

Sanctions *Sans* Commitment: An Assessment of UN Arms Embargoes

By David Cortright, George A. Lopez, with Linda Gerber

An impeccable logic makes arms embargoes a potentially powerful instrument in the array of United Nations (UN) peace- and security-building mechanisms. By denying aggressors and human rights abusers the implements of war and repression, arms embargoes contribute directly to preventing and reducing the level of armed conflict.¹ There could hardly be a more appropriate tool for international peacemaking. Moreover, in constricting only selected weapons and military-related goods and services, and in denying these to ruling elites, their armies, and other violent combatants, arms embargoes constitute the quintessential example of a smart sanction. Not only do arms embargoes avoid doing harm to vulnerable and innocent civilian populations; the better the embargoes' enforcement, the more innocent lives are likely to be saved.

This powerful logic may explain why arms embargoes are the most frequently employed form of economic sanction. Since 1990, the UN Security Council has imposed mandatory arms embargoes in twelve of its fourteen sanctions cases. See the table "Selected Cases of Arms Embargoes, 1990-2001" for a complete listing of Security Council arms embargoes in the past decade. Only in the cases of Cambodia and Sudan did the Security Council choose not to apply a restriction on arms imports. In most cases arms embargoes were part of a broader package of sanctions measures. In some cases (Angola, Rwanda since 1995, and Sierra Leone since 1998) arms embargoes have been targeted against rebel movements fighting against an established government. In all other cases arms embargoes were applied against governments deemed to be violating human rights and posing a threat to international peace. Through September 2001 UN arms embargoes remained in place against seven states.

Selected Cases of Arms Embargoes, 1990–2001

Country	Arms Embargoes
Iraq	S/RES/661 (1990)
Yugoslavia	S/RES/713 (1991) S/RES/1160 (1998)
Somalia	S/RES/733 (1992)
Libya	S/RES/748 (1992)
Liberia	S/RES/788 (1992) S/RES/1343 (2001)
Haiti	S/RES/841 (1993)
Angola/UNITA	S/RES/864 (1993)
Rwanda	S/RES/918 (1994)
Sierra Leone	S/RES/1132 (1997)
Ethiopia/Eritrea	S/RES/1298 (2000)
Afghanistan	S/RES/1333 (2000)

Regional institutions have also employed arms embargoes. The European Union (EU), under its Common Foreign and Security Policy, has applied arms embargoes frequently. As of mid-2001 EU arms embargoes were in place against eleven countries.² In addition, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has imposed a general albeit ineffectual moratorium on all arms shipments in the region.

Unilateral arms embargoes have also been utilized intensely. The United States alone has imposed arms restrictions against dozens of countries in recent years. Even when the UN has suspended arms embargoes and other sanctions, for example in the case of Libya in 1999, U.S. restrictions often have remained firmly in place. Moreover, decisions to discontinue arms restrictions are often met with criticism, as was evident when the new administration of George W. Bush decided to renew training and exchange programs with the Indonesian armed forces.

The task of embargoing arms is a complicated one because it occurs at such different levels in the international community with distinct challenges in each area. As the experience with sanctions against Iraq indicates, controlling the production of weapons of mass destruction requires not only very tight sanctions on a nation's borders, but inspectors within the country itself, especially regarding chemical and biological materials. Transfers of major conventional arms and the spare parts and fuels that support them may be easier to control if the Permanent Five who are principal suppliers of these weapons are willing to cooperate. Effective participation by suppliers and frontline states (as in the case of the monitoring and control system ultimately imposed by Europeans against the former Republic of Yugoslavia) can stifle such trade. Trafficking in small arms may be the most difficult to monitor and curtail both because of the wide diversity of suppliers and the ability of gun-runners to evade even serious border controls. The problem, of course, is that most of the people dying in the wars that the UN wants to end are being killed by these small arms.

The control of small weapons has become a high-profile issue at the UN. The UN "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects" of July 2001 brought an intense focus to the problem, with a general consensus on the need to control more stringently the lethal trade in these weapons. In the end, however, the United States, despite its frequent reliance on arms embargoes, was unwilling to support strong measures to clamp down on small arms trafficking.

The effectiveness of arms embargoes is hard to measure or to isolate from the impact of other sanctions. In some cases, such as the five cases where arms embargoes were imposed as stand-alone measures,³ the impact of UN sanctions in reducing the supply of weapons or ending armed conflict has been minimal. In other cases, however, most notably Iraq, arms embargoes have successfully constrained the military capabilities of the targeted regime. When arms embargoes are combined with other measures, they can help to achieve UN objectives. In some cases arms embargoes have driven suppliers underground and forced targeted regimes to rely on illicit networks that are inherently more expensive and riskier. This forces the targeted regime to pay a premium for weapons supplies and is an indicator of positive impact.⁴ The increased cost and difficulty of acquiring military goods may influence a targeted regime's calculus of the costs and

benefits associated with an objectionable policy and prompt a greater readiness to seek a resolution of the conflict. In recent years there has been a marked trend toward enhanced enforcement and a greater willingness by governments around the world to comply with UN arms embargoes. These developments, to be examined below, offer hope that arms embargoes will become more effective instruments of international peacemaking. Part of that effectiveness derives from the reality that an embargo does not need to prohibit or confiscate every weapon but rather be sufficiently strong to raise the cost of arms and their supply to prohibitive levels.

A Systematic Pattern of Neglect

The Security Council imposed stand-alone arms embargoes in Somalia, SCR 733 (1992), Liberia, SCR 788 (1992), and Rwanda, SCR 918 (1994). The embargo against the government of Rwanda was suspended in 1995 with the adoption of SCR 1011, but it was maintained against Hutu rebels operating in eastern Zaire. In none of these cases was any serious effort made to enforce the sanctions. In the case of Somalia, the UN sanctions committee rarely met and it took no action to encourage compliance. In the Liberian sanctions, the sanctions committee was created two years after the sanctions were first imposed. The Rwanda sanctions constitute a classic case of too little, too late. The UN arms embargo was not imposed until May 1994, after most of the genocidal killings by Hutu extremists had already occurred. In none of these did the council appear willing to create effective multilateral enforcement mechanisms.

Recent evidence confirms that arms have continued to flow freely into Somalia, Liberia, and the Hutu rebel regions of eastern Congo. In Somalia, warlords and private militias have remained well equipped with Kalashnikovs, visibly and readily available in local markets. According to a recent investigative report in the *Atlanta Constitution*, the average Russian-made Kalashnikov sold for \$200 at the Bakhar market in Mogadishu, well below the official price.⁵ As we examine below, the flow of arms into Somalia has been partly a spillover effect from the war between neighboring Ethiopia and Eritrea. The arms embargo that had remained in effect against Liberia was renewed in 2001 with the adoption of SCR 1343. The sanctions were a response to Liberia's continued material support of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone. The report of the Sierra Leone panel of experts confirmed that weapons continued to flow into Liberia, mainly from Eastern Europe, and that Liberia provided substantial military assistance to the RUF.⁶ Notwithstanding these new developments, the long-standing UN arms embargo had virtually no impact on the outcome of the Liberian civil war or the conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone.

The sanctions against the Hutu rebels in eastern Congo have remained ineffective. Reports of the UN International Commission of Inquiry (UNICOI) documented vast networks of arms suppliers, brokers, and transport companies providing a steady flow of weaponry to central Africa.⁷ In fact, the Hutu rebels became stronger militarily during the embargo. The flow of arms increased with the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila against Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko and during the subsequent regional conflict that involved troops from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Libya, Zimbabwe, and a variety of rebel movements. To finance their additional weapons and armed militias, some of these governments and rebel movements systematically looted the

Congo's natural resources.⁸ The war became as much an economic venture as a dispute over security issues.⁹

Under these circumstances the continuing UN arms embargoes against the Hutu rebels in the region became utterly meaningless. The panel of experts on the Congo recommended that the Security Council consider declaring an arms embargo on all the rebel groups operating in the Congo and the governments supporting them. Yet no action was taken on this recommendation, and none appears likely.¹⁰ Given the obvious ineffectiveness of the existing arms embargo, it would only further discredit the Security Council and its sanctions policies to attempt to impose additional limitations in a setting where such restrictions were impossible to enforce. This raises the question whether the secretary-general should advise against sanctions that he knows will not be seriously enforced.

Sanctioning UNITA and the RUF

The arms embargo and other UN sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) have attracted substantial international attention in recent years. The 1999 Fowler mission report, the March 2000 report of the panel of experts, and the reports of the Angola monitoring mechanism thoroughly documented the means by which UNITA circumvented the sanctions and acquired supplies for its armed forces. UNITA acquired weapons in two principal ways: capturing them in battle from the Angolan armed forces, and purchasing cold war stocks from Eastern Europe. Governments and arms dealers in Africa also played a crucial role in supplying and transporting weapons to UNITA. The panel of experts report specifically implicated Burkina Faso, Togo, Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, and South Africa, in some cases naming those responsible for sanctions violations, including the heads of state of Burkina Faso and Togo.

The reports of the monitoring mechanism on Angola sanctions identified private arms brokers as crucial players in violating UN arms embargoes. The role of these brokers, according to the addendum report, is “overwhelming and cannot be over-emphasized.”¹¹ Arms brokers have been responsible for purchasing, supplying, and in some cases providing training for the bulk of UNITA's weapons.

Some modest progress toward better enforcement of the arms embargo has occurred recently. These advances, combined with the success of military offensives by the Luanda government, have dealt a severe blow to UNITA. UNITA has lost control of important diamond-producing areas, limiting its revenue and eliminating many of the bases and supply routes previously used to import arms. With diminished territory and fewer resources, UNITA has faced a drop in arms imports. According to the monitoring mechanism report, the flow of arms to UNITA is “highly reduced . . . nothing enters in significant amounts.”¹² These changes have resulted primarily from reverses on the battlefield, but the persistent UN efforts to monitor and enforce the arms embargo and other sanctions against UNITA have also played a part.

The arms embargo and other sanctions against Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone have also become steadily more effective in recent years. The arms embargo, oil embargo, and travel

sanctions initially imposed against the military junta in 1997 were reimposed against the RUF in 1998 after ECOMOG (Military Observer Group of ECOWAS) troops forced the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council from office. ECOWAS strongly encouraged the sanctions against the RUF and in October 1998 instituted a moratorium on all arms shipments to West Africa as part of an attempt to stem the violence not only in Sierra Leone but throughout the region. The Security Council strengthened the sanctions in July 2000, imposing a diamond embargo and establishing a panel of experts.

The panel's report documented violations of the arms embargo and confirmed that Sierra Leone and all of West Africa are "awash in small arms."¹³ The report found a pattern of supply and transshipment similar to that utilized by UNITA. Arms were procured primarily in Eastern Europe, usually with the assistance of private arms brokers, and transshipped to Liberia through Burkina Faso. From Liberia, helicopters shuttled the supplies, primarily small arms, to RUF forces in the field.¹⁴ The report acknowledged that the RUF also obtained many weapons during confrontations with the Sierra Leone army, ECOMOG forces, and UN peacekeepers. The panel found little evidence that the arms embargo or the ECOWAS moratorium on arms imports was having much effect in constraining the military capabilities of the RUF.

The Sierra Leone panel came to many of the same conclusions as the Angola panel and monitoring mechanism. Governments in Eastern Europe needed to exercise greater restraint and due diligence in monitoring and controlling arms dealers operating from their territory.¹⁵ Greater international efforts were needed to license and control private arms brokers. The panel documented the crucial role of air transport in ferrying weapons to RUF forces from Liberia. It noted the problem of lax procedures for aircraft registered in Liberia and recommended that all aircraft registered there be grounded immediately.

Despite the Security Council's efforts to improve the monitoring and enforcement of the arms and diamond embargoes in Sierra Leone, these sanctions have had little impact in pressuring the RUF to end its military rebellion and demobilize its forces. On the other hand, the extension of UN sanctions to Liberia has had a significant impact in applying pressure on the rebel movement's principal patron. These additional sanctions on Liberia, the presence of British troops in Sierra Leone, and the RUF's battlefield reverses at the hands of the Guinean armed forces have combined to change the political dynamics of the struggle in Sierra Leone, resulting in a cease-fire and a greater willingness by the rebels to cooperate with UN peacekeepers. The continuing arms embargo and other sanctions against the RUF and Liberia have helped restrain military hostilities.

Crisis in the Horn

The UN arms embargo imposed against Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 2000 (SCR 1298) parallels the Rwanda case in its futility. The embargo was not imposed until after war had already begun and the two countries had spent the previous years arming themselves to the teeth. Between them, Ethiopia and Eritrea squandered a staggering \$1 billion on arms in the two years leading up to the war.¹⁶ Military spending in Ethiopia rose sharply in the late 1990s to more than \$500 million in 2000.¹⁷ Eritrea spent equivalent amounts. This frenzied spending spree occurred

in two deeply impoverished countries whose residents were suffering desperate hunger. The arms spending was so excessive that the International Monetary Fund suspended its program in Ethiopia.¹⁸ While all this was going on, the Security Council did nothing other than to issue a nonbinding resolution in February 1999 (SCR 1227) “strongly” urging countries to ban the sale of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea. For a listing of sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea see the chart “Ethiopia and Eritrea Security Council Resolutions.”

Ethiopia and Eritrea Security Council Resolutions	
Resolution Number	Action
S/RES/1227 (10 February 1999)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strongly urged states to end sales of arms and munitions
S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Imposed binding arms embargo

A December 2000 editorial in the *New York Times* criticized the U.S. government for failing to prevent the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and for resisting calls to impose an arms embargo. The newspaper also took issue with the Washington’s unwillingness to suspend more than \$1 billion in World Bank loans “at a time when the two countries were hemorrhaging cash on weapons.”¹⁹ U.S. priorities were focused elsewhere, on neighboring Sudan, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was seen as a sideshow. The United States seemed to be more interested in supporting the Sudanese rebels fighting against the government in Khartoum than in pressuring Ethiopia and Eritrea to halt their arms buildup. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were supporting American policy aims in Sudan, and U.S. officials did not want to jeopardize this cooperation by imposing UN sanctions.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been closely linked to disputes in neighboring countries. Former U.S. national security official John Prendergast has described the horn of Africa as “an integrated conflict zone.”²⁰ Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported rival militias in Somalia and have aided the rebels battling the Khartoum government in Sudan. When fighting broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, and then again in 1999 and 2000, the flow of weapons to rival factions in Somalia increased, helping to reignite the civil war there.²¹ At the same time, the two countries reduced their support for Sudanese opposition groups.²² In the end, U.S. policy seems to have failed on all fronts. It stopped neither the outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea nor renewed fighting in Somalia. Nor did it prevent a reduction of Ethiopian and Eritrean support for the Sudanese rebels. The failures of U.S. policy in the region obviously contributed to the failure of UN policy there.

The arms embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea marked the debut of a sanctions policy reform advocated by France and Russia: time limits. SCR 1298 (2000) specified that the sanctions would remain in place for only one year, or until the secretary-general reported that a peace settlement had ended the conflict. The demand for time limits was motivated by the desire of some Security Council members, particularly France, to avoid a replay of the Iraq impasse,

where sanctions have continued with no end in sight because of the inability of the council to agree on lifting them. Ironically, the demand for time limits has itself become a divisive issue among the Permanent Five, preventing agreement within the Security Council on sanctions reform. Nonetheless, the council has adopted time limits in all of its recent sanctions resolutions, including the Ethiopia and Eritrea case. When the council adopted SCR 1298 (2000), Russia's permanent representative to the UN, Sergey Lavrov, hailed the provision as a historical first for the Security Council.²³ The wording of the resolution required an affirmative vote of the Security Council to continue the sanctions beyond May 2001.

Despite the tentative nature of the cease-fire and evidence of blatant violations of the arms embargo,²⁴ the council duly allowed the embargo to expire in May 2001. A terse announcement from the president of the council noted that the provisions of SCR 1298 (2000) "have not been extended."²⁵ The statement by James Cunningham, acting permanent representative of the United States, urged Ethiopia and Eritrea "to ensure that efforts are redirected from weapons procurement and other military activities toward the reconstruction and development of both economies and regional reconciliation, with a view to achieving stability in the horn of Africa." The statement also encouraged UN member states "to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in discouraging arms flows to countries and regions emerging from armed conflicts."²⁶ These were hollow words that masked the council's inability to agree upon or enact an effective policy to prevent the continued flow of arms to the region.

The United States attempted to lift the arms embargo even earlier, as part of an apparent political bargain with Ethiopia to halt its military advance into Eritrean territory and accept a UN-monitored cease-fire.²⁷ Following the signing of a peace agreement between the two parties in January 2001, the United States proposed that the Security Council lift the arms embargo. A number of member states objected to the suggestion, particularly Canada and the Netherlands, whose troops were part of the UN peacekeeping force monitoring the cease-fire. Some countries were concerned about the continuing tensions between the combatants and were reluctant to give a green light to additional arms shipments into the region. These same concerns were expressed a few months later when the twelve-month time limit was reached, but the council could not muster the political support for continuing the arms embargo.

Flawed Policy in Yugoslavia

A UN arms embargo was in place against Yugoslavia from 1998 through 2001. The council adopted SCR 1160 which banned military sales or support to Serbia and Montenegro. Few noticed or paid attention to the arms embargo, however, and enforcement efforts were practically nonexistent. The Yugoslavia sanctions committee was among the least active of recent years. Despite a commitment to peacekeeping in the region, the Security Council did not mount a monitoring effort for the arms embargo. NATO and the security institutions in Europe also stood on the sidelines. The European agencies that played a big role in supporting the earlier UN sanctions in Yugoslavia (1992-95) did not offer the resources for monitoring the arms embargo.²⁸

Even with the best of monitoring, an arms embargo against Yugoslavia would face overwhelming obstacles. The region has been overflowing with arms for a decade. Serbia drew

from the well-stocked arsenal of the Yugoslav army, and the Albanian rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Macedonian National Liberation Army benefited from the looting of Albania's military stockpiles after the meltdown of government authority in 1997. Many of these Albanian arms have since flowed into Macedonia to fuel armed rebellion there, and the supply of new weapons from areas of the former Soviet Union has continued unabated. Ironically, the one party that did take steps to enforce the arms embargo was Serbia, which deployed the Yugoslav army on the Kosovo-Macedonia border in 1998. As a result of these efforts, the cost of an AK-47 rifle reportedly increased from DM 50 to DM 1,000.²⁹ This provided evidence that the deployment of enforcement units could make a difference, if not in stopping arms flows completely, at least in raising the price of weapons and possibly limiting some of the supply.

The UN arms embargo in Yugoslavia is another example of a flawed policy in which the Security Council and member states were unwilling to take the steps necessary to implement the measures they adopted. The same pattern evident in the cases of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia, Liberia, and the Rwandan Hutu rebels reappeared in the Balkans, despite substantial investments in other dimensions of security building. Stand-alone UN arms embargoes have been utterly feckless. They are commonly referred to as “a joke,” although the consequences of failed policy are no laughing matter for the victims of armed conflict. Diplomats go through the motions of responding to a crisis without actually doing anything. The adoption of Security Council resolutions may give the appearance that something is being done, and this may bring political benefit to the decision makers involved, but the impact of these measures on the ground is usually nil. In instances where there is no prospect of an enforcement effort, it might be preferable for the council to do nothing. This would at least preserve some semblance of credibility for future UN arms embargoes that are seriously implemented and give greater weight and deterrent force to such sanctions.

Iraq: The Importance of Enforcement

Iraq represents the one case in which an arms embargo has effectively curtailed the military capability of a targeted regime. The combination of comprehensive trade sanctions, intrusive UN weapons inspections, and selective military attacks by the United States and the United Kingdom have significantly degraded Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and its overall military capabilities. The economic and social consequences of more than a decade of draconian sanctions have been devastating, however.³⁰ The political divisions that have arisen over the maintenance of general trade sanctions have had a corrosive effect on politics within the Security Council and in the region. Yet, the resulting tensions have not undermined the efficacy of the arms embargo, even as compliance with the general trade sanctions has steadily eroded. Thus, the effective military containment of Iraq has been sustained. The Security Council has considered a restructuring of the Iraq sanctions to ease restrictions on civilian trade while maintaining a strict embargo on imports of weapons and military-related goods, but as of September 2001 the council has been unable to agree on such a plan.

The continuing UN control of Iraqi oil exports has denied the Baghdad regime the ability to use its oil-generated revenues to purchase arms. Rough calculations suggest that since 1990 Iraq

has forgone or lost control over more than \$150 billion in oil revenues.³¹ This has prevented Iraq from rebuilding and modernizing its armed forces after the Gulf War. The loss of control over revenue has also impeded the regime's efforts to reestablish and develop its weapons of mass destruction. Since the imposition of UN sanctions, Iraqi military spending has plummeted. According to estimates from the U.S. Department of State, Iraqi military expenditures dropped from \$22.5 billion in 1990 to \$1.25 billion in 1997.³² The accompanying chart, "Military Expenditures in Iraq, 1987 through 1997" depicts this drop in Iraqi military spending.

As a result of sanctions, the huge volume of military goods that flowed into Iraq in the 1980s has slowed to a trickle. The cumulative arms import deficit for the 1991–98 period has been calculated at \$47.7 billion.³³ This is the total shortfall in arms imports compared with the annual average of such imports in the five years preceding the Gulf War. A 1998 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated that Iraqi armed forces have "decaying, obsolete, or obsolescent major weapons."³⁴ Although Baghdad has pursued various weapons-smuggling efforts, which have no doubt expanded as cracks in the sanctions regime have widened, these black market operations have been no substitute for the large-scale, diversified weapons supply that equipped the Iraqi armed forces for war with Iran in the 1980s. The sanctions have been highly effective in curtailing Iraq's military capabilities.

There is no mystery about the reasons for the success of the arms embargo in Iraq: the control of oil revenues, and effective international enforcement. The first factor is unique to the case of Iraq and stems from the special circumstances of the oil for food program. Revenues from permitted oil sales are deposited in a UN-controlled fund and can be used only for approved humanitarian and civilian infrastructure expenditures. In light of the Security Council's increased emphasis on commodity controls as a means of constraining the revenue used for weapons purchases by targeted governments and rebel movements, it is conceivable that future arms embargoes might attempt to develop financial capture mechanisms similar to those employed in Iraq.

The second factor, widespread international compliance, is more general and could be replicated in other cases, but only if the major powers consider this to be in their interest. The United States and other countries have made substantial commitments to monitoring and interdicting shipments to Iraq, especially by sea. The most important part of this enforcement effort has been the Maritime Interception Force (MIF), which monitors naval traffic in the northern Gulf. Maritime transport represents the largest threat of smuggling, because one ship can carry the freight equivalent of many truckloads of goods. The MIF began as a bilateral effort of the United States and the United Kingdom in 1990. Although it has received naval support from nearly a dozen Western nations, the MIF has remained primarily a U.S. operation. In ten years of operation, the MIF searched more than 12,000 ships.³⁵ Until 1994 the MIF also monitored ships entering the Jordanian port of Aqaba, a major transshipment point for goods entering Iraq. In 1994, MIF patrols were replaced by dockside inspections conducted by Lloyd's Register under arrangement with the UN. These inspections came to an end in December 2000 and as of this writing have not been replaced. The weakening of these monitoring efforts and the general erosion of sanctions compliance have increased the likelihood of prohibited weapons imports into Iraq.

Sanctioning the Taliban

The Security Council added to the sanctions imposed against the Taliban in 1999 (SCR 1267) by imposing an arms embargo and other measures in SCR 1333 (2000). The idea of restricting the flow of arms to a country at war appeared to make sense, theoretically, but as a practical matter the arms embargo has faced substantial obstacles. The problems in Afghanistan have been similar to those that have bedeviled UN arms embargoes in Africa and Yugoslavia. The legacy of the 1980s war against the Soviets and more than a decade of continuous civil conflict have left the region brimming with weapons. The supply lines into Afghanistan from unrestricted outside sources, primarily Pakistan, are numerous and virtually impossible to monitor. The Northwest Frontier along the Pakistani border with Afghanistan is largely ungovernable and has many links (including shared Pashtun ethnicity) with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

An unofficial study produced by the UN Secretariat acknowledged the many difficulties in attempting to cut off the flow of weapons from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The border between the two countries is more than 1,500 miles long, much of it along sparsely populated mountainous or desert terrain.³⁶ The two main roads to Kandahar and Jalalabad in Afghanistan can be monitored with relative ease. But there are numerous secondary routes and trails, well worn from the resistance effort against Soviet occupation, that can be used to bring in supplies of arms and ammunition. These secondary routes have been used since time immemorial as pathways for smuggling and the movement of people between the two countries. Over the decades imperial powers and regional governments have attempted in vain to establish control over these border areas. The prospect that a UN arms embargo could stem the flow of arms is extremely remote.

Limitations of Arms Embargoes

From the preceding case analyses, it is obvious that UN arms embargoes suffer from numerous problems. In some cases these are structural factors over which the Security Council and member states have no influence. When an armed conflict has already broken out and weapons supplies in a region are already abundant, the imposition of even a well-monitored and -enforced arms embargo will likely have little impact in reducing the violence. Even in such instances, though, early action by the international community to restrict the flow of arms could increase the prospects for preventing deadly conflict. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the buildup of arms on both sides began before the first armed clashes in 1998 and continued to accelerate into 2000. An earlier and more effective effort to cut off the supply of arms to the two countries might have made a difference in preventing or at least reducing the scale of subsequent military hostilities.

In most cases the limitations of UN arms embargoes can be traced to specific political factors. One of the greatest problems is the unwillingness of the major powers to create and enforce an effective international arms monitoring and enforcement system. This is linked to efforts by these same countries to promote, or at least not restrain, arms exports by their own producers.

Some of the obstacles are technical and administrative. They include vague wording in Security Council resolutions, inadequate monitoring of air cargo, improper documentation of end-use certificates, and lack of implementation capacity among UN member states and within the UN Secretariat.

Grounding Arms Smugglers

The means by which arms traffickers violate UN arms embargoes are well documented. The role of air transport in supplying arms to sanctioned rebel movements is particularly crucial. The panel of experts and the monitoring mechanism reports on sanctions in Angola identified air transport as “the main avenue” for supplying arms to UNITA.³⁷ The panel of experts on Sierra Leone came to similar conclusions about the central role of air transport in providing military supplies to RUF rebels.³⁸ Air shipments have also been used to violate the sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The considerable effort the United States has devoted to preventing the smuggling of drugs via airplane or ship illustrates that, with the investment of sufficient resources, illegal air transport operations can be detected and curtailed. The U.S. anti-drug program has required a concentrated air surveillance and interdiction effort. For such a program to be effective for sanctions enforcement, the United States and other major powers would have to provide airborne surveillance and other expensive detection systems, since air-monitoring capabilities in many regions of conflict are very limited. Support would be needed as well in managing interdiction operations, to avoid interference with legitimate flights while ensuring effective action against unregistered and illicit missions. International enforcement efforts against drug smuggling in Latin America have had dramatic effects in reducing the volume of unregistered flights in the region and have significantly constrained the efforts of drug exporters.³⁹ The flow of drugs to the United States has not stopped, but smuggling efforts via aircraft have become more difficult and dangerous.

Improvements are also needed in the present international system for regulating cargo planes. Current procedures are archaic and inconsistent, according to the U.S. International Air Cargo Association.⁴⁰ A related problem is the lack of regulation and monitoring for aircraft registered in Liberia. As documented in UN reports, such planes have been used frequently as a means of evading international controls and delivering illegal arms shipments. The Sierra Leone panel of experts recommended that all Liberian aircraft be grounded until they were properly registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal.⁴¹

UN reports have repeatedly noted the crucial role of arms brokers in violating UN arms embargoes. Instead of buying arms directly from producers, rebel movements and sanctioned governments often obtain weapons through intermediaries. Utilizing unregulated brokers makes it easier for a sanctioned regime to acquire weapons and complicates the task of monitoring and preventing violations. In many cases arms brokers not only supply weapons but arrange for transport, training, maintenance, and spare parts. According to the Angola panel of experts report, a small number of known brokers have accounted for the bulk of weapons imports to

UNITA.⁴² A concerted international effort to regulate arms brokers and shut down firms that violate UN sanctions could significantly curtail illicit arms trafficking.

One of the frequently used tools of evasion is the falsification of end-user certificates. When brokers arrange arms shipments from suppliers, many of them in Eastern Europe, they often file documents claiming that the weapons are destined for such countries as Burkina Faso and Togo. When the arms arrive at these locations, however, they are forwarded to Liberia, Angola, or other conflict zones. The Angola monitoring mechanism confirmed that the arms shipped to Togo from Bulgaria ended up in the hands of UNITA.

The central figure in the shadowy world of arms brokering, transport, and falsification has been Victor Bout. UN investigative panels on Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Congo have identified Bout and his company, Air Cess, as the principal suppliers of weapons to rebel groups. Air Cess has been the single carrier of the bulk of weapons supplied to UNITA in Angola.⁴³ The final report of the Angola monitoring mechanism on sanctions provided an extensive profile of Bout and his air transport operations.⁴⁴ Bout was born in Tajikistan; has passports from five countries, including Russia and Ukraine; and is reportedly a former KGB officer. He formed Air Cess in 1996 and built a fleet of approximately fifty Russian-made Antonov transport planes, registered in Liberia.⁴⁵ Bout originally headquartered his operations in Ostende, Belgium, but when Belgian officials tightened their monitoring efforts, Bout moved Air Cess to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Public exposure also prompted Bout to restructure his company and shift his operations to a network of subcontractors and partners for continuing his sanctions-busting activities.⁴⁶ The British government has exerted pressure on the UAE to shut down Bout's operations.⁴⁷ In response, Air Cess moved its headquarters from Sharjah to Ajman, a smaller emirate ten miles away, but its sanctions-busting activities have continued. "We know that he is still selling weapons to Liberia and Angola in breach of sanctions," said Peter Hain of the British Foreign Office in July 2001. "Bout is the principal merchant of death in Africa. If you want to stop sanctions-busting, you have to stop Bout."⁴⁸

The case of Bout and Air Cess highlights both the dilemma and the opportunity in enforcing UN arms embargoes. A company that has repeatedly violated UN sanctions should be required to face the consequences of its actions. If the Security Council were serious about enforcing the various arms embargoes in Africa, it would support nationally coordinated efforts to shut down Air Cess's operations. The voluminous evidence of the company's violations should be publicized to the international community and formally presented to the countries directly involved in Bout's operations, including the UAE and Liberia, with the demand that these countries take action against the company. Similar actions could be taken against other known arms traffickers as part of a systematic effort to drive these merchants of death out of business.

Promoting Arms

Much of the discussion of UN arms embargoes has rightly focused on the huge demand for weapons by rebel movements and governments in Africa and other conflict zones, and the underworld of private brokers and transport companies that traffic in illegal arms. But the largest producers and promoters of arms exports are the major powers and permanent members of the

Security Council. The same governments that have applied pressure on other countries to tighten arms export laws and limit the sales of weapons to areas of conflict are themselves engaged in a feverish competition to produce and sell arms.

After a decade-long decline associated with the end of the cold war, worldwide military spending levels have started to increase again. In 1999, the last year for which figures are available, global military spending increased by 2 percent, to approximately \$780 billion.⁴⁹ Arms transfers, after declining rapidly at the end of the cold war, have remained at constant levels since 1995.⁵⁰ In 1999 the volume of negotiated contracts for future arms deliveries increased from the previous year's figure of \$23 billion to more than \$30 billion, indicating a trend toward rising arms transfers in the years ahead.⁵¹ The United States continues to dominate the world arms market, delivering more than \$18 billion in arms in 1999. The United Kingdom and Russia were second and third respectively in the ranking of global arms merchants.⁵²

Officials of the major powers make a distinction between these legal arms sales to legitimate governments and illicit arms trafficking to regimes under UN sanctions. They also point to their domestic arms export control laws that provide assurances against illegal shipments and, in the case of the United States, prohibit military sales or support to regimes that violate human rights. Past experience has shown, however, that weapons delivered to an established government may find their way into the hands of rebel movements or regimes that violate international norms. U.S. arms transferred to Pakistan in the 1980s to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have helped to fuel civil war in Afghanistan. Arms supplied to Iraq in the 1980s were used in the invasion of Kuwait and for the development of weapons of mass destruction. The vast arsenals of weapons produced by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries during the cold war have been a major source of supply for arms traffickers violating UN arms embargoes. When so much military hardware is produced and promoted in the world marketplace, a percentage of this lethal equipment inevitably falls into the hands of aggressors and human rights abusers. As long as the major powers continue to depend on large-scale arms exports as means of economic leverage at home and foreign policy influence abroad, arms will continue to flow into conflict zones and the enforcement of UN arms embargoes will be more difficult.

While promoting tighter arms export controls abroad, the United States has enacted domestic legislation to promote and expedite its own arms export licensing procedures. Under the Defense Trade Security Initiative announced in May 2000, Washington introduced changes that make it easier for arms exporters to sell their wares abroad.⁵³ Human Rights Watch and other groups have expressed concern about these changes and have criticized efforts to weaken U.S. arms export controls. At the UN conference on small arms held in July 2001, the United States blocked international efforts to control weapons trafficking. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton told delegates that the United States would not support a proposed UN convention on arms transfers because of concerns over the rights of domestic gun owners. The draft convention under consideration at the UN conference would have created tighter controls on automatic weapons and other light arms that account for most of the deaths in military conflicts around the world. Because of U.S. obduracy, the small arms conference failed to reach agreement on binding measures to restrict arms trafficking and had to settle for vaguely worded platitudes. The opportunity for strengthening UN arms embargoes that the conference presented was lost.

Moral and Political Hazards

One of the strategic dilemmas the Security Council faces when imposing an arms embargo is whether such action will inadvertently benefit one of the parties in a conflict. When the council imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1991 (SCR 713), critics observed that this would benefit Serbia by freezing the enormous military advantage of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) over its Bosnian and Croatian adversaries. A study from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that the YPA enjoyed a 9:1 military advantage over the forces of the Bosnian government.⁵⁴ As Serbian attacks against Bosnian forces continued and intensified, the United States and several Islamic states quietly decided to ignore the arms embargo and provided military support and equipment to the beleaguered forces of the Bosnian government. In this instance a comprehensive arms embargo on all parties was widely perceived as morally and politically unsound, conferring unjustified and unintended advantages to the aggressor.

In the case of Afghanistan, the opposite situation has emerged. The council imposed sanctions only on the Taliban, thereby overtly favoring the forces of the United Front in the country's northern region. In adopting such a policy, the council abandoned the previous position of neutrality implicit in the UN General Assembly's mission in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch and other groups questioned the wisdom of this approach and urged the council to impose an arms embargo on the United Front as well as the Taliban. Imposing an arms embargo on both parties could have very unequal consequences, however. As Human Rights Watch acknowledged, the arms supply routes available to the United Front were less numerous and more vulnerable to interdiction than those of the Taliban. An embargo on both sides that did not take these differences into account "could inadvertently benefit the Taliban."⁵⁵ Designing and implementing an even-handed embargo turns out to be a difficult proposition.

Toward More Effective Arms Embargo Enforcement

Despite the many problems and limitations of UN arms embargoes, some significant advances have occurred in recent years. A gradual trend toward enhanced monitoring is clearly visible, and the building blocks for strengthening enforcement capacity are being put in place. By reviewing the progress that has been made and assessing the key recommendations of UN expert panels, we can identify the outlines and structure of a more effective policy on international arms embargoes.

One of the most important recent innovations has been the use of investigative panels to expose sanctions violations and recommend steps to strengthen enforcement. The Security Council has established a de facto policy of creating special investigative bodies for each sanctions episode. The reports of these panels have uncovered a wealth of information about the means used to circumvent UN sanctions and the options for preventing such violations. These investigative reports have already had an impact, and the tactic of naming and shaming illegal arms suppliers and brokers and their accomplices has proven rather effective. The intense

discussion and debate that accompanied the release of the Angola and Sierra Leone reports indicates the impact that merely exposing violations can have.⁵⁶

Partly in response to the violations documented in UN reports, a number of governments, especially those in Eastern Europe, have taken steps to strengthen export control laws and prevent violations of arms embargoes. Significant progress in this direction has occurred in Bulgaria, which was singled out in the Angola panel of experts and monitoring mechanism reports. Anxious to gain membership in NATO and the EU, the government in Sofia has adopted stronger legislative controls and restrictions on arms exports and taken steps to verify and certify end-user documents.⁵⁷ In April 2001 the government listed twenty countries under UN or EU arms embargoes to which it would not sell arms.⁵⁸ While Bulgaria has made progress, however, it has not yet closed loopholes in its arms export regulations or incorporated human rights criteria into these regulations.⁵⁹ Other states that have strengthened legal and administrative regulation of arms exports in the 1990s include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland.⁶⁰ The United Kingdom also recently declared its intention to adopt new arms export controls that, among other things, will require the registering and licensing of arms brokers.⁶¹ This pattern in Europe points in one logical direction: the European Union should require future member states from Eastern Europe to adopt adequate legislative control of arms exports as a criteria for membership in the Union.

Regional organizations have also made progress in controlling arms exports and establishing codes of conduct. In June 1998 the EU adopted a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that pledged member states to refrain from shipping military equipment that could be used for internal repression or international aggression.⁶² The ECOWAS moratorium on the importation, exportation, and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa, initially approved in October 1998, was extended in July 2001, although it has proven largely ineffective.⁶³ The Southern African Development Community drafted a protocol on the control of small arms and took special measures to enforce the arms embargo and other sanctions against UNITA. The various specialized multilateral export control regimes—including the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement—have become progressively stronger and more effective in recent years. Taken together, these cooperative arms control efforts are signs of progress in stigmatizing and restricting the proliferation of prohibited arms.

As regional organizations and member states enhance their capacity, parallel efforts are needed within the UN system. Some progress has been made, for example, in more precise and comprehensive wording of Security Council resolutions. Since 1993 the language of arms embargo resolutions has become more consistent and has broadened to include multiple forms of military assistance.⁶⁴ Further improvements are necessary, however, to help the Security Council and member states develop a common understanding of the specific items covered in an arms embargo.⁶⁵ Defining military-related dual-use items is a particularly challenging task. It has proven to be a major source of friction in the operations of sanctions committees and in the debate over restructuring the Iraq sanctions. Developing lists of common dual-use items, drawn from the Wassenaar Arrangement and other multilateral arms control regimes, may help in standardizing such definitions. These and other steps toward facilitating the implementation of

arms embargoes were addressed in the Bonn-Berlin process sponsored by the German government. The concrete recommendations emanating from the German initiative have helped to advance the capacity of the UN to implement arms embargoes. The final outcome of the Bonn-Berlin process provided rich detail on implementation and monitoring for use in future embargo environments.⁶⁶

Human Rights Watch and other groups have proposed the creation of a special arms embargo unit within the UN Secretariat.⁶⁷ The proposed unit would collect information on violations, conduct site visits, dispatch teams of experts, issue reports to the secretary-general and the Security Council, and recommend ways to improve sanctions implementation.⁶⁸ To some extent these functions are already being met through the various ad hoc investigative panels established in recent years. But standardizing and coordinating these efforts within a special unit would facilitate the investigative work and allow for comparative analyses that could identify persistent patterns of violations. A coordinated unit would also help to establish a common database and maintain a ready inventory of expert investigators. The creation of such a unit would ensure that the progress achieved to date through the ad hoc panels is sustained and institutionalized as a permanent feature of UN sanctions enforcement. It might even lead to decisions to suspend ineffective arms sanctions.

The various expert panels have proposed additional steps that deserve priority support. The Fowler mission, the panel of experts, and the monitoring mechanism on Angola recommended that the Security Council apply sanctions against individuals, companies, and governments found to be intentionally violating UN arms embargoes. The Security Council took a major step in this direction when it imposed an arms embargo and other sanctions against Liberia, SCR 1343 (2001), because of its blatant violations of the sanctions against the RUF in Sierra Leone. Taking such action in other cases of documented disregard for Security Council sanctions could significantly strengthen enforcement efforts.

The expert panels also recommended greater international efforts to license and regulate arms brokers. While a number of countries have improved national legislation in this regard, more vigorous international enforcement and common standards are needed to make these efforts effective. Arms brokers and air transport companies that do not meet international standards for licensing and certification should be subject to fines and suits, thus dramatically increasing the cost of sanctions busting.⁶⁹ Concerted UN and international action against sanctions violators would have the benefit of making it easier politically for states in which such violators operate to take national action against them. For a nation worried about the repercussions of constraining private economic interests, the external support and legitimacy conferred by acting in concert with the UN and the international community may be crucial in making such action possible.

The UN, regional organizations, and member states must assume the primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcing arms embargoes, but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can also play a critical role. Citizen monitoring and verification efforts have become increasingly important in international arms monitoring and control. Reports by Human Rights Watch, Saferworld, Global Witness, International Alert, and other groups have provided groundbreaking information on arms trafficking and violations of UN arms embargoes. The first UN investigative panel, UNICOI, was the direct result of NGO efforts to examine the flow of arms

into the Great Lakes region of Africa.⁷⁰ A number of the expert investigators employed in subsequent UN investigative panels have come from the leading independent research groups. Citizen organizations have also played a direct role in monitoring international arms limitation agreements.

The best example of this may be the work of the Nobel Prize–winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which played a decisive role in persuading governments to adopt the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and that has since created a monitoring network, with researchers in ninety-five countries, to verify and encourage compliance with the land mine convention.⁷¹ This campaign represents the first time a grassroots citizens movement played a central role in ensuring compliance with an international treaty. This precedent illustrates the potential importance of citizen involvement and indicates the role NGOs might play in strengthening the implementation of UN arms embargoes.

The potential of arms embargoes as a tool of international peacemaking has yet to be fully realized, but progress in the form of usable roadmaps for stifling the flow of arms has been achieved in recent years. It is unlikely that the supply of weapons can ever be curtailed completely, but concrete steps to increase the costs and risks associated with illicit arms trafficking can be taken. By steadily improving arms control and strengthening efforts to penalize illegal arms transfers, the UN community can make arms embargoes a far more effective means of international peacemaking than it has been to date.

¹ By an arms embargo we mean a ban on weapons, materials related to weapons use (e.g., ammunition), and maintenance (e.g., spare parts) as well as a cessation in the training and technical assistance provided to armed services personnel. For an authoritative analysis of the verification side of arms embargoes, see W. Andy Knight, *The United Nations and Arms Embargoes Verification* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1998).

² Ian Anthony, “Improving the Cooperation of Major Arms Suppliers” (paper presented at the First Expert Seminar “Smart Sanctions, The Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions,” Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, 21-23 November 1999), 3.

³ Somalia, Liberia (until 2001, when other sanctions were added), Rwanda, Yugoslavia (1998), and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

⁴ Michael Brzoska, “Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes,” in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

⁵ Margaret Coker, “Amid War, Famine, Selling Guns ‘Guarantees My Family Will Be Fed,’” *Atlanta Constitution*, 9 July 2001, 6A.

⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, New York, 15 December 2000, para. 21–23.

⁷ See United Nations Security Council, *Final Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)*, S/1998/1096, New York, 18 November 1998.

⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2001/357, New York, 12 April 2001, paras. 109–25, 173–83.

⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2001/357, para. 175.

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2001/357, para. 224.

¹¹ United Nations Security Council, *Addendum to the Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2001/363, New York, 11 April 2001, para. 33.

¹² United Nations Security Council, *Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions*, S/2000/1225, New York, 21 December 2000, para. 19.

¹³ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, para 19.

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, paras. 20–28.

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, para. 237.

¹⁶ “Peace in the Horn of Africa,” editorial, *New York Times*, 12 December 2000, A32.

¹⁷ Jane Perlez, “U.S. Did Little to Deter Build-up as Ethiopia and Eritrea Prepared for War,” *New York Times*, 22 May 2000, A9.

¹⁸ Perlez, “U.S. Did Little to Deter Build-up.”

¹⁹ “Peace in the Horn of Africa,” A32.

²⁰ John Prendergast, *Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 1999), 2.

²¹ John Prendergast, *Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa*, 2.

²² Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, *Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Africa Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 25 May 1999.

²³ Barbara Crossette, “Arms Embargo Ordered for Eritrea and Ethiopia,” *New York Times*, 19 May 2000, A3.

²⁴ A Ukrainian cargo plane carrying thirty tons of weapons to Ethiopia and Eritrea was seized in Bulgaria in April 2001. See Colum Lynch, “Ukraine Firm Denies Seized Arms Were Headed for Eritrea in Violation of Ban,” *Washington Post*, 14 May 2001, A16.

²⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2001/14, New York, 15 May 2001.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2001/14.

²⁷ “Some Leery of Plan to Lift Ban on Arms in Africa Horn,” *New York Times*, 8 January 2001, A6.

²⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 26 February 1999 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/1999/216, New York, 4 March 1999, para. 11.

²⁹ Brzoska, “Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes,” 197, citing Chris Smith and Domitilla Sagramoso, “Small Arms Trafficking May Export Albania’s Anarchy,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 11, no. 1 (1997), 27.

³⁰ The best accounts of the humanitarian impacts of the sanctions on Iraq remain Richard Garfield, *Morbidity and Mortality among Iraqi Children from 1990 to 1998: Assessing the Impact of Economic Sanctions* (occasional paper series 16:OP:3, paper commissioned by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, and the Fourth Freedom Forum, March 1999); and Mohamed M. Ali and Iqbal H. Shah, “Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq,” *Lancet* 355 (May 2000) 1837-57.

³¹ Meghan O'Sullivan, *Iraq, Time for a Modified Approach*, Policy Brief 71 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, February 2001), 4.

³² U.S. Department of State, *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1998* (Washington, D.C.: April 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/wmeat98/table1.pdf> (31 July 2001).

³³ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2001), 79 <<http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/milexpenditurearmstransfer.pdf>> (7 August 2001).

³⁴ Anthony Cordesman, "The Iraq Crisis: Background Data," background paper (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), 15.

³⁵ Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, *Statement to the Committee on the Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives*, 106th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C., 15 March 2000.

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity; The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War* 13, no. 3 (July 2001), 8, <<http://www.hrw.org>> (28 September 2001).

³⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions*, S/2000/1225, para. 112. See also United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203, New York, 10 March 2000, paras. 163–167.

³⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, para. 22.

³⁹ The success of this program was diminished in the eyes of some observers after civilian missionaries were killed in April 2001 when a Peruvian air force plane mistakenly shot down their plane during a drug interdiction mission. The investigation of the incident revealed that, more than any other factor, language barriers between U.S. and Peruvian pilots were responsible for the missionary plane being wrongly identified and shot down. See "Report Issued in Plane's Downing; Lax Procedures are Cited in Peru Shoot-Down," *Washington Post*, 3 August 2001, A2.

⁴⁰ Cited in Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, "Arms Brokering Emerges from the Cold War," and "Flying the Company 'Flags of Convenience,'" in *The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents*, research report 99.3 (London: British American Security Information Council, November 1999), <<http://www.basicint.org>> (28 September 2001).

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, paras. 255–56.

⁴² United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203, para. 15.

⁴³ United Nations Security Council, *Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2001/966, New York, 12 October 2001, para. 97.

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions*, S/2000/1225, paras. 120–44.

⁴⁵ Craig Nelson and Philip Sherwell, “New Address but Business as Usual for Africa’s ‘Merchant of Death,’” *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 22 July 2001, 29.

⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2001/966, para. 128.

⁴⁷ Andrew Parker, “Britain Tells UAE to Close Arms Dealer’s Freight Business,” *Financial Times*, 24 January 2001, 14.

⁴⁸ Nelson and Sherwell, “New Address but Business as Usual.”

⁴⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 231.

⁵⁰ *SIPRI Yearbook 2000*, 339.

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2001* (New York: 2000), 153.

⁵² Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2001*, 153.

⁵³ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2001*, 161.

⁵⁴ Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Oxford University Press, 1996), 246.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity*, 8.

⁵⁶ Brzoska, “Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes.”

⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2001*, 159.

⁵⁸ Peter Finn, “With Pain and Hope, Bulgaria Curbs Weapons Trade,” *Washington Post*, 8 July 2001, A19.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2001*, 159.

⁶⁰ Anthony, “Improving the Cooperation of Major Arms Suppliers.” See also the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute export control project, Ian Anthony, project leader, <<http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/expcon.htm>> (28 September 2001).

⁶¹ “Arms Export Controls,” *Times* (London), 25 June 2001.

⁶² Kathleen Miller and Caroline Brooks, *Export Controls in the Framework Agreement Countries*, BASIC Research Report, 2001.1 British-American Security Information Council, July 2001), 7, <<http://www.basicint.org>> (28 September 2001).

⁶³ “ECOWAS Leaders Extend the Moratorium on Light Weapons,” press release no. 63/2001, Lusaka, 6 July 2001 <<http://www.ecowas.int/sitecedea0/english/pub-4-63-2001.htm>> (28 September 2001).

⁶⁴ Edward C. Luck, “Choosing Words Carefully: Arms Embargoes and the UN Security Council” (paper presented at the First Expert Seminar, “Smart Sanctions, The Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions,” Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, 21-23 November 1999), 4.

⁶⁵ Brzoska, “Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes.”

⁶⁶ Michael Brzoska, ed. *Design and Implementation of the Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the ‘Bonn-Berlin Process’*, (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2001).

⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2001*, 158.

⁶⁸ Loretta Bondi, “Arms Embargoes: In Name Only?” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions*.

⁶⁹ We thank Jeremy Carver of Clifford Chance in London for this helpful insight.

⁷⁰ Interview with Joost Hiltermann by David Cortright, George Lopez, and Linda Gerber, Washington, D.C., 11 June 2001.

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2001*, 151-52.