

TOWARD A MORE SECURE AMERICA

**Grounding U.S. Policy
in Global Realities**



This report is a joint project of the Fourth Freedom Forum and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

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This policy brief grew out of discussions with a team of former national security and foreign policy officials held at the Washington office of the Fourth Freedom Forum in the summer of 2003. The brief was written by the staff of the Fourth Freedom Forum and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, who are solely responsible for the report's specific content. The authors incorporated numerous comments and suggestions from the policy advisers. The policy advisers listed below endorse the general thrust of this report and generally agree with the findings presented. Each participant may not, however, be in full agreement with every specific point and detail. The policy advisers listed extend their endorsement as individuals, not as representatives of any organization.

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Ambassador Edward L. Peck, former Chief of Mission in Iraq and Mauritania. Former Deputy Director of the White House Task Force on Terrorism; Deputy Coordinator for Covert Intelligence Programs and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department; Liaison Officer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and lecturer and consultant for governments and businesses in the U.S. and abroad.

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Joe Wilson, former Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and Deputy Chief of Mission to Iraq; former Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council; former Special Assistant to President Clinton.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In just two years the Bush administration has squandered the sympathy our country received from the rest of the world in the wake of the September 11 attacks, when the French daily *Le Monde* declared “We are all Americans now.”

Without reducing the threat of international terrorism, the administration has pursued a bullying form of unilateral militarism, which has belittled the United Nations, lampooned traditional allies, and offended Muslims around the globe. These actions have made Americans less secure and the world a more dangerous place.

In Iraq, the unauthorized invasion and ill-conceived occupation have broadened the recruitment base for extremist organizations, created a magnet for terrorist infiltration, and increased the risks of terrorist attack at home and abroad. U.S. troops face continuous attack there and in Afghanistan. The enormous military, economic, and political costs of occupying Iraq are depleting American power and global leadership.

The policy of preemptive unilateralism is a failure. It is undermining the tradition of bipartisan foreign policy and abandoning sixty years of successful effort by past presidents to create and lead an international system of collective security.

The objective of American policy toward Iraq should be the rapid transition to full Iraqi sovereignty. It is in the U.S. interest to transfer political authority to the United Nations and to work within the world community to provide security, restore the economy, and create a broad-based representative government.

American policy in the war on terrorism should focus on international cooperation to improve the intelligence base, strengthen law enforcement capabilities, restrict terrorist access to funds and weapons, and reduce the root causes driving people to radical violence.

The United States should renew its commitment to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, to deny these capabilities to tyrants and terrorists. This effort should include taking further steps to reduce and eliminate nuclear and other means of mass destruction, securing fissile materials in the former Soviet Union, and strengthening the inspection and oversight mechanisms of the United Nations and other international bodies.

Global teamwork is the key to winning the campaign against terrorism. International cooperation, like democratic government, may have many shortcomings, but history has shown it to be the most effective route to establishing a more secure world.

THROUGH COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT, THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND CARROTS AND STICKS DIPLOMACY, THE UNITED STATES CAN PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND REALIZE A MORE SECURE FUTURE.

A MOMENT OF RECKONING

September 11 fundamentally altered U.S. thinking about global security.¹ The Bush administration mobilized for a “war on terror” and launched a military invasion and occupation of Iraq. Commentators in

Washington began to speak openly of empire and a U.S. mission to dominate and “democratize” the Middle East and Central Asia. The concept of “preemptive” war moved to the center of U.S. security doctrine.²

President Bush asserted that failure to act in Iraq was not an option, implying that military action was the only means of countering Saddam Hussein. In fact many alternative means were available in Iraq, and are available generally, for addressing terrorism, weapons proliferation, and other threats to U.S. and international security.³ The use of military force is sometimes necessary, as this report affirms, but numerous nonmilitary options

are also available, and may be more appropriate and effective in achieving security objectives. The alternatives to preemption include diplomacy, conflict prevention, deterrence, containment, and collective defense.

In the aftermath of the war in Iraq the United States must now deal with the broader implications of preemptive military action: 1) its corrosive effects on the system of collective security established in the past sixty years through international institutions including the United Nations and NATO, 2) the prospect that we are entering a cycle of permanent war as we pursue “evil” regimes and face continuing terrorist attacks, and 3) an unpredictable cost in terms of American lives and U.S. taxpayer dollars. The new strategy has aroused animosity toward the United States abroad and reduced international trust in U.S. policies. This excessive reliance on unilateral military force makes the United States less, not more, secure.

TOWARD A MORE SECURE AMERICA

President Bush, accompanied by First Lady Laura Bush, salutes the cadets at the June 2002 West Point commencement. In his address to the graduating cadets the president unveiled his doctrine of preemptive foreign policy. (AP Photo/Stephan Savoia).



This report affirms the primacy of combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction but offers a critical examination of 1) the nature of the threat, 2) the perils of preemption, and 3) the value of cooperation, containment, and addressing root causes. The objective of the report is to move beyond the metaphor of war to a more sustainable and effective international policy based on international collaboration rather than unilateral preemption.

ASSESSING THE THREAT

The *National Security Strategy* released in September 2002 redefined the threat to U.S. security as the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of access to such weapons through failed states or “rogue” regimes. The greatest danger was identified as the “crossroads of radicalism and technology,” the fear that terrorists aided by tyrants would acquire and use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.⁴

Terrorism itself is nothing new, but the “democratization of technology” over the past decades has made terrorists more lethal and more agile. In the twentieth century, a pathological individual—a Hitler or a Stalin—needed the power of a government to be able to kill millions of people. In the last years of the twentieth century, terrorist groups began acting as the armies of frustrated political movements independent of any government, wreaking their havoc with increasing lethality. If twenty-first-century terrorists get hold of weapons of mass destruction, this devastating power will for the first time become available to deviant groups and individuals.⁶

The problem of “failed” states exacerbates this threat. When governments cannot maintain law and order in their territories, terrorists use the resulting power vacuum as a safe haven, much as Al Qaeda did in Afghanistan. Iraq has become a “magnet” for terrorists in the wake of the collapse of government and social structures following the U.S.-led invasion.⁷ Policies that contribute to failed-state conditions, or that fail to forestall or ameliorate such conditions, undermine global efforts to counter terrorist networks.

“At this precarious juncture in American history, America needs more humility than hubris in the applications of American military power, and the recognition that our interests are best served through alliances and consensus.”⁵

—Senator Chuck Hagel,
24 January 2003,
University of Notre Dame

Average of Percentages of Those Who View the U.S. Favorably ⁸ (Respondents in three surveys of twelve selected countries*)

| 1999/2000 | Summer 2002 | Summer 2003 |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| 59 | 57 | 42 |

***Countries include Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.**

The danger of mass destruction terrorism is growing as the deadliest weapons proliferate. A recent Pentagon analysis showed twelve nations with nuclear weapons programs, thirteen with biological weapons activities, sixteen with chemical weapons programs, and twenty-eight nations with ballistic missile activities.⁹ An influential commission report released before September 11 concluded that, “[t]he most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states.”¹⁰ This problem has still not been adequately addressed. It is exacerbated by unemployed nuclear scientists in the former Soviet Union who are desperate for work and could illegally provide others with the expertise to develop nuclear weapons.

The United States is also threatened by the longer-term effects of growing lawlessness and the increasing isolation of the U.S. from like-minded states. U.S. leaders have contributed to this lawlessness and isolation through a penchant for unilateral action, the abrogation or disregard of international agreements, and the invasion of Iraq without UN approval.

Among the daunting array of challenges the United States now faces are the following:

- A global campaign against terrorism that—as continuing attacks around the world demonstrate—is not over, has taken on uncertain dimensions, and is costing hundreds of billions of dollars;
- A perilous and uncertain nation-building challenge in both Afghanistan and Iraq;
- A seemingly intractable conflict between Israel and Palestine;
- A looming showdown with a nuclear-capable North Korea;
- A divided regime in Iran that may be developing weapons of mass destruction;

“ . . . we should try our best not to have to go it alone. The costs in all areas will be much greater, as will the political risks, both domestic and international ”¹¹

—James A. Baker III,
25 August 2002,
New York Times

In his presentation before the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003, Colin Powell, United States Secretary of State, holds up a vial of powder to demonstrate that the same amount of anthrax shut down the U.S. Postal Service. He argues that Iraq had thousands of liters of anthrax in its stockpiles in an attempt to win Security Council support for the U.S. resolution for war in Iraq
(UN Photo by Mark Garten).



- An unstable South Asian subcontinent, where India and Pakistan possess huge armed forces and hundreds of nuclear weapons that could be used in anger over the disputed territory at Kashmir.

TARGETING TERRORISM

Defeating Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists is a primary U.S. security objective. While the Bush administration has devoted substantial energy to this task, important opportunities have been missed. The U.S. has been unprepared to engage states amenable to change whose entrance into full compliance with antiterrorism mandates could yield important dividends. Trapped by prior, tired labels of “rogue” states, the administration has neither seized nor created opportunities to strike a new relationship with Iran or Syria. Similarly, the administration’s approach to terrorism has obfuscated the distinct environments in which terrorists operate, glossing over important differences between Al Qaeda and groups like Hamas. Winning the campaign against terrorism does not require an attack on all terror groups everywhere. What is necessary is the ability to distinguish those whose terror is based on historic and possibly negotiable political struggles from those whose terror is consciously directed at the United States.

A successful campaign against terrorism will require a two-pronged strategy: coordinated international efforts to drive terrorist networks out of business, and the pursuit of foreign policies that address the grievances and conditions that motivate political extremism. Facilitating a just peace in the Middle East, accelerating multilateral approaches to restoring Iraqi sovereignty, lowering the U.S. military profile in the Arab and Muslim world, promoting representative government, funding equitable development, and poverty reduction efforts—these are among the policies that can mitigate anti-American resentment and enhance global security. They need to be combined with more effective counterterrorism efforts.

Effective intelligence is one of the most important tools in the campaign against terrorism. Especially important are cooperation among police and intelligence agencies and the coordination of information on terrorist activities. The Bush administration compromised these capabilities in its efforts to justify war in Iraq. The politicization and manipulation of intelligence regarding Iraq damaged the credibility and integrity of U.S. policy. As a result, other nations will be less likely to accept U.S. intelligence assessments in the future. Greater congressional oversight is needed to prevent the type of abuses that led to the misuse of intelligence in the Iraq case.

The path to security lies in pursuing the campaign against terrorism with the same hard-boiled focus and clarity of purpose that proved so successful during the cold war. We can do this by working with other nations to share intelligence about terrorist groups, dry up their financial assets, and arrest them before they are in a position to cause harm.

The metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient, unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing, police work, tracing financial flows, and border controls.¹²

Cooperative law enforcement and diplomatic strategies have proven effective in recent efforts to prevent terrorism. In the wake of September 11, the United States worked with more than 150 governments through the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to coordinate international law enforcement efforts, and to deny financing and safe haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks. Many nations have continued to cooperate with the U.S. on these efforts, despite differences over Iraq, because it is in their national security interest to do so. As a result of this unprecedented multilateral collaboration, the financial resources available to Al Qaeda have been reduced, and the operations of the terrorist network have been disrupted.

To date, the world community has frozen more than \$100 million in potential terrorist financial assets. More than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been taken into custody in a wide array of countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Pakistan, and Turkey.¹³

UN sanctions and diplomacy in the 1990s helped to tame terrorism in Libya and Sudan. After the American bombing of Tripoli in 1986, which the U.S. pronounced as a great success at the time, Libyan terrorist agents destroyed American and French airliners in 1988 and 1989. The UN imposed targeted sanctions in 1992, and seven years later Libya turned over terrorist suspects to an international tribunal. The State Department's 1996 annual report on terrorism stated, "Terrorism by Libya has been sharply reduced by UN sanctions."¹⁴ The recent compensation settlement tied to the lifting of UN sanctions illustrates that sanctions-based diplomacy can be effective. In Sudan UN sanctions and U.S. diplomatic pressure prompted the regime to expel Osama bin Laden in 1996 and to cooperate with American counterterrorism efforts before and especially after September 2001.

“ . . . war in Iraq has probably inflamed radical passions among Muslims and thus increased Al-Qaeda’s recruiting power and morale and, at least marginally, its operational capability . . . the immediate effect of the war may have been to isolate further Al-Qaeda from any potential state supporters while also swelling its ranks and galvanising its will. ”¹⁵

—International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, October 2003

Achievements through Cooperation in the Campaign against Terrorism¹⁶



| | <i>Amount</i> | <i>Countries Involved</i> |
|---|--|---------------------------|
| Terror suspects detained and/or arrested | 3,000 individuals | More than 100 |
| Orders issued to freeze terrorists' assets | \$144 million frozen, 250 groups and entities identified (approx. two-thirds frozen outside the U.S.) | More than 170 |

CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction have foundered in recent years. The international nonproliferation regime is threatened by numerous developments: the spread of nuclear weapons to Israel, India, and Pakistan; the developing nuclear weapons capability of North Korea; the apparent nuclear ambitions of Iran; the controversy over Iraq's nuclear program; Russia's avowal of a first-use nuclear policy; and the U.S. policy of increasing the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. U.S. criticisms of the United Nations and its decisions to bypass the Security Council in Iraq and other international crises have weakened the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that rests upon UN authority.

The U.S. is preparing to become more not less reliant on nuclear weapons. By declaring a readiness to use such weapons against nonnuclear threats and proposing the development of bunker buster weapons, U.S. political leaders are increasing nuclear dependence and lowering the threshold of potential nuclear use. This attempt to legitimize nuclear weapons sends exactly the wrong message to potential proliferators, including North Korea, Iran, and Al Qaeda, and erodes U.S. and global security.¹⁸

Such policies increase rather than reduce incentives to other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons. The U.S. is applying a double standard that undermines the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime. By its actions, the U.S. is saying, in effect, "We will not permit nonnuclear nations to acquire nuclear weapons, but will retain and develop them ourselves."

This position is not tenable. India used the hypocrisy of the United States and other nuclear powers as an excuse for its development of nuclear weapons. North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, and other nations, particularly Iran, appear to be violating the treaty as well. If they continue to move in that direction, one or more of Syria, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, and

"... make no mistake; we simply cannot win that war [on terrorism] without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence."¹⁷

—Brent Scowcroft,
15 August 2002,
Wall Street Journal

Japan are likely to follow suit. The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that sixty to seventy countries are now capable of building nuclear weapons.

Greater efforts are needed to prevent states or rogue actors from acquiring nuclear weapons and selling them to—or having them stolen by—terrorists. The supply of nuclear weapons and other deadly technologies to terrorists must be cut off at the source. Addressing the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons will require fundamentally new approaches that strengthen the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

The disarmament of Iraq or of any single country must be linked to broader regional and global disarmament efforts. The Gulf War cease-fire resolution of 1991 specified that the disarmament of Iraq was to be a first step toward the creation in the Middle East of a “zone free from weapons of mass destruction.” In making this determination the Security Council recognized that the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq requires the reduction and elimination of such weapons in Israel and throughout the region, since the security policies of the various states are inextricably linked. Regional disarmament must in turn be linked to global arms reduction and disarmament.

Disarmament measures are meaningless without robust means of verification. The policies that the world community supported for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq—rigorous inspections, targeted sanctions, and multilateral coercive diplomacy—can and should be applied broadly to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. An expanded UN weapons inspection capability could be deployed wherever necessary to verify a weapons ban. Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by ratifying the Additional Protocol for more rigorous inspections and increasing the agency’s funding, would be steps in that direction.

The United States Senate should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, whose intrusive verification regime will reduce incentives for states to proliferate. Efforts are also needed to strengthen implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including an improved inspection system, and to develop an effective enforcement protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.


Greater efforts are needed to secure the fissile materials and nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. This means expanding significantly the budget of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and other initiatives designed to help Russia deal safely with its cold war legacy of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons-related expertise and materials.¹⁹

The Russian and U.S. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the U.S. Nuclear Policy Review, published in 2002, make it clear that Russia and the U.S. plan to retain thousands of nuclear warheads for decades ahead, if not in perpetuity. These policies are a clear violation of Article 6 of the NPT, which requires the five declared nuclear powers—Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China—to negotiate the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The five declared nuclear powers should petition the Security Council to develop a global initiative focusing on the following actions:

Results of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program²⁰

Reduction of nuclear weapons systems, current numbers as of 11 July 2003



- All nations now possessing nuclear weapons will state the number and type of weapons they possess in a formal submission to the Security Council. A register of fissile materials should be submitted to the UN, following the example of the UN conventional arms register;
- Any nation not now possessing nuclear weapons will not be allowed to acquire them;
- Nations now possessing nuclear weapons will present to the Council a program to drastically reduce their number over a period of years, leading eventually to their elimination;
- When necessary to assure the security of nations giving up nuclear weapons—e.g., Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, or India—legally binding security guarantees will be provided by the nuclear weapons states;
- Nations that cooperate with disarmament mandates will receive inducements in the form of economic assistance, trade and technology preferences, and security assurances;
- Evidence of failure of any nation to adhere to Security Council regulations implementing the Security Council resolution will lead to the introduction of inspections for such periods of time—indefinitely if necessary—as are required to enforce transparency and compliance;
- Violation of the Security Council regulations will result in the Council authorizing the use of targeted sanctions and other coercive measures, including conventional military force, to compel compliance.

THE PERILS OF PREEMPTION

The administration's doctrine of preemption is a once-discredited notion, now resurrected as a centerpiece of American foreign policy. In the last days of the first Bush administration, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, circulated a classified draft of a defense planning guidance document asserting that the United States must be "postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated."²¹ In the document, Wolfowitz outlined plans for military intervention in Iraq as an action necessary to assure "access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil."²² When excerpts of the draft document were published in the *New York Times* in March of 1992, it embarrassed the administration as being too hawkish and was shelved.²³

Wolfowitz and his associates returned to power as part of the Bush-Cheney administration. The terror attacks of September 11 and the national numbing that followed created a climate where their ideas regarding the proactive use of military force could be reintroduced. The result was a major shift in U.S. security policy that was adopted without adequate interagency review, congressional oversight, or media debate. The action resulting from this doctrine—a war of conquest and occupation to overthrow another government—was a radical departure from the accepted norms of U.S. and international policy.

A strategy of preemption creates instability in the international system when other nations adopt the same principle. In October 2002 Russia declared a policy of preemption against Chechen rebels. In April 2003 India argued that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and support of terrorists in Kashmir made it a more suitable target for preemptive attack than Iraq.²⁴ This boomerang effect undermines the principle of mutual respect for national sovereignty that is essential to international order.

Over time preemption weakens deterrence by encouraging countries to adopt precarious "launch-on-warning" force postures. In a crisis nations may undertake a "race to the button" to unleash their weapons systems in advance of a destructive preemptive strike. Unilateral preventive action against states that try to acquire a nuclear arsenal could encourage others to accelerate weapons development to deter such attacks.²⁵ The invasion of Iraq has prompted leaders in North Korea and Iran to increase military preparedness and weapons development.

A strategy of threatening and using military force breeds resentment, fosters countervailing coalitions, and overburdens resources. Over the long haul, it also weakens the fabric of domestic institutions vital to democracy by unduly strengthening the executive branch and replacing norms of accountability and transparency with secrecy.

It is important to avoid the dangers of "imperial overstretch." Empire builders in the past found that the social, economic, and military exertions required to maintain imperial dominance invariably erode the health of their societies. The United States is already the world's largest debtor nation and more dependent on foreign capital than at any time in the last fifty years. Foreign nations now have claims on the United States for approximately \$8 trillion, or 80 percent of our annual GDP.

*"It is not in the American national interest to establish preemption as a universal principle available to every nation."*²⁶

—Henry Kissinger,
11 August 2002,
Chicago Tribune

The bottom has fallen out of support for the United States in the Arab and Muslim world. According to a government-appointed panel, “hostility toward the United States has reached shocking levels.”²⁷

- In Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, only 15 percent view the United States favorably, compared with 61 percent in early 2002.
 - In Turkey, a longtime supporter of America, favorable opinion toward the U.S. dropped from 52 percent three years ago to 15 percent in the spring of 2003, according to the Pew Research Center.
 - The problem is not limited to the Arab and Muslim world. In Spain, an ally in the war in Iraq, 3 percent had a very favorable view of the United States while 39 percent had a very unfavorable view.²⁸
-

There are limitations to what force can accomplish. Trying to impose democracy through the barrel of a gun will not work. Relying on the use of force as the centerpiece of foreign policy will not resolve the long-term threats to U.S. security and may undermine American interests, particularly if it is used unilaterally and preemptively.

THE VALUE OF COOPERATION

Many of the challenges that the United States faces in the world today—terrorism, weapons proliferation, crime, global financial instability, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, poverty—are transnational in nature and cannot be resolved by acting alone. A strategy that emphasizes cooperation among nations and strengthening international institutions is essential to meeting these challenges and winning the campaign against terrorism. As the world’s preeminent power, the United States must be the leader in marshalling and sustaining joint action.

Because of the Bush administration’s “our way or the highway” approach to international relations, alliance relations are at an all-time low. The U.S. is squandering decades of successful diplomatic efforts that created cooperative relations with long-established allies.²⁹ The United States is less secure today because of the damage the Bush administration has caused to vital alliances around the world.

The use of so-called “coalitions of the willing” is not a substitute for established alliances and partnerships. Without shared commitments and the regularized patterns of communication and training that come with formal alliances, it is much more difficult to build effective coalitions, as the administration has learned in the case of Iraq.³⁰

Established alliances have many advantages over temporary coalitions. They:

- Provide a forum for consultation and the marshaling of diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities for achieving shared security goals;

“Dealing with borderless challenges will require borderless solutions. The United States will be most effective in combating these threats by coordinating with other states.”³¹

—Senator Chuck Hagel,
Spring 2001,
The Washington Quarterly

Comparison of Gulf Wars I and II³²

| | Gulf War I | Gulf War II |
|--|--|---|
| <i>UN support</i> | Yes | No |
| <i>Total cost of military operations</i> | Estimates range from \$61 to \$71 billion. ³³ | Estimated \$128 billion through fiscal year 2004. ³⁴ |
| <i>Warfighting costs paid by non-U.S. countries</i> | All (\$70 billion). ³⁵ | Minimal. The U.S. paid money to most allies. ³⁶ |
| <i>Proportion of U.S. troops in fighting force</i> | Calculated at 79 percent, counting only troops deployed in Iraq proper. ³⁷ Calculated at 52 percent counting troops deployed along Iraq's borders as well. ³⁹ | Calculated at 86 percent. ³⁸ |
| <i>Number of countries providing combat troops</i> | Over 32. ⁴⁰ | Four. ⁴¹ |

- Serve as a force-multiplier, by supporting partners in efforts to apply diplomatic, economic, or military resources to achieve common objectives;
- Assure burden sharing and avoid the costs and risks of attempting to police the world alone.

A cooperative strategy is a policy that emphasizes multilateral approaches in international affairs; advocates the use of American power to strengthen norms and institutions; advances efforts to combat global poverty and lawlessness; adapts and builds cooperative security arrangements; integrates former adversaries into an international system that supports shared values; emphasizes preventive diplomacy; and recognizes that, if the use of force becomes necessary, its legitimacy is enhanced by international support.

Such a policy emphasizes new synergies in global law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and efforts to thwart money laundering to fight terrorists more effectively. It advocates the use of U.S. power to strengthen those norms and institutions designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It emphasizes preventive diplomacy to quell conflicts before they erupt into major crises.

Significant global institutions—the UN, NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the global trading regime—were made in America. International institutions are vital to advancing U.S. and global security interests. If Washington uses it wisely, the UN can serve U.S.

*“America’s ultimate challenge is to transform its power into moral consensus, promoting its values not by imposition but by their willing acceptance . . . ”*⁴²

—Henry Kissinger, 2001

Cooperative Efforts to Fight Terrorism

- In late September 2001, the UN Security Council created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) mandating worldwide efforts to deny financing, safe haven, and support for Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks.
 - In June 2002 the G-8 agreed to a transportation security initiative that prescreens people and cargo and increases security on ships, planes, and trucks and in airports and seaports.
 - In June 2002 the G-8 also created a global partnership against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
 - In June 2003 the G-8 established a Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) of donor countries to provide training and assistance for developing countries to implement counterterrorism mandates.
-

purposes in a variety of practical ways. But the reverse is also true; attacks on the UN may backfire in ways that undercut American influence.⁴³

The U.S. should assist the UN Security Council in gaining more reliable access to well-trained and -equipped forces for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. It should also take up the unfinished project of creating a permanent standing force for the UN.

Rebuilding war-torn societies requires partnerships. The experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq suggest that international financial institutions and multilateral agencies have an important role to play in postwar transitions. The United States needs assistance from its friends to defray the costs of reconstructing countries in parts of the world where it is not familiar with local culture and traditions. This help will not be forthcoming if nations are prodded into a coalition of the sullen and unwilling.

By focusing almost entirely on military solutions, the new unilateralists ignore the importance of cooperative strategies for advancing U.S. security interests. Cooperative or “soft” power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It arises from economic and social influence, and from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Coercive power will remain important in a world of nation-states jealously guarding their sovereignty, but cooperative power is increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that require multilateral partnerships for their solution.⁴⁴

CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE

Military deterrence is a core element of international security. When dealing with other nation states, the threat of force is sometimes necessary for the success of coercive diplomacy. In some circumstances the actual use of force—ideally in a targeted and narrow fashion, with authorization from the UN Security Council or other regional security bodies—may be required. The use of force should be employed only when the threat is imminent and leaves no viable alternatives.

Estimated Total Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq (2003 through 2013)⁴⁵

| Scenario | Cost (in billions of dollars) |
|--|----------------------------------|
| 2003 and 2004 supplemental requests with no new costs after 2004. | \$178.8 |
| Scenario A: "Things go well." U.S. forces remain in Iraq through 2006, includes total reconstruction costs of \$28 billion. | \$237.8 |
| Scenario B: "Middle case." U.S. forces remain in Iraq through 2008, includes total reconstruction costs of \$75 billion. | \$308.9 |
| Scenario C: "Things go worse." U.S. forces remain in Iraq through 2010, includes U.S. reconstruction costs of \$73 billion (assuming that other countries provide approximately 30 percent of the reconstruction costs). | \$418.3 |

Examples abound of recent uses of force for cooperative security purposes. NATO and other international forces helped to stabilize Bosnia and Kosovo. The intervention of Australian troops provided security for the independence of East Timor. The introduction of Nigerian and U.S. forces in Liberia forced the Taylor regime from office. These were effective uses of force, operating in support of UN mandates, to promote U.S. and international security goals.

There are limitations to deterrence when dealing with terrorist organizations. It is difficult to threaten retaliation against decentralized networks of fanatical zealots that operate in secret and without addresses. The dictators in charge of rogue regimes are a different story, however. They are susceptible to the logic of deterrence.

When dealing with state actors, history teaches that even the most tyrannical rulers are rational actors who wish to remain in power. The credible threat of military retaliation can be an effective means of deterring aggressive regimes. Military and economic pressures can be used to contain such regimes. Deterrence and containment were employed effectively against the Soviet Union during the cold war. These approaches also helped to constrain Saddam Hussein's military ambitions in the years prior to the U.S.-led invasion.

ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES

Even the most effective defensive measures will not by themselves eliminate terrorism completely. It is also necessary to look at root causes and to develop policies that lessen the motivations for political extremism. Terrorism cannot be justified and must never be excused, regardless of the



Members of the UN Security Council offer a moment of silence in honor of victims of the September 11 terror attacks (*UN/DPI Photo*).

grievance, but it is important to understand and eliminate the factors that cause terrorism. The campaign against terrorism must seek to drain the swamp from which terrorists emerge, and reduce the grievances and hostilities that terrorists exploit.

This will require U.S. global leadership and engagement, especially on issues of concern to Arab and Muslim societies. A key priority is and must remain U.S. support for a genuine peace process in the Middle East that provides security, justice, and economic opportunity for both sides. The U.S. should also encourage reform and modernization throughout the region, not through military coercion but through persuasion and incentives that reward regimes that become more open and democratic.

Working to extend representative government and free-market democracy will enhance security. Democratic nations with extensive trading relations tend not to wage war on one another. Democratic governments help to build more open and productive economies, empower women, and permit a free press that educates and informs the public and holds governments accountable for failed policies. Fostering these conditions helps to create more representative and accountable societies that are less prone to political extremism.

Violent conflict is often associated with joblessness and the lack of economic opportunity among young men. Terrorist leaders often come from societies where political expression is limited because of autocratic governments (as in most nations of the Middle East) or there is a sense of exclusion from political decision making. Improved opportunities to participate in vibrant economic and political systems will be the key to reducing the breeding grounds for terrorism. Development aid, debt relief, and other forms of economic assistance can create jobs and increase opportunity and thus reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Economic aid

and trade incentives can also be important means of encouraging recipient nations to resolve ethnic and religious disputes and to uphold norms of democracy, tolerance, openness, and respect for human rights.

Following the conflict in Afghanistan the United States, Japan, Iran, and other nations pledged more than \$4 billion to assist the transitional authority in Kabul and provide economic opportunity for the Afghan people. These pledges must be fulfilled. The United States has undertaken a new and costly obligation for the reconstruction of Iraq, which it must uphold. Similar large-scale economic development initiatives are needed in other nations and

regions as a means of overcoming the poverty and despair that feed terrorism and armed conflict. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, has developed the concept of a global Marshall Fund in which the world's wealthiest nations provide increased development assistance funding of \$50 billion a year. This is an initiative that deserves support.



British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown challenged the world's wealthiest nations to help the world's poorest countries (Tim Graham for Corbis).

The United States must help to build mutually beneficial trade relationships, increase foreign direct investment in the developing world, alleviate global poverty, and fight infectious diseases. AIDS cases, which now number sixty-five million globally, will triple by 2010. The World Health Organization (WHO) has asked the United States to contribute \$10 billion a year, the annual cost of developing a national missile defense system, to fight infectious diseases in poor countries. Just as the United States is leading the world in the fight against terrorism with a global reach, it needs to lead a global campaign against poverty, hunger, and disease.

The campaign against terrorism is, in significant part, a struggle over the hearts and minds of the world and, in particular, the world's Islamic societies. If America wins military battles on the ground, but in the process loses the war over ideas, then the larger goal of producing a durable peace may be lost.

APPLYING COOPERATIVE SECURITY PRINCIPLES IN SPECIFIC CASES

Iraq

Whatever their prewar disagreements, many nations, and the UN itself, support the same ends as U.S. policy: an independent, safe, democratic, and prosperous Iraq. The challenge before the Bush administration is to provide the visionary leadership needed to harness an international consensus that produces real resources for change on the ground in Iraq. This will demand that the White House recognize the benefits, if not the necessity, of substantial multilateral authority and resources in Iraq. Not to take advantage of this option now, in the wake of shared U.S.-UN losses, will be to condemn U.S. efforts to failure.



A North Korean military unit carrying missiles during a military parade in Pyongyang (AFP/Corbis)

The goal of U.S. and international policy in Iraq should be a quick end to the military occupation and a rapid political transition leading to full Iraqi sovereignty. Iraqis themselves must lead the transition process and must be allowed to assume their proper responsibilities and sovereign rights in the shortest possible time. Toward this end, the U.S.-led occupation should establish a fixed timeline for the complete withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign military forces and the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. The United States should forswear any intention to control Iraqi resources or establish long-term military bases on Iraqi territory. This will boost U.S. support among skeptical Iraqis.

The United States should work with the Security Council to create a new UN authority that would: 1) manage the political transition process, 2) create a genuine “transitional government” with substantial authority to manage Iraqi affairs during the transition, 3) set priorities for a UN-authorized international security force, 4) administer oil revenues and economic reconstruction, and 5) accelerate the creation of an indigenous Iraqi police force and Iraqi armed forces. The U.S. should support UN leadership as the best hope for creating a stable and secure Iraq.

North Korea

The policy options for addressing the weapons proliferation crisis on the Korean peninsula are limited. Preemptive military action could precipitate a war with devastating consequences. Comprehensive U.S. sanctions are already in place. UN sanctions are a nonstarter as long as China and other key Security Council members object.

Previous U.S. administrations relied on incentives-based diplomacy to influence Pyongyang’s behavior. In 1994 the Clinton administration negotiated the Agreed Framework in which economic inducements were used to achieve a verifiable freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The previous Bush administration handled the situation in a similar manner in



August 1998 photo showing the launch of a North Korean multi-stage rocket (AFP/Corbis)

1989. In exchange for Pyongyang's agreeing to allow the IAEA to monitor and inspect its nuclear facilities, the first president Bush withdrew U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, canceled a joint military exercise with South Korea, and agreed to a high-level meeting with North Korean officials.

The United States should develop a diplomatic strategy that results in a more stringent, verifiable inspections regime in North Korea to ensure that the country is no longer a nuclear menace. The United States should work closely with South Korea and other partners in the region—most prominently China, Japan, and Russia—to negotiate a broad and verifiable agreement. In exchange for a permanent shutdown of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs, the United States should offer a nonaggression agreement with assurances against military attack, and affirmative steps toward ending sanctions and normalizing economic and diplomatic relations.

Iran

U.S. relations with Iran pose significant challenges but also offer important opportunities. Iran is actively developing weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons, and has adopted a hostile stance toward Israel and the United States. But Iran and the United States share a common interest in countering the activities of Al Qaeda and preventing the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The removal of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq could benefit Iran and, depending on the outcome of the postwar transition, provide a basis for enhanced security in the region and improved U.S.-Iranian relations.

The goals of U.S. policy are to prevent weapons proliferation, increase cooperation in the campaign against terrorism, and encourage Iran's evolution toward a more democratic society. The United States should design its policies in ways that strengthen the hand of reform constituencies. This requires an understanding that liberal reform in Iran will have to emerge from internal dynamics, not from external pressures by the United States.⁴⁶

To date the United States has relied on counterproductive policies of isolation and sanctions.⁴⁷ The Atlantic Council and other policy groups have recommended a program of political and economic engagement with Iran that would include a partial easing of economic sanctions, an expansion of diplomatic dialogue, and the encouragement of private and nongovernmental cooperation. These steps toward engagement should be linked to reciprocal gestures of cooperation from Iran, such as acceptance of the IAEA Additional Safeguards Protocol and concrete steps toward implementation of UN counterterrorism mandates. Increased dialogue and cooperation will increase understanding on both sides and create a basis for a gradual improvement in political relations and enhanced security on both sides.

CONCLUSION

Looking to the future, in light of the new threshold the U.S. has passed as a result of the Iraq war, it is critical to recognize that safer, less costly, and ultimately more successful strategies are available for countering terrorism/proliferation dangers. Through cooperative engagement with other countries,



Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power reactor in southwestern Iran, which Washington fears is part of a program to build nuclear weapons (*Reuters/Morteza Nikoubazl*)

multilateral disarmament, the strengthening of international institutions, and carrots and sticks diplomacy, the United States can protect itself against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and realize a more secure future.

The following is a summary of policy tools that are available to achieve counterterrorism and nonproliferation objectives within the framework of a cooperative global security strategy:

1. Reducing the threat of terrorism

- enhanced international enforcement of the UN counterterrorism mandates that criminalize all forms of support for terrorist networks;
- wider cooperation against terrorist threats through international and regional groupings, including the Group of Eight Industrialized Democracies and Interpol.

2. International diplomacy and enforcement

- strengthened international diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve conflict;
- the use of economic and financial incentives, trade and technology assistance, and security assurances to induce compliance with international disarmament and counterterrorism agreements;
- the use of targeted economic sanctions, including financial sanctions, travel bans, and arms embargoes, to enforce compliance with international arms control and counterterrorism agreements;
- cooperative containment efforts to isolate and weaken regimes that refuse to comply with international disarmament and counterterrorism mandates;

- strengthened conventional deterrence, to provide cooperative security protections against noncompliant or threatening regimes;
- the use of the International Criminal Court, UN-authorized tribunals and other legal instruments to hold abusive leaders accountable to international law.

3. Eliminating weapons of mass destruction

- enforceable international agreements to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, and to regulate the trade in weapons-useable technologies;
- expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and related efforts to control and secure fissile materials in the former Soviet Union and globally;
- intrusive, no-notice weapons inspections, following the Iraq model, applied as needed to enforce a ban on weapons of mass destruction;
- a greater role for the United Nations and other international institutions in enforcing compliance with arms control agreements and overseeing weapons inspections.

4. Promoting economic and political development

- large-scale economic development initiatives to encourage democracy, the rule of law, and commercial interdependence, thereby lessening the tendency toward armed conflict and creating incentives for peaceful cooperation;
- the promotion of greater political participation through democracy, human rights, the empowerment of women, and freedom of information;
- the development of renewable energy technologies and sustainable development policies that lessen dependence on oil imports and reduce the likelihood of conflict over scarce resources.

These and other policy instruments are part of a global security strategy that emphasizes cooperation over unilateralism, prevention over preemption and peaceful diplomatic means over military force as the primary tools of influencing policy. These tools offer a strategy based on the “force of law” rather than the “law of force,” one that relies on the power of trade rather than military might and that employs peaceful diplomatic means for achieving a more just and secure future.

Notes

1. The authors are grateful for revisions and comments offered by a team of policy advisers, listed on the front inside cover. We are especially indebted to Lawrence Korb and the Council on Foreign Relations for permission to draw from portions of his paper on a new national security strategy. See Lawrence J. Korb, “A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2003. Available online at the *Council on Foreign Relations* <<http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5999>> (23 July 2003).

2. The term “preemption” usually implies action to counter a pending or imminent military threat that has taken definite form. In the case of Iraq, however, there was no imminent threat

of attack from the Baghdad government. A more accurate term for the administration's policy might be "preventive," since it seeks to prevent a possible future attack rather than an immediate present danger. In this paper we use the two terms interchangeably to refer to the single phenomenon of an administration policy employing military force proactively in the absence of prior attack or the imminent danger of such attack.

3. In August 2002 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published *Iraq: A New Approach*, proposing an enhanced system of robust weapons inspections to guarantee Iraqi disarmament. In October 2002 the Fourth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame published *Winning Without War: Sensible Security Options for Dealing with Iraq*, outlining a series of specific policy steps—including more vigorous external border monitoring and tighter controls on Iraqi oil exports—for containing and deterring Iraqi military capabilities. In February 2003 U.S. and UK religious leaders published *An Alternative to War for Defeating Saddam Hussein* that urged the indictment of Saddam Hussein on war crimes charges and UN enforcement of Iraq's disarmament. Available online at *Sojourners* <http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=action.6_point_plan> (2 September 2003).
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According to the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the FY2003 supplemental appropriations bill provided \$64.2 billion for all military programs. Of this amount, \$53.4 billion was designated for military operations in Iraq. Another \$4.5 billion was set aside for international military/economic/other assistance. Loan guarantees were provided to Israel (\$9 billion), Turkey (\$8.5 billion), and Egypt (\$2 billion). This figure differs slightly from that given by Dov Zakheim, comptroller of the Department of Defense, who provided \$62.6 billion as the amount of Congressional supplemental appropriations. Pauline Jelinek, "Iraq war has cost Pentagon \$48 billion so far." *Redding Record Searchlight*, 15 July 2003. Available online at *Redding* <<http://www.redding.com/news/apwar/past/20030715aptop074.shtml>> (15 September 2003).

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Through cooperative engagement with other countries, multilateral disarmament, the strengthening of international institutions, and carrots and sticks diplomacy, the United States can protect itself against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and realize a more secure future.

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