcoming the serious intra-regional rivalries which have circumscribed the potential for effective sub-regional security cooperation. Although the contentious state of relations between certain countries in eastern Africa does complicate sub-regional counterterrorism cooperation, it is precisely because those underlying tensions and conflicts are some of the main drivers of terrorism in eastern Africa that it is essential to stimulate efforts at the regional and sub-regional level.

The chances of overcoming these challenges to more effective counterterrorism will increase significantly if the United Nations and regional and sub-regional bodies develop effective partnerships and programmes aimed at promoting a holistic response to the threat which are tailored to address the needs and realities of the sub-region.

## **The role of regional and sub-regional bodies**

The comparative advantages of regional and sub-regional bodies in the context of contributing to efforts to counter terrorism are many. They include having at their disposal knowledge and expertise of local issues that makes them well suited to develop approaches that take into account cultural and other contextual issues and undertake region- or sub-region-specific initiatives or other actions that complement and build upon global counterterrorism objectives; increasing a sense of local ownership of global initiatives; and fostering interest and maintaining momentum on the ground that is critical to ensuring

the implementation of such initiatives. They can facilitate the exchange of expertise and information among governmental and non-governmental experts, as well as the sharing of good national practices and lessons learned from national implementation among the countries of the region or sub-region. Although there are a number of regional and sub-regional bodies relevant to countering terrorism in eastern Africa, this article focuses on those most relevant to eastern Africa, ICPAT and the AU.

The AU plays an important role in the sub-region in terms of conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacekeeping missions (including in Somalia and Sudan), which are critical in this volatile area where ongoing regional tensions underlie much of the terrorist violence. The AU has also adopted a broad treaty-based framework to combat terrorism,<sup>12</sup> but unfortunately many of its members have yet to sign up to and still more have yet to implement that framework. Competing priorities within its Peace and Security Commission, differing perceptions of the threat among AU members, as well as lack of resources have so far limited its contributions in this area. In 2004, the AU established the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) as its technical arm on matters related to terrorism and implementation of the AU counterterrorism programme. It has organised a number of meetings of national and regional focal points including one in eastern Africa as well as a number of training seminars at its well-equipped facility in Algiers. In general, however, much like the AU Commission, a lack of both human and financial resources has limited the ACSRT's ability to make practical contributions to fulfilling its wide-ranging mandate, although recent funding contributions from the Council of the European Union and European Commission should help.<sup>13</sup>

IGAD began with a focus on development issues but gradually took on security functions, underscoring the reality of the intimate relationship between security and development in the Horn of Africa. Since its inception IGAD has also been extensively involved in peace efforts in Somalia and southern Sudan, which generally contributes to addressing 'conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism'. However, it is in the context of strengthening the sub-region's capacities to combat terrorism where IGAD, through ICPAT, is making its greatest contribution.

The four-year ICPAT programme was launched in June 2006 in Addis Ababa, where the programme is based. It is funded by European and other donors, administered by an African non-governmental organisation with research and networking experience in the security area (the Institute for Security Studies), and overseen by a steering committee made up of the member states of IGAD and including non-voting representatives from the countries that provide direct support to ICPAT, thus utilising an innovative approach aimed at developing an effective sub-regional counterterrorism mechanism. It has also succeeded in overcoming the human and financial resource limitations that other parts of IGAD as well as many other African-based multilateral organisations suffer from and the lack of political support for deepening sub-regional cooperation among its members in the security field.

The programme focuses on capacity- and confidence-building measures in the IGAD region, working closely with partners at the regional and global level. ICPAT's work focuses on five areas: enhancing judicial measures; working to promote greater inter-agency coordination on counterterrorism within individual IGAD member states; enhancing border control; providing training, sharing information and best practices; and promoting strategic cooperation. ICPAT, at times in partnership with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) and the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO), and with the contributions of such institutions as the International Organisation for Migration, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and high-level experts from the region, has carried out country-specific capacity-building initiatives in each of these areas.

Highlighting this approach, in September 2007, ICPAT, with the support of UNODC's TPB, organised the first-ever IGAD ministerial-level meeting on countering terrorism in Kampala to which six IGAD member states sent high-level delegations. The purpose of the meeting was to provide a platform for reviewing progress on strengthening legal cooperation against terrorism and to establish a more effective mechanism of future cooperation in the legal field. The Kampala Statement calls on IGAD members, *inter alia*, to take the necessary legal, administrative, and regulatory measures, including establishing inter-ministerial counterterrorism coordination mechanisms in each country; to respect human rights while countering terrorism; and exchange information and experiences related to combating terrorism, including through the establishment of a forum of counterterrorism experts. The statement also takes note of and requests the member states to implement the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and requests the continuation of the UNODC/ICPAT capacity-building training.<sup>14</sup>

Despite success in its first year and a half of existence, ICPAT faces a series of challenges going forward. Perhaps first and foremost are the conditions in the sub-region, which pose an obstacle to the development of a successful sub-regional security agenda. For example, it has been impossible to date to launch a special programme for Somalia in light of its unique needs. Also, the absence of Eritrea from the IGAD forum has a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of ICPAT. The politics of the region also mean that cooperating in the security field among some of the countries still leaves much to be desired.<sup>15</sup> Despite those challenges, ICPAT member states seem to genuinely appreciate its technically focused, results-oriented work and are deeply engaged in the programme.

## **The role of the UN system**

With the significant capacity gaps and vulnerabilities in eastern Africa, in addition to ICPAT and bilateral donors, nearly every part of the UN system represented on the UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force has an important role to play in helping

to build counterterrorism capacity in the sub-region. Given the often counterproductive emphasis that has been placed on hard security approaches to combating terrorism in eastern Africa to date, the United Nations should emphasise a holistic, more balanced, and hopefully more effective approach to addressing the threat. Coordinated, strategic, and sustained engagement by the different parts of the UN system can help recalibrate and significantly augment the counterterrorism capacity of countries in the region. The relevant parts of the UN system include traditional counterterrorism bodies such as the various Security Council bodies and UNODC's TPB, as well as entities not traditionally associated with counterterrorism, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).<sup>16</sup>

Despite the potentially important role of the United Nations in building state capacity in the sub-region, it appears that states in eastern Africa have so far not benefited from this UN technical support in implementing UN counterterrorism mandates, apart from legislative drafting and criminal justice training delivered by UNODC's TPB, aimed at helping countries join and implement the sixteen universal instruments against terrorism. To its credit, UNODC has been rather successful in pursuing this narrow mandate. To help sustain its involvement in the sub-region, UNODC established a formal working relationship with ICPAT in June 2006 to enhance the overall impact of its counterterrorism technical assistance for IGAD member states. Pursuant to this agreement, ICPAT has sought and received UNODC support on several joint counterterrorism initiatives in the sub-region, including training for senior criminal justice officials, legislative drafting workshops, and the production and dissemination of joint technical assistance tools. In addition, UNODC supported the convening of the September 2007 IGAD Ministers of Justice meeting on counterterrorism, which will hopefully turn into a regular event. UNODC should encourage IGAD to use future meetings of the ministers as a platform for reviewing progress on strengthening national and regional cooperation against terrorism.

Cooperation with sub-regional partners such as ICPAT is particularly important to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the technical assistance UNODC provides and should be leveraged to ensure its one-off workshops have an enduring impact on the ground. As UNODC continues with its work in the sub-region, there is the need to ensure that its capacity-building activities are part of a broader, strategic UN approach that 'provides in-depth and substantive training to the right officials, practitioners, and policy makers', includes a 'steady dissemination of useful and accessible training tools and handbooks, backstopped by effective follow-up and reinforced by ongoing support services'<sup>17</sup> and promotes the development and implementation of a holistic response to addressing the terrorist threat. UNODC needs to ensure that its efforts to get countries to adopt comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation go hand in hand with initiatives that help the states of the region utilise the new instruments in a way that strengthens public support, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights.



Going forward, given the allegations of human rights abuses being committed by some governments in the sub-region in their fight against terrorism, particular attention should be paid to ensure that UNODC raises awareness of human rights issues that may confront practitioners. Donors and other providers of technical assistance need to be sure to balance capacity-building assistance to law enforcement and security services with human rights training, and where possible, involving civil society groups in such training. Efforts should also be made to reinforce oversight mechanisms such as national human rights commissions.

Overall, the impact of the United Nations on the sub-region's counterterrorism capabilities has been limited. This is largely due to the underperformance of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its expert group, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). The CTC is charged with monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001), which imposed a range of law enforcement and other security-related counterterrorism obligations on all UN member states. Among other things, the CTC/CTED is responsible for facilitating the delivery of counterterrorism technical assistance to states that it has identified as needing help implementing the provisions of the resolution. Despite the significant capacity gaps in the sub-region, the CTC/CTED's interactions with and impact on eastern Africa have been limited, having conducted site visits to two countries in the sub-region: Kenya and Uganda.

Generally, the CTC/CTED has had difficulty sustaining a dialogue with countries in eastern Africa, partly due to the limited amount of information it has received from those countries and the difficulty it has had reaching past diplomats in New York and interacting with local counterterrorism practitioners. The CTC/CTED can only cite two examples in eastern Africa in over six years of work where it played a role in facilitating the delivery of technical assistance: one in Kenya and one in Uganda.<sup>18</sup> Although its difficulties in facilitating the provision of technical assistance extend well beyond eastern Africa,<sup>19</sup> the shortcomings of the CTC/CTED effort so far are magnified when looking at a sub-region such as eastern Africa where both the terrorist threat and capacity needs are so significant.

There are signs, however, that the situation has been improving since the appointment of a new, highly qualified CTED executive director in late 2007 and the approval of the new director's reorganisation and revised work plan aimed at moving the CTC/CTED away from relying on written country reports towards engaging more directly and informally with experts in capitals, which should allow for more tailored dialogues with states. In addition to a reorganisation of the staff, the new approach includes different types of site visits and improved outreach to states, regional bodies, and civil society outside New York.

The CTED may, however, continue to have trouble engaging meaningfully with implementing agencies on the ground so long as its entire staff is based in New York.

Although the new reforms should help improve its outreach somewhat, consideration should be given to moving some of the CTED's New York-based staff into UN country and/or regional offices where more sustained and ongoing interaction can take place with national counterterrorism practitioners, regional and sub-regional bodies, civil society, and other relevant actors. Alternatively, a UN entity with a presence in the sub-region could serve as the CTED's focal point in eastern Africa.

In a sub-region where human rights/counterterrorism concerns are so acute and national human rights institutions fragile or non-existent, OHCHR has a critical role to play. OHCHR has a regional office in Addis Ababa and a presence in Nairobi. Priorities for OHCHR in the sub-region should include improving the poor record on ratification and cooperation with international human rights treaties and their monitoring mechanisms; improving cooperation with the Universal Periodic Review mechanism and UN special procedure mandate holders such as the special rapporteur dealing with human rights and counterterrorism; reinforcing the capacity of national human rights institutions; and providing training and otherwise reinforcing the human rights capacity of security officers, judges, and civil society in close cooperation with UNODC, the CTED, and ICPAT.

Finally, with promoting good governance, the rule of law, social inclusion, and addressing other conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism essential to effective long-term efforts to prevent terrorism in eastern Africa, UNDP has a critical role to play, including through its democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery programme, and its field presence in all eastern African countries. Yet, UNDP has so far been reluctant to associate itself with 'counterterrorism' actors for fear of unduly politicising its ongoing work. So long as UNDP's overabundance of caution remains, it will be difficult for the wider United Nations to leverage any UNDP expertise, resources, or build on the partnerships it has with local actors across the sub-region.

Finding ways to get UNDP to be less reflexively 'anti-counterterrorism' is crucial to encouraging the United Nations to become more active at the country level, where UNDP is the most prevalent actor. In addition, greater UNDP engagement with the United Nations' traditional counterterrorism actors would likely increase opportunities to use the often more politically palatable rule of law framework to reinforce counterterrorism-related objectives. Such an approach may prove more fruitful in some eastern African countries than one dominated by the CTC/CTED.

The one exception to UNDP's general reluctance to engage on counterterrorism is a Danish-funded UNDP project in Kenya which UNDP is currently carrying out in cooperation with UNODC and the Kenyan National Counterterrorism Centre under the Office of the President. The project was designed to help, inter alia, promote the adoption and effective implementation of national counterterrorism legislation that

safeguards human rights and raise awareness among the general public of the reasons why such a law is needed.<sup>20</sup>

The close working relationship in Kenya not only between UNDP and the counterterrorism elements of the UN system, but also with government actors, civil society, and faith-based groups, may be the exception that proves the rule, but it demonstrates the logical synergies possible on the ground. Despite the challenges it has faced as a result of the political situation in Kenya, the abovementioned UNDP programme demonstrates that UNDP's slow-moving efforts to devise a policy on counterterrorism in New York need not preclude cooperation in the field and provides a model of cooperation among a wide array of stakeholders on the ground that could be reproduced elsewhere with regard to implementation of the Strategy.

## **The significance of the UN Strategy for eastern Africa**

Adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 8 September 2006, the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy marked the first time that all UN member states agreed on a common framework for addressing the terrorist threat. The UN Strategy presents a unique opportunity to improve both regional counterterrorism cooperation in eastern Africa and the UN system's engagement with the sub-region.

Its four-pillar plan of action includes measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, measures to prevent and combat terrorism, capacity-building, and ensuring an approach based on human rights and the rule of law to countering the threat. It sets forth a holistic way forward that reinforces what many terrorism experts on and from eastern Africa have long believed, namely that an effective counterterrorism strategy must combine preventative measures with efforts to address both real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic, and political conditions.

The UN Strategy, therefore, offers states and other stakeholders in the sub-region a framework through which to promote a more holistic response to the threat. It represents a conceptual shift away from a primarily law enforcement/military approach to a more holistic one that might be characterised as a 'human security' approach to counterterrorism. Thus the Strategy reframes the international counterterrorism discourse in a manner that is both better suited to the needs in the sub-region and politically palatable to eastern African governments and their populations, providing an alternative narrative to the controversial US-led War on Terror.

If this conceptual shift is going to succeed in practice, however, states in the sub-region, as well as donors, need to reflect this change of emphasis in their policies. Donors and

the United Nations need to emphasise the development pillar of the Strategy and in particular target disaffected and marginalised groups and parts of the sub-region which are potential breeding grounds for terrorism.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity of the UN Strategy, however, is it that it provides countries in eastern Africa, the UN system, the African Union, relevant regional bodies, and civil society with a coherent framework that can serve as a basis for improving the overall coordination and cooperation within and among them on the continent. Eastern African stakeholders will need to determine how best to implement the Strategy's generally broad provisions to maximise its impact on the ground and ensure that implementation efforts are not a top-down exercise initiated from and dictated by New York, but rather proceed from the bottom up and thus reflect the needs, priorities, and concerns of eastern Africa and eastern Africans.

## Conclusion

There are significant challenges to effective cooperative action to counter terrorism in eastern Africa including severe intra- and inter-state conflict, increasing radicalisation, lack of state capacity, competing priorities, and political sensitivity surrounding the very notion of counterterrorism itself. To date most counterterrorism efforts have focused on short-term security and law enforcement measures to the near exclusion, and at times to the detriment, of longer-term efforts to address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. The UN Strategy and the holistic approach it represents offer an opportunity to recalibrate counterterrorism efforts in the sub-region.

Given the nature of the states and the problems and realities on the ground in eastern Africa, however, translating the framework in the Strategy into action will be a challenge. The chances of overcoming the challenges will increase significantly, however, if the UN, and regional and sub-regional bodies, in particular ICPAT, develop effective, broad-based partnerships and programmes aimed at promoting the holistic message of the Strategy, rather than just its law enforcement and other security-related aspects, that take into account and are tailored to address the needs and realities on the ground.

ICPAT is therefore a logical focus for UN Strategy implementation efforts in the sub-region. If provided with the necessary mandate and additional resources, ICPAT could play an important role in supporting sub-regional implementation of the Strategy. It could head a sub-regional task force on implementation of the Strategy, becoming a focal point for interactions with the UN Task Force in New York and other stakeholders and devising and overseeing a plan of action for Strategy implementation in the sub-region. The IGAD ministers of justice forum of counterterrorism experts, which was created

following their September 2007 meeting in Kampala, could be used for developing this sub-regional plan of action (and monitoring and evaluating its implementation).

To make its work more broadly relevant to a broader-based approach to counterterrorism such as that reflected in the UN Strategy, ICPAT should broaden its approach both in terms of the stakeholders with which it engages and the substantive focus of its activities. Its focus on strengthening the capacity of national law enforcement and other security officials to fight terrorism should be anchored in the context of larger security enhancement efforts, and it should examine ways to expand the involvement of civil society in its work.

## Notes

- 1 A H Bashir, Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD member states on legal cooperation against terrorism, 20 September 2007 (opening speech by IGAD on file with the authors).
- 2 For purposes of this report 'eastern Africa' refers to those countries in the region of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. These are Djibouti, Eritrea (although it withdrew from IGAD in 2007), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.
- 3 See <http://www.un.org/terrorism> for a list of the 24 entities represented on the Task Force.
- 4 Bashir, Meeting of Ministers of Justice.
- 5 N Lyman and J S Morrison, The terrorist threat in Africa. *Foreign Affairs* 83(1) (2004), 75–86.
- 6 S Bloomfield, Somalia: the world's forgotten catastrophe, *The Independent*, 9 February 2008.
- 7 Combating Terrorism Center, Al-Qa'ida's (mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa, 2006, <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqIL.asp> (accessed 15 April 2009).
- 8 A B Chikwanha, The anatomy of conflicts in the East African Community (EAC): linking security with development theme for 2007 – development policy and the security agenda for africa: reassessing the relationship, Leiden: African Studies Institute, Leiden University, 2007, [www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/LectureAnnieChikwanha.pdf](http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/LectureAnnieChikwanha.pdf) (accessed 15 April 2009).
- 9 IGAD Secretariat, Report on IGAD at the Conference on The Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Addis Ababa, 24–27 June 2003.
- 10 P Gastrow and A Hübschle, African perspectives on the international terrorism discourse, *African Security Review* 15(3) (2006), 70.
- 11 P Kagwanja, Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: new security frontiers, old strategies, *African Security Review* 15(3) (2006), 84.
- 12 The AU's counterterrorism framework includes the 1999 Organisation of African Union (OAU) counterterrorism convention and the 2002 counterterrorism plan of action and 2004 protocol.
- 13 Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning, Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa, *African Security Review* 15(3) (2006), 43. As of 2007, the Council of the European Union intended to contribute €665 million to the ACSRT for a programme to support AU member states' capacities to combat terrorism and the European Commission contributed some €1 million to help set up the ACSRT's information technology and database system as well as its documentation centre, and to organise training seminars for relevant AU member state officials.
- 14 Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD member states on legal cooperation against terrorism, Kampala, Uganda, 20–21 September 2007 (the Kampala Statement), [http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65](http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65) (accessed 15 April 2009).
- 15 R Barno, Building regional partnerships: perspectives from the IGAD Region, in W Okumu and A Botha (eds), *Understanding terrorism in Africa: in search for an African voice*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2006, 98–99.
- 16 There are a number of UN peacekeeping and other activities related to addressing the longstanding

conflicts in the sub-region which are relevant to elements of the Strategy, but which will not be addressed in this paper due to space limitations.

- 17 A du Plessis, The role of the United Nations in providing technical assistance in Africa, In Botha and Okumu (eds), *Understanding terrorism in Africa*, 89.
- 18 Even in the cases of Kenya and Uganda, it is not clear to which extent the CTC/CTED was responsible for the matching up of donors and recipients. See the semi-annual report of the work of the Counterterrorism Executive Directorate 1 January to 30 June 2007 – Annex 2: Progress and outcomes of the facilitation of technical assistance by CTED [on file with the authors].
- 19 For a discussion of the CTC/CTED's difficulties facilitating the provision of technical assistance, see Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar and Jason Ipe, *The UN Security Council's Counterterrorism Program: what lies ahead?* New York: International Peace Academy, October 2007, [www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/207/cter.pdf](http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/207/cter.pdf) (accessed 15 April 2009).
- 20 The project has worked since 2006 to assist with the finalisation of Kenya's anti-terrorism bill – which has still not been passed by parliament – and anti-money laundering bill; convene sensitisation and awareness-raising workshops; organise training workshops for officers from the judiciary and the security sectors; assist in the establishment of a financial investigation unit; and produce and disseminate informational materials: UNDP, e-mail communication with authors, 7 December 2007. UNDP has conducted public awareness raising workshops in different parts of the country, focusing mainly on police chiefs and sub-chiefs. However, much of the work has yet to take place because many of the other project activities were contingent upon the passage of the counterterrorism bill, which remains stalled in parliament due to strong objections from civil society that the draft targets Muslims and expands the powers of a police force already accused of abusing its current powers. The continuing political sensitivities surrounding this issue have not allowed UNDP to bring together officials from the NCTC and civil society to discuss the difficult issues surrounding the legislation as was planned. Despite the problems caused by tying the programme's mandate to the passage of a specific piece of legislation, UNDP Kenya can play an important role in promoting implementation of the Strategy there because of its strong relationship with both Kenyan counterterrorism officials and civil society.