Recommendations

for Improving the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee's Assessment and Assistance Coordination Function

Written and Produced by
the Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Project
of the Fourth Freedom Forum and the Joan B. Kroc Institute
for International Peace Studies at the
University of Notre Dame

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Alistair Millar
Jason Ipe
George A. Lopez
Tona Boyd
Linda Gerber
David Cortright

The Authors

Alistair Millar is vice president and director of the Washington, DC office of the Fourth Freedom Forum. He has written widely on sanctions, incentives, and nuclear nonproliferation, focusing on nonstrategic nuclear weapons control. Millar teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. He has a Master of Arts degree in International Studies from the University of Leeds and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Bradford.

Jason Ipe is a research associate with the Washington, DC office of the Fourth Freedom Forum. His work focuses on issues of counter-terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from Connecticut College in New London, and his Master of Arts degree in International Security Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC.

George A. Lopez is senior fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. His research focuses primarily on the problems of state violence and coercion, especially economic sanctions, and gross violations of human rights. Lopez has served in an advisory capacity to a number of foundations and organizations involved in human rights, international affairs education, and peace research.

Tona Boyd is the research associate for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Sanctions and Security Project, where her work is focused on counter-terrorism and human rights. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, Spanish, and Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame.

Linda Gerber is research director of the Fourth Freedom Forum. She received her Master of Library Science degree from the School of Library and Information Science at Indiana University, Bloomington. She participates in the joint Fourth Freedom Forum/Kroc Institute Sanctions and Security Project and has helped write and edit various reports and books produced by the Fourth Freedom Forum.

David Cortright is president of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana and a research fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. He has served as consultant or advisor to agencies of the United Nations, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and the International Peace Academy. He has written widely on counter-terrorism, nuclear disarmament, nonviolent social change, and the use of incentives and sanctions as tools of international peacemaking.

Acknowledgements

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Executive Summary

This report provides recommendations for improving the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee's (CTC's) assessment and assistance coordination function. The following summary outlines the policy options described in the narrative report:

High-level Panel report and CTED review process

- Defer any action on the High-level Panel's recommendations to create a capacity building trust fund or develop predetermined sanctions for noncompliance.

Conduct more credible needs assessments

- Utilize information provided by multiple sources, not just state reports to the CTC;
- Develop mechanisms for fully sharing with donors all information about the counter-terrorism capacity needs of individual states;
- Set clearer priorities for the specific forms of capacity building assistance that are most needed by particular states and regions; and
- Further develop and refine an overarching structure for the classification of required assistance activities.

Improve CTC site-visits

- Fully brief the CTC in advance of visits;
- Produce and disseminate more complete site-visit reports which more specifically target each provision of Resolution 1373;
- Develop more flexible site-visit scheduling; and
- Coordinate CTC site-visit assessments with those of specialized organizations and other subsidiary bodies of the UN.

Improve international coordination

- Prioritize the task of cooperation and information sharing with the G8's Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG);
- Adopt a more proactive role in brokering technical assistance;

- Conduct a dialogue with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) about cooperation in the provision of capacity building assistance;
- Develop a more accessible and user-friendly assistance database;
- Make establishment of specialized counter-terrorism units a priority in *all* regions, with clear points of contact within each;
- Establish an informal working group in New York on counter-terrorism technical assistance and capacity building;
- Overhaul CTC-hosted special meetings of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations;
- Increase transparency by creating an improved infrastructure for information sharing;
- Conduct regional workshops, which will bring together national counter-terrorism practitioners;
- Encourage states receiving technical assistance to create nationally harmonized inter-agency mechanisms for enhancing cooperation among affected agencies; and
- Encourage donors to provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the counter-terrorism capacities of regional organizations.

Develop and implement UN counter-terrorism standards and best practices

- Sponsor an independent process outside of the constraints of UN diplomacy to establish performance standards and best practices.

Recommendations

for Improving the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee's Assessment and Assistance Coordination Function

The effectiveness of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) depends on its ability to keep pace with transformations in the global security environment. When the CTC was established in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the primary target was understood to be Al Qaeda and its international network of related terrorist groups. Because of pressure applied against the network, in part through the efforts of the UN counter-terrorism program, Al Qaeda has adapted into a more decentralized network in which smaller splinter groups operate with less direct connection to a central organization than might have been expected four years ago. While Al Qaeda leaders have continued to claim responsibility for major terrorist attacks in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world, it appears that independent terrorist groups may be taking the initiative in launching local attacks. This development creates new challenges for the global campaign against terrorism and makes it incumbent upon the CTC to develop more flexible, streamlined modes of operation. In order to secure its central role and relevance among multilateral counter-terrorism efforts, the CTC must find more creative ways to collect, assess, and disseminate information about current counter-terrorism capacities and to facilitate the provision of needed technical assistance by potential donors in a timely and sustainable manner.

Since its creation in September 2001, the CTC has been tasked with monitoring and facilitating state implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373. Its mandate includes facilitating the delivery of technical assistance for states that need help implementing the resolution.[1] The first chair of the CTC, Sir Jeremy Greenstock of the United Kingdom, described the CTC as "a switchboard, a catalyst and a driver of other institutions to do their work in a globally coordinated way."[2] Its essential functions are: 1) to determine states' capacity to implement the provisions of Resolution 1373, and 2) to ensure that potential donors have sufficient information to provide technical assistance that will address the most urgent needs in a timely and sustainable manner.

With the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) under Resolution 1535, the Security Council provided the CTC with additional staff resources to strengthen the facilitation of technical assistance and improve coordination among international, regional, and sub-regional organizations as well as with other subsidiary bodies of the UN. The CTC is now expected to work more closely with states in identifying gaps in their counter-terrorism capabilities and to connect these states with the necessary technical assistance to fill those gaps. It also faces the challenge of expanding its efforts to galvanize regional and worldwide efforts to adopt and implement best practices and performance standards.

This report provides recommendations for improving the coordination and facilitation functions of the CTC. Section I provides an evaluation of UN reform proposals regarding counter-terrorism that are contained in the report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*.[3] Section II offers an assessment of the work of the CTED. Section III examines the challenge of improving the facilitation of technical assistance. It offers concrete

proposals for the CTC to improve data collection efforts, exchange more useable information with other subsidiary bodies of the UN, states, and other international organizations, and establish new mechanisms for coordination. Section IV examines the challenge of international coordination. Several proposals are offered for improved information sharing and more productive international coordination meetings. Section V explores the specific role of regional and sub-regional organizations and proposes steps to facilitate the counter-terrorism efforts of these vital players in the global fight against terror. Section VI considers the challenge of developing best practices and performance standards for counter-terrorism implementation. It reviews the rationale for establishing an agreed set of best practices and identifies performance standards that already exist within international functional organizations. It discusses the value of an independent process to develop such standards and proposes that Japan sponsor and participate in such a process. The conclusion of the report summarizes the various policy recommendations.

As the July 2005 bombings in Sharm el Sheik and London demonstrate, terrorist violence remains a clear and present danger in many countries. The need for a coordinated international response to counter this threat is greater than ever.

We offer these observations and recommendations with a sense of urgency regarding the challenges facing the UN counter-terrorism program. The CTC must meet both the expectations of its original mandate and find ways to adapt flexibly to the changing nature of the transnational terrorist threat. As the July 2005 bombings in Sharm el Sheik and London demonstrate, terrorist violence remains a clear and present danger in many countries. The need for a coordinated international response to counter this threat is greater than ever. It is our hope that

this report can contribute practical policy options toward the development of a more effective UN counter-terrorism program.

I. Evaluating the Recommendations of the High-level Panel

The report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, published in December 2004, recommended that:

- The Security Council extend the authority of the CTED to "act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities."[4]

- The UN establish "a capacity-trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate" to assist in the provision of counter-terrorism technical assistance.[5]

- The Security Council devise "a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance" if confronted by states that have the capacity to undertake their obligations but repeatedly fail to do so.[6]

At the Club de Madrid's "International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security" in March 2005, the Secretary-General presented the *Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism* (*Global Strategy*)[7] based on five pillars [emphasis in original]:

- **dissuade** disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals;

- **deny** terrorists the means to carry out their attacks;

- **deter** states from supporting terrorists;

- **develop state capacity** to prevent terrorism; and

- **defend** human rights in the struggle against terrorism.

Many of the specific recommendations of the High-level Panel informed the *Global Strategy*, but neither the proposal for a capacity building trust fund, nor the idea of predetermined sanctions were included in the Secretary-General's presentation. Neither proposal has garnered much support or enthusiasm in the international community.

Capacity-building trust fund

The recommended "trust fund" might be appealing to states that do not have large-scale assistance programs and that wish to pool resources with other donor states. The proposal was not supported by the Secretary-General, however, partly because of "donor fatigue."[8] There was also a reluctance to propose anything that might be seen as undercutting the role of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as the primary counter-terrorism assistance provider in the UN system. The proposal to place the recommended "trust fund" in the CTED does not make sense organizationally or logistically. Perhaps the CTED could play an advisory and oversight role, but in light of the CTED's already heavy burden and limited resources, it cannot take on this additional responsibility. The most logical host of such a fund would be the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), but the UNDP has been reluctant to consider such a role.

While it is clear that capacity building assistance can help states to implement their Security Council-imposed counter-terrorism obligations, it is not clear that the establishment of a capacity building trust fund would help address this problem. Most of the major bilateral donors are now part of the G8's Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), which focuses on coordinating the delivery of counter-terrorism assistance. Each G8 member state retains control over how its national funds are allocated. These countries are unlikely to contribute to a UN fund, where they would relinquish at least some of this control. The politically sensitive nature of much bilateral counter-terrorism assistance decreases the chances that donors will give a multilateral body decision-making control over which states should be on the receiving end of such assistance. Another concern is that the significant administrative costs of operating a UN fund might dissuade many potential donors.

A prerequisite for the successful operation of a capacity building trust fund is giving potential donors a sense of exactly what the priorities of such a fund will be. The CTC and its CTED are not yet able to produce a list of priority countries and/or aid requirements that need priority treatment. With the CTED fully operational in the fall of 2005, it may be that this will change.

Predetermined sanctions

The idea of developing predetermined sanctions for noncompliance has not been accepted by most states. In retrospect, many involved in following-up on the High-level Panel's report are aware that its drafters probably missed an intervening step, such as recommending the development of some objective guidelines, standards, or best practices, which could eventually be used to measure compliance with Security Council-imposed counter-terrorism obligations. Resolution 1373 was adopted under Chapter VII and included a Security Council determination to "take all necessary steps" to ensure full implementation. Thus, the legal framework exists for the Council to

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develop and implement mechanisms to adopt forceful measures. The CTC has not reached a point, however, where it would be appropriate or even possible to refer non-complying states to the Council for appropriate action.

CTED as a clearing house for bilateral technical assistance

With respect to the High-level Panel report's recommendation that the authority of the CTED be extended to act as a clearing house for state-to-state provision of capacity building assistance, it would appear that the CTED already has this authority. As of yet, however, the CTED has not exercised it. Because of staffing shortages during its first year of operation, it has lacked the necessary resources to do so. With the CTED fully operational, it remains to be seen whether the CTC or the donor community will want the CTED to assume this role. Moreover, due to the political sensitivity of much military and police/border control assistance, donors may want to retain control over how and where this assistance is disbursed. They may prefer to continue dealing directly with the relevant recipient state.

II. Assessing the Work of the CTED

Since the initial process of revitalization began, the CTC and its CTED made some important strides forward. However, a significant amount of the momentum for effective counter-terrorism policy and action has dissipated in the last year and a half. The task of revitalizing the CTC through the creation of the CTED has been mired in bureaucratic delays and other impediments. It took more than a year after the CTED Executive Director's organizational plan for the CTED was endorsed by the CTC before the CTED was finally fully staffed. It is still struggling to

reduce and respond to the substantial backlog of reports from states (nearly ninety) received more than three months ago. It is also struggling to complete the preparation of technical needs assessments, which were first called for in the CTC's April 2004 work programme, and to respond to requests for technical assistance from UN member states. In addition to playing catch-up on these tasks, it must continue to prepare for and lead country visits and ensure proper follow-up to the first four such visits (Morocco, Albania, Kenya, and Thailand).

In light of the difficulties the CTED has faced since its inception in the spring of 2004, the Security Council must be careful in how it approaches the December 2005 comprehensive review mandated by Resolution 1535 to ensure that the review is both fair and credible. Appropriate benchmarks for assessing the work of the CTED can be found in the "Proposal for the Revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee,"[9] CTED Executive Director Javier Rupérez's organizational plan,[10] and the CTED's work programmes. Those documents, particularly the report of the CTC on its revitalization, lay out clearly defined goals for the revitalization process and explicit criteria for the work and structure of the CTED.

Because the CTED did not become fully staffed until September 2005, it is unrealistic to expect it to have met all of its responsibilities. The December 2005 review must also be careful not to dwell upon the administrative delays, nor to renew bureaucratic disputes between the CTC and the Secretariat that have at times interfered with the CTC's work. The best approach would be to take a constructive, forward looking approach. In this vein, the December review could be used as an opportu-

> **The December review could be used as an opportunity for the Security Council to outline the ways in which the CTED could enhance its effectiveness in some of its main areas of work.**

Members of the CTED, led by Executive Director Javier Rupérez (middle of front row), with Albanian officials during their site-visit to Albania in June 2005 (Photo: CTED).

nity for the Security Council to outline the ways in which the CTED could enhance its effectiveness in some of its main areas of work.

The following are steps that the Security Council could recommend as part of its review of the CTC's work:

1. Improve Needs Assessments

The CTC's eleventh 90-day work programme[11] provides that the CTC would "[b]egin preparation of country assessments of assistance needs that can be shared with interested donor states and organizations with the prior approval of the country concerned." Because the CTC is the repository of perhaps the largest database of global counter-terrorism capacity, the CTC is well-placed to assess each state's potential counter-terrorism assistance needs and share such assessments with potential donors. Recognizing this, in late 2003, donor bodies such as the G8's CTAG began expressing an interest in receiving such assessments.

As of September 2005, seventy-five country assessments had been completed. The assessments contain two parts. The first consists of an analysis of the particular state's efforts to implement Resolution 1373, drawing almost exclusively from the reports submitted to the CTC and the CTC's written responses to date. The second consists of a list of the priority areas where the CTED believes

the particular state needs technical assistance to enable it to implement the resolution fully. Thus far the assessments have not been considered fully adequate and have received mixed reviews from CTC members and donor organizations.

The December review could enumerate some of the ways in which the quality of the assessments could be improved to enhance their usefulness.

- First, the analysis section should not be based almost entirely on the particular state's reports to the CTC. Rather, a broader range of documentation should be utilized, including reports from other UN bodies and from international, regional, and sub-regional organizations.

- Second, the analysis section should be more focused on the specific provisions of Resolution 1373 and the relevant state's efforts to implement each provision. This would focus more attention on specific Resolution 1373 implementation problems in particular states.

- Third, the CTC should share the analysis sections of its reports, in addition to the assistance priorities sections. Potential donors would benefit from reading the CTC/CTED's analysis of a state's efforts to date, since this would provide them with useful context for deciding whether to provide assistance in one of the identified priority areas.

Fourth, the CTC should direct the CTED to highlight two or three areas of highest priority for capacity building assistance, to give donors a greater sense of direction in deciding what forms of assistance to provide. These focused priorities should take into consideration whether there are particular risks in the country or region that need to be addressed on an urgent basis.

2. Enhance the Effectiveness of Site-Visits

Resolution 1535 explicitly authorized the CTC, through the CTED, to conduct site-visits, "with the consent of the State concerned, to engage in detailed discussions on the implementation of Resolution 1373." As of the end of September 2005, the CTED had conducted four site-visits. The visits were prepared for and conducted in accordance with the CTC's *Framework Document* for CTC visits.[12] With these visits, the CTC has been able to begin to assess states' local implementation efforts and to better identify areas where states would benefit from technical assistance to aid in more fully implementing the provisions of Resolution 1373.

The CTC's facilitation role will be stronger and more functional if the committee implements a more rigorous process for identifying states' needs and a more proactive approach to engaging with the donor community.

The CTC is in the process of undertaking a comprehensive review of the CTED visits and is likely to make some changes in the way the CTED prepares for, conducts, and follows-up future visits. The conclusions of this review could be included in the December review.

The following are some of the possible ways to enhance the effectiveness of the site-visits.

- First, the CTED should fully brief CTC representatives in advance of site-visits and reach consensus on the goals of the visit and various issues to be raised with the host state. The briefings should address any difficulties the state to be visited may be having with implementing the resolution, the technical assistance that is currently being provided to that state, and the outcome of visits of other international, regional, and sub-regional organizations and other subsidiary bodies of the UN.[13]

- Second, the official reports of the visits should provide states with a clear picture of the specific steps to be taken to implement each provision of Resolution 1373. The reports should be drafted with the dual purpose of assisting the state concerned, and facilitating the CTC's efforts to assess implementation. If the CTC decides at a later date to refer certain states to the Security Council for failing to implement Resolution 1373, it can then rely on these reports as documentation on specific failures.

- Third, the CTED should ensure that there is proper follow-up to the visits. It should work closely with both assistance providers and the visited country to close the gaps identified in the trip report and to keep the CTC informed of these efforts.

- Fourth, the CTC should develop a more flexible approach to site-visits, rather than a one-size-fits-all schedule of staying in a single country for a fixed period of time. In some instances it might be a more effective use of resources to have the CTED-led team go to a region and visit a number of countries over the course of several weeks. For those countries that have not submitted a report to the CTC in a long time, the CTED could use the visit as a way to gather much needed information on the country's Resolution 1373 implementation efforts.

- Fifth, the CTED should be careful not to duplicate the work carried out by other organizations and subsidiary bodies of the UN that may have recently conducted field visits. Thus, where technical organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have recently visited and/or conducted a thorough assessment of a country, the CTED team may not need to address the technical issues covered by these organizations and can concentrate on other areas of implementation.

III. Facilitating Technical Assistance

As the CTC and its CTED move forward, there are practical, attainable policy actions that should be considered to improve the CTC's role in facilitating the provision of counter-terrorism technical assistance. The CTC's facilitation role will be stronger and more functional if the committee implements a more rigorous process for identifying states' needs and a more proactive approach to engaging with the donor community. Criteria for potential donor states and organizations to consider when evaluating a state's capacity to implement the provisions of Resolution 1373 is available in Table 1 on page 8.

Defining and improving the CTC's analytical function

The CTC must recognize the necessity of conducting thorough analyses, using multiple data sources to determine:

- What states already have done to implement the provisions of Resolution 1373; and

- What additional steps need to be taken to help states implement the provisions fully.

As noted, the CTC/CTED analysis should draw upon information provided not only in state reports submitted pursuant to Resolution 1373 but from a wide range of other sources. Information generated from the various sources should then be clearly presented to states in question and relevant donors. The CTC/CTED should tailor its analysis to the specific provisions of the resolution, seeking to provide states with a clear sense of what steps need to be taken to implement each of the relevant provisions of the resolution. It should seek to engage states in the analytic process without being perceived as judging their efforts to implement Resolution 1373.

Conducting and disseminating credible needs assessments

As noted above, the CTC/CTED must improve and further develop mechanisms for gathering and assessing information about the counter-terrorism capacity of individual states and sharing that information with members of the donor community (both states and organizations).[14] These needs assessments are necessary to guide potential donors as they commit resources to counter-terrorism technical assistance. More widely shared and accessible assessments can lead to more strategically targeted assistance and a greater commitment of resources from donors.

Assessments will be more useful and credible if relevant organizations and local government experts (for example in countries where site-visits might occur) are properly consulted and encouraged to communicate with the CTC/CTED on substantive issues. With the CTED now fully staffed, there should be experts available who

The CTC/CTED should tailor its analysis to the specific provisions of the resolution, seeking to provide states with a clear sense of what steps need to be taken to implement each of the relevant provisions of the resolution. It should seek to engage states in the analytic process without being perceived as judging their efforts to implement Resolution 1373.

Table 1 — Technical Assistance Needs Assessment Typology

Table 1 (below) lists the priority areas under Resolution 1373 in which assistance is needed and the support a state may be receiving from donors and organizations. Potential risk factors affecting counter-terrorism compliance are also identified. Technical assistance is systematically classified in a linear sequence using series of questions to assess a state's capability and needs.

For donors the process must begin with an evaluation of existing data sources. These data sources and the types of information available are as follows:

CTC/CTED
- Country reports[1]
- CTED site-visit reports
- CTED needs assessments
- CTC assistance matrix

Multilateral and bilateral assistance providers[2]
- Reports of multilateral assistance agencies
- Reports of donor countries

International functional organizations[3]
- Reports of capacity building assistance missions
- Directories and matrices of available services and technical assistance

Regional, sub-regional organizations
- Action plans
- Reports of regional meetings
- Reports of regional technical assistance efforts

1. In addition to the CTC's database of some 700 country reports submitted pursuant to Resolution 1373, the CTC/CTED generates data in the form of follow-up letters to each report, needs assessments, technical assistance matrices, and site-visit reports.

2. In this context we recommend that donor countries and agencies should also contact CTED regional expert(s) who should have the most up-to-date information on countries within the region under their purview.

3. Information provided in assessments and reports prepared by functional organizations pertaining to identified needs and efforts to meet those needs. Examples include data provided in the G8's CTAG Matrix on Assistance and other indications of aid provided on a bilateral basis.

1373 Category[1]	(A) Multilateral and Bilateral[2]	(B) Regional Support	(C) Potential Risk Factors[3]
1. Anti-terrorism legislation	Assistance provided by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/ Commonwealth Secretariat/ bilaterally? Legislative action plan in place? Parties to twelve international counter-terrorism-related conventions/protocols?	Regional or sub-regional organization capable of facilitating the delivery of and/or providing assistance? Regional workshops?	Difficulties with obtaining parliamentary support for draft legislation? Legal institutions established/functioning?
2. Measures against assets used for criminal purposes	Assistance provided by Financial Action Task Force (FATF)/ International Monetary Fund (IMF)/ bilaterally?	Financial Action Task Force (FATF) FATF-Style Regional Body (FSRB) developed? FATF member? Member of Egmont Group?	High incidence of illicit capital/asset flows reported? High use of informal banking systems?
3. Effectiveness of law enforcement services	Member of Interpol? Connected to I-24/7 Communications system? Assessments conducted/ assistance provided by Interpol? Bilateral assessments/assistance?	Arrangements for operational-level cooperation, such as the exchange of information and intelligence with neighbors?	Evidence of lack of cooperation among government agencies? Law enforcement hampered by official collusion and bribery?
4. Territorial control	Assistance provided by World Customs Organization (WCO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), or International Organization for Migration (IOM)? Bilateral assessments/assistance?	Regional customs arrangement (e.g., Schengen)?	Conflict and/or terrorist risks internally or in neighboring countries? Security concerns at ports/international airports?

1. Although eight categories were identified by the CTC and are being used to delineate themes in the CTC "Directory of Assistance," the four categories used here are more up-to-date and have been taken from the categories referred to as: "Areas covered by the Visits" identified in the CTED's *Framework Document*. See United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, *Framework Document for CTC Visits to States in Order to Enhance the Monitoring of Resolution 1373 (2001)*, New York, 9 March 2005. Available online at the *United Nations* <http://www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1373/frameworkdocument.htm> (accessed 14 September 2005).

2. Information provided in assessments and reports prepared by functional organizations pertaining to identified needs and efforts to meet those needs. Examples include data provided in the G8's CTAG Matrix on Assistance and other indications of aid provided on a bilateral basis.

3. To further refine the evaluation of need it is important to draw upon available data pertaining to risk-assessment applying a deliberate, analytical approach to identify vulnerabilities in the state and region in question. These variables for the risk assessment should, where possible, be ranked according to predetermined criteria in order to establish priorities that can be used to select safeguards to reduce vulnerabilities. According to the *Framework Document,* the following aspects of each state's situation are relevant to a thorough understanding of potential risk factors: 1. Geographic characteristics, 2. Specific historical and cultural features, 3. Level of development, 4. Political situation, 5. Administrative organization, 6. Institutional and legal system, 7. The specific threats of terrorism and other underlying criminal phenomena."

have a deep understanding of the assistance needs/priorities for each region. This would allow for more substantive interactions between the CTC/CTED and the donor community.

Assessments should also take account of risk factors. For example, in states with vulnerable sea ports, cargo security and protection of maritime transportation assets would be given priority over other related issues in the near-term. In regions where collective counter-terrorism mechanisms are weak or nonexistent, the emphasis could be on encouraging the creation of functioning FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) or law-enforcement cooperation mechanisms.

Developing a proactive coordination function with states and organizations

The CTC/CTED's facilitation role is best understood as a coordination function involving states and organizations including UN and non-UN players.[15] To fulfill its facilitation and coordination function the CTC must play a proactive role in six essential areas:

a. Assuming a more hands-on role in brokering technical assistance (e.g., reaching out to members of the donor community to identify suitable assistance providers to fill the priority needs being identified in the needs assessments and where assistance is committed, ensuring that the assistance is being delivered in a timely manner);

b. Supporting functional organizations in the development, promotion, and monitoring of international norms and standards relevant to the implementation of Resolution 1373;

c. Encouraging regional and sub-regional organizations to assist their member states in adopting those norms and standards, with a view to implementing Resolution 1373;

d. Improving contact among all relevant organizations and the CTC to reduce unnecessary duplication of these efforts among UN and non-UN players;[16]

e. Providing models for the development of specialized counter-terrorism units within organizations across all regions; and

f. Requiring states to develop a national harmonized inter-agency approach to counter-terrorism capacity building as a condition of receiving assistance. An inter-agency process will improve states' capacity

to identify and prioritize opportunities for strengthening counter-terrorism capacity.

Until the newly arrived CTED staff are fully trained (end of 2005), the CTED should limit its focus to marrying identified needs among priority states and regions with assistance resources that are available from existing sources. In addition, it should work to ensure that the necessary assistance is available to build capacity in all the different areas of responsibility mandated in Resolution 1373. The CTED should then further develop and refine the classification of required assistance activities as its knowledge base grows. This classification system should be sensitive to the two quite different funding communities involved—security and development. It should present opportunities to both communities that are consistent with their respective mandates. Differences can be bridged by approaching security matters as necessary elements of good governance, which is essential to effective development.

Improving regional coordination

Since its establishment, the CTC has based its work on the idea that only by engaging international, regional, and sub-regional organizations would it succeed in getting all states to implement Resolution 1373. The task of monitoring 191 member states' efforts to implement the resolution is too large for the CTC to handle alone. It requires the assistance of these organizations, which can work to ensure that their member states are taking the steps necessary, as outlined by the CTC, to implement the resolution and to report regularly to the CTC/CTED on such efforts.

A number of organizations have established dedicated counter-terrorism units, task forces, or posts within their secretariats to work on these issues.[17] Unfortunately, regional organizations in some areas (e.g., Africa and the Middle East) do not have a dedicated counter-terrorism unit/task force/staff within the secretariat. These are areas where Resolution 1373 implementation efforts are lagging furthest behind. The CTC should therefore make the establishment of these specialized units a priority in *all* regions, with clear points of contact within each.

Developing a more accessible and user-friendly assistance database

The assistance matrix, which provides information about country needs to potential

donors and indicates what assistance has been or is being provided, is not efficiently organized. From the perspective of a potential donor country or organization, the matrix is cumbersome and difficult to use. It presents over ninety pages of information without enabling the user to identify geographic regions or themes, such as border controls or terrorist financing. Moreover, it does not always indicate the stage of the delivery of assistance, the results of the assistance activities (e.g., terrorist financing legislation drafted and adopted or machine-readable passports introduced), and whether the CTC believes additional assistance is needed. A number of CTC representatives have suggested that the CTC/CTED consider including this information in a revised matrix.[18]

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and U.S. President George Bush at the Gleneagles G8 Summit, Scotland, 7 July 2005 (Chris Young/Crown Copyright).

One official has suggested that the CTC consider a thematic matrix that lists some of the priority areas of terrorism concern (e.g., Man-Portable Air Defense Systems [MANPADS], radiological smuggling, non-banking conduits) along with information about the providers of technical assistance for those particular priority areas.[19]

The CTC technical assistance team recommended in 2003 that information about assistance needs and availability be placed in a word-searchable and thus more accessible database.[20] The proposed database would be organized by sector, activity-type, and country, with cross referencing possible in all directions. The World Health Organization's program budget and database provides a possible model.

Establishing a technical assistance working group

The CTC should consider the creation of an informal working group on counter-terrorism technical assistance and capacity building. This working group would be a forum for coordination with all the key actors, including both donors and recipients of assistance. It would be New York-based, chaired by the CTED's Executive Director, and could include the representatives of key players such the UNODC, UNDP, the G8's CTAG, regional bodies, and other members of the donor community, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Donor and recipient governments would be encouraged to send representatives from their UN missions in New York as well.

The proposed working group would provide an informal forum for the discussion of general issues related to counter-terrorism technical assistance, which would help to enhance overall coordination. It could convene perhaps twice yearly and report to the CTC. Subjects for discussion could include needs assessments, site-visits, the coordination of technical assistance, the identification of gaps in capacity and associated assistance needs, the financial requirements of the countries and agencies, the ability of donor governments to respond to the identified needs, and the effectiveness of the assistance being delivered. While the G8's CTAG brings together many of the key members of the donor community, the recipient community is not represented. The proposed working group therefore would satisfy an important need: creating a much needed opportunity for the donor and recipient communities to discuss a variety of counter-terrorism technical assistance issues.

Leaders of the G8 countries at the end of the Gleneagles G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, 8 July 2005. Pictured: Front row: President George Bush, United States; President Jacques Chirac, France; Prime Minister Tony Blair, UK; President Vladimir Putin, Russia; Chancellor Gerhard Shröder, Germany. Back row: Prime Minister Paul Martin, Canada; Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan; President Silvio Berlusconi, Italy; President of the EU, José Manuel Barroso (Stephen Pond/Crown Copyright).

IV. International Coordination

Improve coordination with the CTAG

To perform its duty as coordinator of international counter-terrorism, the CTC must develop a closer and more responsive relationship with the CTAG. The vast majority of available technical assistance flows bilaterally from the G8 countries. Improving its coordination with CTAG is one of the central roles the CTC can serve in facilitating counter-terrorism assistance. The CTC, along with representatives of other relevant UN bodies, is now represented in the CTAG, but the level of meaningful cooperation to date has been relatively minimal. Despite CTAG requests for information, the CTC has been slow to respond, due partly to staffing shortages and its cumbersome procedures. In early 2004, the CTAG asked the CTC to share its analyses of the hundreds of state reports it had received, along with its assessment of states' counter-terrorism capacities and their priority assistance needs. In April 2004, the CTC asked its experts to prepare the needs assessments. More than one year later the CTAG had only received four—although this number is expected to increase significantly in the coming months. Even then the CTAG will still not have access to the complete analytic reports with the first section of the needs assessments. All such barriers to full cooperation should be eliminated.

Once the CTED is fully operational, some portion of its staff should be solely responsible for liaison with the CTAG. Similarly, information generated by the CTAG, particularly reports about the extensive bilateral assistance programs available from the G8 countries, should be shared on a regular basis with the CTC/CTED and, where appropriate, incorporated into the CTC's assistance directory. Improving coordination with the CTAG, which includes finding ways to allow the CTAG to benefit from the CTC/CTED's analyses and assessments, should be one of the CTC's priorities.

Improve coordination with the UNDP

The CTC should develop a closer working relationship with the UNDP. Traditionally the UNDP has focused exclusively on development, with little or no involvement in security or terrorism-related issues. The UNDP field of development assistance has been seen heretofore as quite distinct from counter-terrorism. But connections between development and conflict-related issues are increasingly clear, and the capacity building challenge of counter-terrorism overlaps with the good governance agenda of UNDP.

The UNDP and CTC should cooperate to highlight the connections between the development goal of good governance and the counter-terrorism goal of building law enforcement capacity. As a first step, the CTC Chairman and the CTED Executive Director should meet with the UNDP executive board to explore specific ways to deepen their relationship.

Overhaul CTC special meetings of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations

These special meetings should play a more effective role in the information-sharing process. If properly planned and conducted, these meetings can allow practitioners at the international, regional, sub-regional, and national levels to share information, exchange best practices, and discuss problems surrounding the implementation of Resolution 1373.

Four special meetings, co-hosted by the CTC and other international or regional organizations, have been held since March 2003 in New York, Washington, Vienna, and Almaty, Kazakhstan with progressively less political direction and senior participation from the most relevant organizations. Too often these meetings have consisted of participants reading prepared statements. The meetings have then concluded with the adoption of a prenegotiated declaration or final statement that enumerates the different steps the participants commit to taking to enhance their contributions to global implementation of Resolution 1373. Generally the CTC has not adequately followed up with the different participants to ensure that the commitments made in these documents are being fulfilled. As a result, many commitments made during these meetings remain unfulfilled.

To be more effective, future meetings must:

- **Have a more narrow focus.** For example, they could focus on identifying specific problems that participating organizations have encountered in trying to support the implementation of Resolution 1373.

- **Address specific substantive issues identified by the CTC.** These include preventing terrorist travels and safe haven or terrorist incitement and recruitment. The CTC should provide political direction regarding the priority topics they wish to address and the outcomes they desire for the meetings, while the CTED staff should be responsible for the organization and conduct of the sessions.[21]

- **Emphasize workshops rather than formal plenary meetings.** There should be fewer speeches from political leaders and organizational chiefs, and more practical problem solving activity among technical experts and practitioners. This would increase the chance of having substantive, interactive discussions of concrete problems.

- **Have the CTC representatives in New York attend the meetings.** This would enable diplomatic officials to learn more about the technical details and challenges of global counter-terrorism implementation and coordination.

Because the declining value of recent meetings is well known, it may be useful to hold the next meeting in New York and to use that meeting to reinvigorate the process. The focus of such a meeting could be the adoption of a revised follow-on work program, with the CTED responsible for increased information exchange and coordination of counter-terrorism cooperation and assistance, as well as ensuring that participants follow through on the commitments made at the meeting.

Transparency: Creating an infrastructure for information sharing

The reluctance of many states and organizations to share intelligence and general information on counter-terrorism capabilities has hampered the ability of the CTC/CTED to effectively facilitate the provision of technical assistance. There are frequent calls for better mechanisms for sharing information on counter-terrorism, but there is also the misconception that the best information is classified and thus cannot be shared. In fact, a great deal of critical information about the counter-terrorism capacity of states is unclassified and can be shared fully. The creation of a better mechanism for sharing such information would benefit the global counter-terrorism effort.

Establishing new or improving existing mechanisms for information sharing would better facilitate the flow of technical assistance by increasing confidence that there is a sophisticated process for identifying the states most in need and the priority areas in those states. Now that the CTED is fully staffed, the CTC should have the expert support it needs to develop these mechanisms.

V. Taking a Regional Approach

The CTC and its CTED need to focus on getting regional organizations around the globe to play a more active role in helping their members implement Resolution 1373, sharing information with the CTC on their members' efforts, and helping the CTC facilitate the delivery of technical assistance.

Table 2	Initial Survey of Counter-Terrorism Efforts by Regional Organizations
Europe	
European Union (EU) – Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator [1]	• Action Plan: Yes • Implementation: Yes – Objectives revised and reviewed every five years with progress charted • Sample Legislation: Yes • Law Enforcement: Yes – Europol leading the way in coordinating counter-terrorism program • Regional Coordination: Yes • International Coordination: Yes
Council of Europe (COE) – Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) [2]	• Counter-Terrorism Task Force Director
Multidisciplinary Group on International Action Against Terrorism (GMT) [3]	• Action Plan: Yes • Regional Coordination: Working to coordinate with the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Interpol, and European Commission
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – Secretariat – Action Against Terrorism Unit (ATU) [4]	• Action Plan: Yes • Sample Legislation: Yes – Works with other Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) instruments to strengthen national anti-terrorism laws • Law Enforcement: Yes – Coordination and support across different law enforcement agencies • Regional Coordination: Yes – Extensive coordination with the other Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) instruments as well as with other European regional bodies • International Coordination: Yes – Bucharest Plan of Action stresses UN legal foundation for fight against terror, includes coordination with other counter-terrorism regional organizations: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, African Union, etc. • Human Rights: Human rights is a foundation of Bucharest Plan of Action – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is part of the organizational mandate
Americas	
Organization of American States (OAS) – Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) [5]	• Sample Legislation: Yes • Training: Yes • Law Enforcement: Yes – Created a database to aid law enforcement officials • Regional Coordination: Yes • International Coordination: Yes

Although the CTC has developed close relationships with some regional organizations (e.g., the OSCE and the OAS/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism), it has not (often because of lack of staff) engaged in regular dialogue and information sharing with other regional organizations. A now fully staffed CTED should enable the CTC to reach out to all regional organizations and deepen its dialogue with these bodies.

As noted earlier, the regions furthest behind in their efforts to implement Resolution 1373 generally do not have effective counter-terrorism programs in their regional organizations. It is in these regions where the CTC could benefit most from having an 'on-the-ground' partner, capable of providing it with information on countries' efforts to implement Resolution 1373 and supporting improved performance.

It may be impossible to measure objectively the relative counter-terrorism capacities of different regional organizations, but a look at several key indicators is illustrative of the disparate capacities of these organizations across different regions:

• does the regional organization have an established coordinating mechanism or dedicated counter-terrorism unit;

Table 2
Continued

Initial Survey of Counter-Terrorism Efforts by Regional Organizations

Africa[6]

African Union (AU) – Preventing and Combating Terrorism[7]	• Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism[8] (2002) • Implementation: No • Sample Legislation: Yes – But no sample legislation listed or included, members simply urged to improve their counter-terrorism legislative abilities • Training: None listed • Law Enforcement: Supposed coordination across states on many different levels however capacity to do so is clearly lacking • Regional Coordination: Yes • International Coordination: Yes • Human Rights: No mention of human rights issues included in action plan or convention

Asia/Pacific[9]

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)[10]	• Law Enforcement: Task Force on Terrorism a mechanism of law enforcement coordination
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) – Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF)[11]	• Action Plan: Submitted to Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) by all Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members • Regional Coordination: Yes – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia Development Bank • International Coordination: Yes – G8, CTC, European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS)
Shanghai Cooperation Organization[12]	• No specific action plan however regional structure does coordinate with CTC • Sample Legislation: China drafted counter-terrorism law August 2005 • Regional Coordination: Yes
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)[13]	• Action Plan: No • Sample Legislation: Armenia adopted counter-terrorism legislation in March 2005 which serves as a model to other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries
Pacific Island Forum (PIF)[14]	• Action Plan: No

Middle East/North Africa (MENA)[15]

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[16]	• Action Plan: No • International Coordination: Relationship with the European Union (EU)

Miscellaneous International Bodies

G8 – Counter Terrorism Action Group (CTAG)[17] India-Canada Joint Working Group on CT[19]	• 2005 Statement on Counter Terrorism[18]

- does it have an action plan;
- is there follow up on implementation;
- does it conduct capacity building programs;
- is it cooperating with other international, regional, and functional organizations; and
- does it provide for the protection of human rights?

Table 2 is an initial survey of the counter-terrorism efforts of many of the major regional organizations. As it illustrates, there are significant discrepancies in the capacity of various regions to contribute effectively to counter-terrorism efforts. The region that seems to have the most organizational capacity and accountability is Europe. EU strengths include: clearly outlined mandates and action plans, dedicated counter-terrorism units, implementation

Table 2 Notes

1. Mr. Gijs de Vries, first EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator, oversees the action plan and coordinates the EU Council's counter-terrorism efforts. See European Union, "EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism – Update," November 2004. Available online at the *BBC* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_05_actionplan16090.pdf> (accessed 14 September 2005).

2. CODEXTER was established in 2003 and is responsible for coordinating the legal aspect of counter-terrorism in the COE. For more information see: Council of Europe, "Committee of Experts on Terrorism." Available online at the *Council of Europe* <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-operation/Fight_against_terrorism/3_CODEXTER/Default.asp#TopOfPage> (accessed 14 September 2005). CODEXTER's mandate derives from the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977, updated 2003), and the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (open for signature May 2005) which emphasizes the preservation of human rights and freedoms within the fight against terrorism. See Council of Europe, "European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism." Available online at the *Council of Europe* <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/090.htm> (accessed 14 September 2005).

3. The GMT was established in 2001 to increase the COE's ability to coordinate its instruments in counter-terrorism efforts. The GMT's mandate derives from the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. For more information See Council of Europe, "Combating Terrorism – The Multidisciplinary Group on International Action against Terrorism (GMT)." Available online at the *Council of Europe* <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-operation/Fight_against_terrorism/3_CODEXTER/The_GMT/GMT%20Default.asp#TopOfPage> (accessed 14 September 2005).

4. The ATU was established in 2001 to address OSCE member counter-terrorism capacity. For more information about the ATU and its mandate see the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Secretariat - Action against Terrorism Unit." Available online at the *OSCE* <http://www.osce.org/atu/> (accessed 14 September 2005).

5. The CICTE was established in 1998 by the Commitment of Mar del Plata. It derives its mandate from the Resolution Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate Terrorism (2001); and the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism (2002). For more information see the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism. Available online at the *OAS* <http://www.cicte.oas.org/> (accessed 14 September 2005).

6. The African region is receiving aid from G8 countries. For example, Nigeria is receiving aid for customs and immigration law and practice, transport security, border control, police and law enforcement work, and counter-terrorism legislation.

7. The mandates governing counter-terrorism efforts in the AU are the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999/2002), and the Protocol to the Convention (2004). Thirty-six out of fifty-three countries in the AU have ratified the convention. For more information about the convention and the recently-established African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, see African Union, "Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa." Available online at the *AU* <http://www.africa-union.org/Terrorism/terrorism2.htm> (accessed 14 September 2005).

8. For more information on the AU Action Plan, see Kathryn Sturman, "The AU Plan on Terrorism: Joining the Global War or Leading an African Battle?," *African Security Review* 11, no. 4 (2002). Available online at the *Institute for Security Studies* <http://www.iss.org.za/Pubs/ASR/11No4/Sturman.html> (accessed 14 September 2005). See also African Union, "Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa," September 2002. Available online at the *AU* <http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/keydocs/PoAfinal.pdf> (accessed 14 September 2005).

9. The Asia/Pacific region is receiving aid from G8 countries. For example, the region is receiving customs and immigration law practice, and emergency response aid. Indonesia is receiving customs and immigration law and practice, transport security, counter-terrorism legislation, capacity building for the judiciary, military counter-terrorism training, and police and law enforcement aid. Other regional counter-terrorism organizations in the Asia/Pacific region include: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); Central Asian Cooperation Organization; and Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova Group (GUUAM).

10. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism." Available online at *ASEAN* <http://www.aseansec.org/14396.htm> (accessed 14 September 2005).

11. The CTTF was established in 2003 as a working group of APEC senior officials. It was designed to complement the overall goal of promoting economic growth in Asia-Pacific region. It derives its mandate from the "Leaders Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth 2002," which outlines various parts of counter-terrorism efforts specific to trade, economic development, and finances (including transportation, energy, customs, trade, and border control). For more information see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, "Counter Terrorism." Available online at *APEC* <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism.html> (accessed 14 September 2005).

12. The regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is based in Uzbekistan and coordinates counter-terrorism efforts. It derives its mandate from the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. For more information see the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Available online at <http://www.sectsco.org/> (accessed 14 September 2005).

13. The CIS derives its counter-terrorism mandate from the Treaty on Cooperation Among States Members to the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism 1999. See Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999, "Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999," Minsk, 4 June 1999. Available online at the *United Nations Treaty Collection* <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/csi_e.pdf> (accessed 14 September 2005).

14. The Pacific region is receiving financial law and practice aid from G8 countries in addition to individual aid to the various islands. The PIF was established in 1971 as a forum for political, economic, and security cooperation in the region. It derives its counter-terrorism mandate from the Declaration by South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Co-operation (2002), which focuses on combating transnational crime through regional cooperation and support. See the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Available online at <http://www.forumsec.org.fj/> (accessed 14 September 2005).

15. The MENA region is receiving aid from G8 countries. For example, Algeria is receiving police and law enforcement work, customs law practice, counter-terrorism legislative aid, and military counter-terrorism training. Afghanistan is receiving police and law enforcement training, immigration law and practice, customs law and practice, military counter-terrorism training, and counter-terrorism legislation aid. Other organizations with some counter-terrorism capacity in the MENA region include: Nayif Arab University for Security and Sciences (NAUSS); League of Arab States; and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

16. The GCC is a partner with FATF. No other counter-terrorism measures are indicated at this time.

17. The G8 member countries provide a great deal of aid to countries in need of technical assistance with counter-terrorism programs.

18. For information on the G8's counter-terrorism efforts see the G8 Gleneagles 2005 Policy Issues, "Countering Terrorism," available online at the *G8* <http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1097073600687> (accessed 14 September 2005).

19. The working group is a partnership established in 1997 that serves as an informational exchange forum.

timelines and reports, incorporation of the weaker parts of the region into training and capacity building exercises, a focus on human rights, and coordination with other regional and international bodies. APEC has also focused on needs assessments and matching donors with regional needs. APEC's Counter-Terrorism Task Force has developed Counter Terrorism Action Plans (CTAPs), for example, which detail a regional set of needs and specific themes. The regions that appear to be particularly in need of greater capacity in key areas are: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region; Southeast Asia; the states of the former Soviet Union (Common-wealth of Independent States); and Africa. Although each of these regions has some form of counter-terrorism plan or organization in place, little has been done beyond stating the need for a coordi-nated approach.

In some less developed regions, e.g., MENA and Africa, the efforts of the regional organizations are generally focused on the implementation of regional counter-terrorism instruments, rather than Resolution 1373 and the twelve (now thirteen) United Nations conventions and protocols related to terrorism. Participation rates in these international instruments are lowest in Africa and the MENA region. In its work with both the regional organizations and potential donors, the CTC/CTED should continue to emphasize the importance of making implementation of Resolution 1373 and the international conventions core elements of regional counter-terrorism programs and action plans.

The inadequacy of counter-terrorism efforts in some regional organizations is due in part to a lack of resources and an inability to address priority needs. There have been efforts by the UN, EU, and G8 countries to develop stronger counter-terrorism capacities in these weaker regions, but these efforts should be expanded and better coordinated through the CTC. The CTC/CTED should encourage donors to provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the counter-terrorism capacities of regional bodies. It should also urge donors to earmark any assistance for efforts that focus on the implementation of Resolution 1373. An initial step for the CTED would be to complete a more thorough assessment of regional counter-terrorism capabilities along the lines of the above survey.

In addition, the CTC should co-sponsor regional workshops with the relevant regional organization.

Representatives of relevant functional and interna-tional organizations could also participate. These workshops would bring together counter-terrorism experts/practitioners from the different countries in the particular region to exchange views on Resolution 1373 implementation efforts. This would provide a forum for sharing practical experiences, with a view to developing regional best practices related to implementation. The organic development of regional best practices could help lay the foundation for creating counter-terrorism performance standards in the particular region. Such workshops should also include experts from regions where best practices have been developed and are well functioning. This would allow regions to garner practical information from peers and help encourage development of best practices as a bottom-up approach, offsetting the often negative appearance of the North telling the South what to do.

VI. Developing Best Practices and Performance Standards

Many states and international organizations agree that establishing criteria for measuring counter-terrorism capacity and implementation efforts would benefit the UN counter-terrorism program. The creation and application of a uniform set of best practices[22] would give greater strategic direction to the work of the CTC. Such formal and objective standards would move the CTC beyond the current situation, where there is a continuous exchange of information with officials in member state governments but no clear understanding of when or how the process will be completed. Enabling states to see a light at the end of the tunnel could serve as an incentive to encourage further capacity building and implementation of Resolution 1373.[23]

These standards would give greater focus to CTC evaluation procedures and technical assistance efforts and would help the CTC set priorities for the coordinated provision of technical assistance. The adoption of objective counter-terrorism standards and best practices would thus both facilitate the CTC's assessment of member state capacity building and implementation efforts and improve its facilitation of technical assistance.

Creating a methodology for evaluating performance

Methodologies exist for assessing implementa-tion of a wide range of UN program goals, and it

would be appropriate to create one for addressing counter-terrorism provisions as well. The methodology should track the specific provisions of Resolution 1373 (such as criminalizing the funding of terrorism) and identify specific indicators to determine compliance (such as the development of legal and administrative capacity to freeze terrorist funds, etc.). These indicators could then be incorporated into a formal set of performance standards that would be adopted by the CTC, referred to the Security Council, and disseminated to regional organizations and member governments.

The CTC must establish a finite number of achievable standards. Developing an extensive list of multiple indicators would only complicate the implementation process and make it more difficult for officials at the UN and within member states to cooperate. The proposed methodology should seek to identify a limited number of specific indicators within each category of counter-terrorism performance as specified in Resolution 1373. This would involve prioritizing the most important performance elements and concentrating the energy of the committee and the CTED staff on assisting in the implementation of these particular practices.

Informal standards in the CTC

The CTC, building off of the work of organizations such as FATF and ICAO, has already developed informal standards for evaluating state capabilities and needs. In communications with member state governments, committee experts have identified steps that states can adopt to help assure implementation. Committee experts have noted, for example, that implementation of the requirement to deny financing for terrorist groups, as specified in Paragraph 1 of Resolution 1373, means establishing mechanisms

to register and monitor the collection of public funds. It may also involve establishing procedures to license those engaged in informal money transfer systems. Similar informal guidance has been provided with regard to other provisions of Resolution 1373. The proposal to develop more formal standards for assessing capacity and Resolution 1373 implementation efforts would build upon these existing methods. It would assure that more formalized, universally accepted criteria are established to evaluate and assist counter-terrorism performance.

Taking stock of existing international standards

Numerous functional and specialized international organizations possess competence in areas directly related to Resolution 1373. Many of them already work in collaboration with the CTC, and it is expected that with the CTED now fully staffed, the CTC will deepen these relationships. Most have participated in the annual CTC special meetings at which they have shared information on codes, standards, and best practices related to counter-terrorism. These functional and specialized organizations represent the most logical source of expertise. In many cases they have existing sets of standards and best practices, which can be useful to the CTC as it moves forward with developing its own standards.

While the standards of the international functional organizations can be extremely useful to the CTC in developing uniform practices, there are also limitations to the utility of these existing standards. For example, some of the best practices developed by these organizations offer only general principles. Others offer highly specific technical guidance on issues

The creation and application of a uniform set of best practices would give greater strategic direction to the work of the CTC. . . . Enabling states to see a light at the end of the tunnel could serve as an incentive to encourage further capacity building and implementation of Resolution 1373.

Table 3	Examples of Relevant Counter-Terrorism Standards and Best Practices[1]
Operative Paragraphs from Resolution 1373	**Relevant Functional Organizations, Standards, and Best Practices**

1. (a) – 1. (d)	Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
	• Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
	    o Guidance Notes
	    o Best practices papers:
	       - Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets
	       - Alternative remittance
	       - Non-profit organizations
	• Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering
	    o Interpretative Notes to the Forty Recommendations
	
	Basel Committee for Banking Supervision
	• Customer Due Diligence for Banks
	• Sharing of Financial Records between Jurisdictions in Connection with the Fight against Terrorism
	
	Regional Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-Style Organizations
	
	Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors
	
	International Monetary Fund (IMF)

2. (a)	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) • Key Elements for Effective Export Control Systems Australia Group Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Suppliers Group Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) • Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons Wassenaar Arrangement
2. (b)	Interpol
2. (c) & (d)	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) • Model Law on Extradition • Model Treaty on Extradition (General Assembly resolution 45/116, as amended by General Assembly resolution 52/88) • Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (General Assembly resolution 45/117, as amended by General Assembly resolution 53/112) • Revised Manuals on the Model Treaties on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters • UNODC computer software for preparing and processing mutual legal assistance and extradition requests
2. (e)	Commonwealth Secretariat • Model Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism • Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions International Bar Association

Table 3 Continued

Examples of Relevant Counter-Terrorism Standards and Best Practices

Operative Paragraphs from Resolution 1373	Relevant Functional Organizations, Standards, and Best Practices
2. (e) (continued)	International Monetary Fund (IMF) • Suppressing the Financing of Terror: A Handbook for Legislative Drafting Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) • Commitments and International Legal Instruments Relating to Terrorism: A Reference Guide United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) • Legislative Guide to Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols • Global Program Against Terrorism
2. (f)	Basel Committee for Banking Supervision • Sharing of Financial Records between Jurisdictions in Connection with the Fight against Terrorism G8 • An Inventory of G8 Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Best Practices Interpol United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) • Model Law on Extradition • Model Treaty on Extradition (General Assembly resolution 45/116, as amended by General Assembly resolution 52/88) • Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (General Assembly resolution 45/117, as amended by General Assembly resolution 53/112) • Revised Manuals on the Model Treaties on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters • UNODC computer software for preparing and processing mutual legal assistance and extradition requests
2. (g)	G8 • Secure and Facilitate International Travel Initiative International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) • ICAO Document 9303 International Organization for Migration (IOM) World Customs Organization (WCO) • WCO Trade Facilitation Initiatives and Simplification of Customs Procedures

Other Relevant Functional Organizations, Standards, and Best Practices

	International Air Transport Association (IATA) • IATA Recommended Security Standards International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) – Aviation Security • ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for the safeguarding of international civil aviation contained in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention • ICAO Security Manual guidance notes on interpretation and implementation of the SARPs found in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention International Maritime Organization (IMO) • International Ship and Port Facility Security Code World Customs Organization (WCO) • WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade • Security and Facilitation of the International Supply Chain

1. This table only provides examples of key functional organizations, standards, and best practices relevant to the provisions of Resolution 1373 and does not represent an exhaustive list of all such organizations and standards. It should also be noted that it does not include relevant provisions of the international and regional instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism or accompanying implementation guidelines.

such as the issuance of machine readable travel documents, which might not be appropriate for all UN members. The variation in the content and form of these existing performance standards and best practices poses a challenge for the creation of a more universal set of standards for UN purposes.

It should also be noted that membership within the functional organizations varies, with few of them having the universal membership of the UN, and that the applicability of the associated standards and best practices is not universal. In addition, the different organizations often have different expectations with regard to what steps their members should take in relation to the proposed standards and best practices. Most of the standards and best practices are not legally binding, and some have expressed the concern that having the CTC, a body operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopt or borrow them might make them so. This concern is overblown, however, as the legal nature of these criteria need not change if the CTC were to use them.

A further complication is that most functional organizations adopt standards for a range of program purposes that might be unrelated to terrorism. Establishing uniform counter-terrorism standards for the United Nations will require separating the terrorism-related standards of functional organizations from unrelated requirements. It will also involve creating a standard-ized format for the presenta-tion of the various recom-mended practices. Notwith-standing these challenges, the inventory of existing standards among functional organizations offers an

> **Because of the political diversity of the UN and the disparate membership of the various functional organizations, the CTC will face continuing difficulties in attempting to develop and adopt performacnce standards and best practices. . . . To avoid these difficulties, UN member states, particularly CTC members, and other interested parties may wish to sponsor and participate in an independent process parallel to but distinct from the formal UN intergovernmental process.**

invaluable resource from which the CTC can draw to establish universal counter-terrorism performance standards.

Table 3 is a preliminary working list that matches the operative paragraphs of Resolution 1373 with relevant functional organizations, standards, and best practices.

Adopting and adapting the standards of existing international agencies

The CTC can develop specific practices for implementing the provisions of Resolution 1373 by adopting and adapting the perfor-mance standards of the functional organizations. This process of importing existing standards would consist of the following steps: 1) identifying the most important counter-terrorism standards and best practices of functional organizations; 2) adapting and universalizing those standards for the purposes of the UN counter-terrorism program; 3) establishing a limited number of priority practices within each category in Resolution 1373; 4) promulgating the proposed standards to states and regional organizations; and 5) using the standards as tools of assessment and guidelines for prioritizing the provision of technical assistance.

In order to guide its work in facilitating the provision of assistance, the CTC has already developed a list of seven "select categories" related to counter-terrorism performance. These include financing, legislative drafting, immigration, customs, extradition, police enforcement, and illegal arms trafficking. These categories were developed shortly after the CTC was established to correspond generally to the specific requirements contained in the operational paragraphs of Resolution 1373. A more up-to-date set of categories has been established by the CTED and is enumerated in the CTC *Framework Document* for site-visits, including: anti-terrorism

legislation, measures against assets used for criminal purposes, effectiveness of law enforcement services, international cooperation, and territorial control.

Finally, the CTC should add a category to ensure that implementation is carried out in a manner consistent with states'obligations under international human rights law as provided by Resolution 1456 (2003).

The CTC has started to move in the direction of adopting performance standards from existing functional organizations. In March of 2005, responding to the Security Council's request in Resolution 1566 (2004), the CTC initiated its work on establishing a set of best practices related to the financing of terrorism. A number of member states and experts recommended adopting FATF's nine special recommendations on the financing of terrorism ("FATF Nine") as a basis for UN standards in this area. The FATF guidelines are widely viewed as the clearest, most readily available standards for adoption. However, committee members have not been able to agree on whether to adopt FATF's standards wholesale as they are, to modify them in some fashion, or to use them as a basis for the CTC to develop separate standards of its own. Committee members expect that the Security Council's late July 2005 adoption of Resolution 1617 (strengthening Council sanctions against Al Qaeda/Taliban and their associates), which "strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the FATF Forty Recommendation on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing," will expedite the CTC's work in this area. Once it agrees on terrorist financing standards, the CTC will turn to the other areas of Resolution 1373.

Developing an independent process to establish performance standards

Because of the political diversity of the UN and the disparate membership of the various functional organizations, the CTC will face continuing difficulties in attempting to develop and adopt performance standards and best practices. Discussions within the committee are likely to encounter impediments that result from diplomatic, political, and legal differences over a range of issues, some of which have no direct

bearing on counter-terrorism. To avoid these difficulties, UN member states, particularly CTC members, and other interested parties may wish to sponsor and participate in an independent process parallel to but distinct from the formal UN intergovernmental process. Such a process would have the specific task of developing proposals for counter-terrorism performance standards. It would bring together representatives of interested states, regional organizations, and functional organizations, along with former officials and independent experts, to develop concrete proposals that could then be fed back into the UN system. This process would encourage a broader exchange of ideas and input from experts and officials with diverse regional backgrounds to encourage the development and application of best practices and performance standards.

Independent processes have been employed successfully in the past to assist with other Security Council policy priorities. The Interlaken process sponsored by the government of Switzerland helped Security Council member states develop more refined policy tools for applying targeted financial sanctions. Similar processes sponsored by the German and Swedish governments provided support for improving the implementation of travel bans and arms embargoes and for more effective targeted sanctions in general.[24]

Major donor governments may wish to consider sponsoring a broadly-based independent process to develop concrete recommendations for creating and applying counter-terrorism performance standards and best practices. The proposed process would be managed by an independent policy institute, under the guidance of the sponsoring state or states. It would involve representatives from Security Council member states and other relevant governments, professional staff from key UN agencies, and independent experts and former officials. The process would operate outside the constraints of official diplomacy, to allow for the free exchange of ideas and policy proposals. The process would involve seminars and meetings in which participants work together in a problem solving mode to develop recommendations for the development of counter-terrorism performance standards.

Further conclusions and recommendations are listed on page 22 of this report.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The following recommendations summarize the policy options described in the narrative report:

High-level Panel report and CTED review process

- Defer any action on the High-level Panel's recommendations to create a capacity building trust fund or develop predetermined sanctions for noncompliance.

Conduct more credible needs assessments

- Utilize information provided by multiple sources, not just state reports to the CTC;

- Develop mechanisms for fully sharing with donors all information about the counter-terrorism capacity needs of individual states;

- Set clearer priorities for the specific forms of capacity building assistance that are most needed by particular states and regions; and

- Further develop and refine an overarching structure for the classification of required assistance activities.

Improve CTC site-visits

- Fully brief the CTC in advance of visits;

- Produce and disseminate more complete site-visit reports which more specifically target each provision of Resolution 1373;

- Develop more flexible site-visit scheduling; and

- Coordinate CTC site-visit assessments with those of specialized organizations and other subsidiary bodies of the UN.

Improve international coordination

- Prioritize the task of cooperation and information sharing with CTAG;

- Adopt a more proactive role in brokering technical assistance;

- Conduct a dialogue with UNDP about cooperation in the provision of capacity building assistance;

- Develop a more accessible and user-friendly assistance database;

- Make establishment of specialized counter-terrorism units a priority in *all* regions, with clear points of contact within each;

- Establish an informal working group in New York on counter-terrorism technical assistance and capacity building;

- Overhaul CTC-hosted special meetings of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations;

- Increase transparency by creating an improved infrastructure for information sharing;

- Conduct regional workshops, which will bring together national counter-terrorism practitioners;

- Encourage states receiving technical assistance to create nationally harmonized inter-agency mechanisms for enhancing cooperation among affected agencies; and

- Encourage donors to provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the counter-terrorism capacities of regional organizations.

Develop and implement UN counter-terrorism standards and best practices

- Sponsor an independent process outside of the constraints of UN diplomacy to establish performance standards and best practices.

Notes

1. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1377 (2001),* S/RES/1377, New York, 12 November 2001.

2. Quoted in United Nations Information Service, "Vienna Symposium on Terrorism Adds More Momentum to Global Fight Against Terrorism," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNIS/CP/413, 6 June 2002.

3. United Nations General Assembly, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,* A/59/565, New York, 29 November 2004.

4. United Nations General Assembly, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,* A/59/565, New York, 29 November 2004, para. 154.

5. United Nations General Assembly, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, New York, 29 November 2004, para. 155.

6. United Nations General Assembly, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, New York, 29 November 2004, para. 156.

7. Kofi Annan, "A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism" (keynote address, Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, 10 March 2005). Available online at the *Club de Madrid* <http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html> accessed 18 July 2005).

8. The Secretary-General also did not support the proposal for a dedicated counter-terrorism capacity building "trust fund" out of what might be described as "fund fatigue," a reluctance to support the general proliferation of dedicated assistance "trust funds" along the lines of that already created for AIDS. The creation of additional dedicated "trust funds" would have obvious organizational and financial implications for current UN agencies and assistance programs.

9. United Nations Security Council, *Proposal for the Revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee*, S/2004/124, New York, 19 February 2004.

10. United Nations Security Council, *Organizational Plan for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate*, S/2004/642, New York, 12 August 2004.

11. United Nations Security Council, *Work Programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (1 April-30 June 2004)*, S/2004/284, New York, 13 April 2004.

12. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, *Framework Document for CTC Visits to States in Order to Enhance the Monitoring of Resolution 1373 (2001),* New York, 9 March 2005. Available **online at the** *United Nations.*<http://www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1373/frameworkdocument.htm> (accessed 14 September 2005).

13. According to a number of CTC representatives, the CTED, largely due to staffing shortages, did not adequately brief the CTC in advance of prior visits. As a result, the CTC was not always able to provide the necessary policy direction to the CTED in the planning and follow-up stages.

14. A technical assistance team and assistance action plan was implemented in 2002. According to Ambassador Curtis Ward, the technical assistance team was tasked with developing an assistance action plan, which was agreed by the CTC, having a number of specific objectives: "facilitating self-help by making information on standards, best practice, and sources of available assistance by establishing a Directory of Assistance on the CTC's website; encouraging donors to respond to assistance needs identified as a priority for each State; working through regional and sectoral organisations to tackle regional/sectoral shortcomings; and encouraging capacity strengthening of regional organisations to respond to the identified needs of their member States." See Curtis A. Ward, "Purposes and Scope: Technical Assistance Activities in the Counter-Terrorism Committee" (unpublished paper, 2004), 3-4.

15. The role of the CTC as a facilitator of technical assistance has evolved since it was established in 2001. In the last four years the CTC has taken some steps to develop and implement a program to facilitate technical assistance, but these efforts have been constrained by the CTC's original structure and lack of available resources. Accordingly, a "revitalization" sought to address these problems and to strengthen the facilitation of technical assistance and coordination among international, regional, and sub-regional organizations. With the creation of the CTED under Resolution 1535, the CTC is now expected, as one P-5 ambassador noted, "to work more closely with states in identifying gaps in their counter-terrorism capabilities and in finding the necessary technical assistance to fill these gaps. . . . expand its efforts to galvanize organizations worldwide to adopt and implement best practices, codes, and standards, and ensure that their members are implementing requirements of the resolution. Of course, it will do this while respecting what have become its hallmarks: transparency, cooperation, and even-handedness." See United States Mission to the United Nations, "USUN Press Release #30(04)," 4 March 2004. Available online at the *United States Mission to the United Nations* <http://www.un.int/usa/04_030.htm> (accessed 16 September 2005).

16. Inherent in the idea of facilitation is the concept of coordination among the various organizations within the UN system, as well as with international organizations and agencies outside the UN system. Some efforts have been made to clarify the CTC's relationship with other entities, but more needs to be done in this regard. The top priority is close coordination with UNODC/Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB). Ambassador Rupérez visited the UNODC in October 2004 to discuss a division of labor. The CTC is a creation of the Security Council, while UNODC was created by the General Assembly and continues to operate under its mandate. The work of UNODC is supposed to be guided by decisions of the UN General Assembly and Crime Commission, in close coordination with the CTC. The UNODC claims: "In carrying out its activities, UNODC works closely with the CTC and in so doing a complementary and synergistic relationship between the two has developed. While the CTC analyzes the reports received from Member States and facilitates the provision of technical assistance to requesting states, UNODC, with its substantive expertise, delivers such assistance. Regular working contacts with the CTC are maintained, in particular through the sharing of mission reports with the CTC and by identifying with the CTC countries in priority need of legislative assistance. In this regard, the CTC directs requests for assistance from countries to the UNODC." For more information see the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Implementing International Action Against Terrorism." Available online at the *UNODC* <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism.html> (accessed 16 September 2005).

17. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), among others, have such specialized units. Within APEC, for example, the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) assists its member states to identify and assess counter-terrorism needs, coordinate capacity building and technical assistance programs, cooperate with international and regional organizations, and facilitate cooperation between various APEC organs on counter-terrorism issues. However in other regions, such as Africa, there are no comparable mechanisms. The African Union (AU) has established an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers, has a dedicated counter-terrorism expert working in its secretariat in Addis Ababa, and convened two High-level Intergovernmental Meetings on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. However, it does not have a enduring structure analogous to CTTF or the specialized units within the OSCE or the OAS.

18. The UNODC/TPB matrix includes much of this information.

19. Brian Woo, "Summation Remarks" (remarks from OSCE Follow-up Conference to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Special Meeting, Vienna, 11-12 March 2004).

20. The CTC "technical assistance team," which operated from mid-2002 until late 2004, worked with assistance from the World Bank to develop a prototype database in 2003. According to one member of the team, consultations were also held at a technical level with the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to approve the installation of the database program in the CTC's computer network.The program has been ready since June 2003, but has not been installed. With the CTED fully staffed, the CTC no longer needs to rely on DPA for technical and administrative support. Thus, the CTED should be able move forward with its installation.

21. Steven Monblatt, telephone interview by Alistair Millar, 9 February 2005.

22. For many UN member states, the terminology "best practices" or "performance standards" is preferable to "compliance standards." Some states are not comfortable with the idea that there is some level of universal compliance with Resolution 1373 measurable by purely objective standards. The terms "best practices" and "performance standards" more accurately describe the process of encouraging implementation and are more palatable to many states than "compliance standards."

23. Meeting some of the possible criteria, for example, adopting a terrorist financing law that meets the FATF standards, will require one-time action by the state: the adoption of the law. Meeting other possible criteria, however, might require on-going action, e.g., effective implementation of the law. Thus, even where the CTC determines that a state has satisfied the legislative or executive machinery-related criteria, the CTC will still need to monitor the state's implementation of the legislation and operation of the executive machinery. Additional state reporting on this implementation, therefore, may still be required.

24. See Swiss Confederation, United Nations Secretariat, and the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University, *Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation—Contributions from the Interlaken Process* (Providence, R.I.: Watson Institute, 2001); Michael Brzoska, ed., *Design and Implementation of the Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the "Bonn-Berlin Process,"* (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2001); and Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, and Mikael Eriksson, *Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2003).